So it Began.....Their Finest Hour

THURSDAY SEPTEMBER 12th 1940
WEATHER:
Cloud cover could be expected in all areas and showers turning to rain for most of the country. Low cloud would persist over the Channel areas and most of the south coast could expect showers that could be heavy at times.
OPERATIONS:
The morning period is virtually a non-event as far as combat action is concerned. Radar reports that a number of lone aircraft are detected well offshore both over the Channel and the North Sea. Fighter Command decide to leave these aircraft well alone as they are probably reconnaissence patrols and not doing any harm and that valuable fighters should not be placed at risk even to lone aircraft.
By midday, a few small formations are detected, some of these break up into individual raids sometimes consisting only of one or two aircraft. In 10 Group, Warmwell despatches just one section of 152 Squadron (Spitfires) to intercept a sighting out from Swanage, the bandit is recognised a a lone Ju88 but it makes full use of the low cloud and disappears.
Shortly after, another enemy sighting is made and 238 Squadron at St Eval (Hurricanes) are scrambled. The squadron records show that one Ju88 is destroyed and another had been damaged.
605 Squadron (Hurricanes) stationed in the north at Drem also claim one enemy aircraft destroyed, possibly a reconnaissence aircraft that had ventured too close to the coast. 213 Squadron Exeter (Hurricanes) and 602 Squadron Westhampnett (Spitfires) both claim to have damaged at least one enemy aircraft in spasmodic and isolated actions. Looking at these figures, it can be seen that the Luftwaffe at this time was keeping well clear of London and all these isolated incidents took place either in the west country or up north in Scotland.
One unfortunate incident that happened was with Wing Commander J.S.Dewar who was commander of the airfield at Exeter. Taking advantage of the lull in combat activity, he was to fly over to Tangmere to visit friends there. He never arrived and it seems obvious that his Hurricane had been shot down after he had encountered some enemy aircraft and he decided to bale out. On the way down he was straffed by German plane or planes and shot to pieces as he dangled helplessly underneath his descending parachute.
The bombers of III/KG51 and I/KG54 did not attack London until late in the evening, and even then was on a far reduced scale than on previous occasions. The night bombers on previous attacks often numbered between two and three hundred, but this time barely fifty made the dismal trek across the Channel in rather murkey conditions. No serious damage was done, although bombs fell in the commercial area of Aldgate, Mansion House and Holborn, but the most serious threat was a H.E. delayed action bomb which fell just to the north of St Pauls Cathedral. It buried itself some thirty feet into the ground and the two officer who defused the bomb, Lieutenant R.Davies and Sapper J. Wylie of the Royal Engineers became the first military personel to receive the George Cross for their actions.
Other spasmodic and isolated raids occurred at Hull in Yorkshire, an area north of Wolverhampton, Liverpool and a number of small ports along the east coast of Suffolk and Essex.

CASUALTIES:
Time not known: Over Channel. Hurricane V7306. 213 Squadron Exeter
W/C/J.S.Dewar killed. (Circumstances not known. Body washed ashore at Kingston Gorse Sussex 30.9.40)
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FRIDAY SEPTEMBER 13th 1940
WEATHER:
No sign in an improvement in the weather, and it was expected to remain unsettled with rain periods in all areas. In areas in the south and east there was a possiblity that there could be breaks in the cloud to give sunny periods. Over the Channel, the heavy cloud and rain should give way to lighter higher cloud during the day.
OPERATIONS:
Many of the German commanders are pushing for an exact date for 'Operation Sealion' to commence. Already the weather seems to be closing in and with these deteriorating conditions it appears that any chance of a successfull invasion may be out of the question if Hitler cannot make up his mind. Already, the date previously set for September 11th had been postponed, and Hitler had said that he favoured September 24th at the most likely date, but if conditions continued as they are, it would be an impossiblility for the barges to cross the Channel should the expected winds that are prevalent at this time of the year accompany the heavy cloud and rain squalls.
A meeting had been called in Berlin to commence at lunchtime, and as was usual a banquet was organised prior to the serious meeting between Hitler, Göring, Milch, Kesselring and Jodl being the most notable commanders in attendance. The Führer outlined the present situation. He made mention of the fact that the Luftwaffe still had not yet attained air superiority over the Royal Air Force, which was a rather hypocritical statement being as he had ordered Göring to concentrate his attacks on London earlier in September at the expense of continuing the raids on RAF airfields. He also made mention that more and more barges were being unloaded along the Dutch and Belgian coasts in readines. Soon, he said, we will be moving our armies to these northern ports, armies of specially trained men, all will be ready. But, he stated, our bombers have justly tore the heart out of the British populace. London is a city burning night after night and the British air force is still terribly weak and we can continue to hit the British where it so terribly hurts.......at their beloved capital.

The Führer spoke at length on the bombing of London, and only outlined to preparations of any forthcoming invasion and the commanders started to think that Adolph Hitler was now more concerned with the total destruction of London and that they were beginning to think that their leader was having second thoughts about any invasion of England. By the time that the meeting was over, all that the commanders had learnt was the thoughts that were coming out of the mind of the Führer, there were no fresh orders, he failed to ask for any reports on the current situation.
In Britain, the radar operators lay in wait for the tell tale blips that would indicate enemy intrusion across the Channel. Pilots sat around waiting for the telephone to ring, but it was the same story of the last few days. A small piece of action occurred high over Hornchurch and Biggin Hill, but these were recognised as weather reconnaissence aircraft when the British "Y" Service picked up their conversations. No action was taken against these aircraft and Fighter Command allowed them to return back across the Channel without any interception.
A Focke-Wolfe 200 is detected over Northern Ireland, the first time that the enemy has penetrated this area and proof that Ireland is not free of the war situation. The aircraft managed to drop bombs on the steamship 'Longfort' just off the coast at Belfast and also submitted an unidentified vessel to gunfire but there were no reports of damage. [1]

For both sides, there were further tactical developments within this period. Now that the Luftwaffe had decided to abort any serious attacks on Fighter Command airfields and turned its attention on inland targets as well as London, Park had more time to assess the situation and gave them greater time to intecept the enemy. Keith Park had also sent out the instruction that squadrons should as far as possible work in pairs. The original order of this instruction went out as early as September 5th.
On the other hand, Kesselring's views on this move by Fighter Command was that he agreed that Park's order was actually working. Not only that, Fighter Command was a much stronger organisation than the tattered remnants of a defeated defence as German sources had earlier imagined. Because of this, formation leaders had now been given the instruction, that should they meet up with what they would consider stiff opposition, they may decide and order the formation to disengage. This oder was given by the German High Command.
Again, as on the day previous, air activities were hampered by bad weather, and the Luftwaffe took advantage of this by sending single aircraft deeper into Britain than they had done during other daylight attacks on the enemy. The Air Ministry buildings at Harrowgate were attacked, so was an alluminium factory at Banbury in Oxfordshire. The large railway junction just outside Reading had been bombed the previous day causing disruptions on the Great Western line, and as previously mentioned, the first raids on Northern Ireland had occurred. [2]
Small raids did occur during the morning period when two German bombers flying single missions towards London and coming from different directions penetrated the defences and dropped a small number of bombs which fell on Whitehall and a part of Downing Street while the other aircraft dropped bombs on the Chelsea Hospital and another fell in the grounds of Buckingham Palace, the third time the Royal Palace had been attacked and this time damaged had been sustained to the Royal Chapel.
1200hrs: Keith Park at 11 Group Headquarters had been alerted from a message that originated from the Radio Interception Unit that German weather reconnaissence aircraft had radioed back to their bases that there was seven tenths cloud at 1,500 metres and stated that attacks could be made possible between 1,500 and 2,500 metres. The assessment that Park made, was that under the circumstances, he believed that the Luftwaffe would make spasmodic raids and have the advantage of using the cloud as a cover. He alerted the commanders of selected airfields to place at least one squadron at readiness.
1330hrs: A number of squadron had been scrambled after reports came through that radar had picked up enemy aircraft, and that the general direction was London. Using the cloud to their advantage, it was difficult for the Observer Corps to keep track, but it did appear that the target were either Biggin Hill, Kenley or Croydon. One of the squadrons scrambled was 501 Squadron Kenley (Hurricanes) who intercepted a small force of He111 bombers and attacked. Most decided to abort but not before one of the Heinkels was shot down.
At the same time, another small raid was centred on Tangmere. One enemy bomber was shot down by 609 Squadron Warmwell (Spitfires). Again, the raid was aborted and no damage was sustained on Tangmere aerodrome.
It had not been a good day for the Luftwaffe. Although only a small number of aircraft were destroyed, there ws no real reason that, under the circumstances they need not have made any missions at all. The first aircraft lost was at 0330hrs while on a raind on South Wales that a He111 hit the cables of a barrage ballon and crashed in the town of Newport. A He111 of 2/KG1 was badly damaged during an operational mission over England that it crashed on landing back at its home airfield. Another He111 crashed on German soil after a bombing mission, due to serious damage cause by AA gunfire and from an attack made by a British fighter. One of the Ju88s that attempted to attack Tangmere was badly damaged and crashed into the ground on landing at its home base. As well as these aircraft destroyed and two others that crashed on English soil, twenty German aircrew were killed. The only British casualty during the German attacks was one of the Hurricanes of 501 Squadron, and then, the pilot Sgt J.H.Lacey baled out and was unhurt.

CASUALTIES:
0700hrs: Norwegian Coast. Blenheim L5491. 248 Squadron Sumburgh
Sgt W.J.Garfield Listed as missing.
Sgt A.Kay. Listed as missing.
Sgt B.W.Messner. Listed as missing. (Failed to return from reconnaissence flight over Norwegian coast)
Night Sortie: Calais. Blenheim Z5721. F.I.U. Shoreham (Time not known)
F/L R.G.Ker-Ramsey. Taken PoW.
W/O E.L.Byrne. Taken PoW.
W/O G.Dixon. Taken PoW. (Baled out near Calais. Exact circumstances are not known)
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SATURDAY SEPTEMBER 14th 1940
WEATHER:
Again no sign in an improvement in the weather, and it was expected to remain unsettled with rain periods and a chance of thunderstorms in all areas. Over the Channel, the heavy cloud and rain should give way to lighter higher cloud during the day, but the chance of showers should persist.
OPERATIONS:
Keith Park and Air Chief Marshal Hugh Dowding confer (by telephone as there is no record of any meeting between them on this day) and they discuss the constant postponements of the intended invasion by Germany. Park again points out that he could not understand why the switch to bombing London was made when the situation at the time was a critical one for Fighter Command, and there was every chance that the Luftwaffe could have finished off with the continued bombing of the airfields. The only thing standing in the way between Germany and the invasion was Fighter Command, now, Fighter Command was almost back to full operational strength and Göring would have to start all over again if he wants to destroy the Command. Dowding mentions, that the bombing of London was his biggest mistake, and one that could cost him the war.

By mid-September the Germans had assembled about 1,000 assorted invasion craft in the Channel ports, with some 600 more in the Scheldt. RAF bombing crippled about 12 per cent of this armada; what remained was still sufficient for the first stage of invasion as planned, but the combination of the bombing, and a sharp riposte by Fighter Command to a renewed attempt at a daylight attack on London on September 9, forced Hitler to yet another postponement of SEALION. It was deferred until the 24th, which meant that a final decision should have been made on September 14 (ten days’ notice was the German Navy’s very reasonable stipulation). With Hider, however, nothing was ever normal; the decision he actually took on that day was to bring forward SEALION to the 17th. He had been misled again by Goering, himself in turn misled by the Luftwaffe’s faulty Intelligence.
It was not so much the evidence that was at fault — rather the ability to interpret it correctly. The 9th had shown that Fighter Command was still very much a force to be reckoned with; the 11th & 14th, however, spoke with equivocal voices. On each of these days Fighter Command and Luftwaffe losses were equal, though this was not appreciated by the Air Ministry at the time. On the 14th, particularly, to the Luftwaffe the opposition appeared scrappy and uncoordinated, and they felt that during the last few days Fighter Command had begun to collapse. This news was, of course, conveyed to the Reichsmarschall, and via the situation reports to Hitler. Both felt that the hour of destiny was approaching.

John Terraine The Right of the Line Hodder & Stoughton 1985 p210
In Berlin, Hitler called a rush conference ordering all his naval, air force and army commanders-in-chiefs to attend. This time, he made little mention on the bombing of London of the last seven days. Instead, he presented to them his plans for the all-out invasion of Britain. At last, Operation Sealion looked as though it was all systems go. The Führer was excited and full of eagerness, but nothing was said that was not already known.....except the exact date of any planned invasion.
Hitler pointed out that the naval preparations for "Operation Sealion" was now almost complete. "All our barges are now in place, and we have more held in reserve along river banks," he said which was borne out by one of the British Observer Groups which had the day previous seen up to ten large enemy transport ships town a number of barges from Calais to Cape Griz Nez. Spitfires of the PRU had also flown over the belgian and Dutch coasts and had also reported and photographed the collection of barges. But there again, based on the PRU intelligence, Bomber Command had bombed many of the barge installations at an average of every second night, so what ws Hitler trying to pull when he said that "All our barges are in place." Maybe he forgot to add that at least one third of them were submerged at their moorings.
"If we plan now," he went on, ".....the invasion date can be set for one week from now, given that we need five days of good weather to achieve the desired results." But then, haven't we heard that before, from Hermann Göring just prior to Adler Tag in early August. "All I need," he said, "....was five days preparation and we will be ready for the day of the Eagle."
Hitler then went on to state that in the preparation we must make sure that the Luftwaffe has complete air superiority over the Channel and over southern England. But again, a remark that had been heard before, when issuing the order to Göring prior to Adler Tag, "Before any invasion can be mounted against England, we must first destroy the RAF both in the air and on the ground." This was the whole concept of the task given to Göring, to eliminate the British Royal Air Force.
Finally, the on again, off again "Operation Sealion" was at last given as September 17th, which again, if we want to be critical, should have been September 19th if Hitler estimated that it would take five days of preparation. Orders were given for a full scale attack to be made prior to the lead up of the invasion, and again this was placed in the hands of Hermann Göring. An alternative date, as was mentioned earlier by the Führer could be given as September 27th. But is does seem that there was a chain of misleading eventsas shown above from the work by John Terraine.
1200hrs: The Germans do what they could in an attemp to jam the British radar with electronic interference. A few aircraft managed to cross the Channel on weather reconnaissence missions. One or two raiders bombed some of the coastal resorts in the vicinity of Eastbourne and Brighton where some sixty civillians were either killed our seriously hurt. A small formation was detected over Selsey Bill and one German aircraft is reported to have been shot down. Others probed the areas of South London and bombs fell on residential areas of Croydon and Mitcham killing over fifty people.
1515hrs: German raiders were detected corssing the coast at both the Thames Estuary and in the Deal and Folkestone areas. Bf109s escorting Do17s, He111 and Ju88 bombers. The enemy strength did not exceed 100 in both areas and a mini aerial combat session developed within 30 minutes.
1545hrs: Again, as was becoming a common occurence, people along the coastal stretches from Folkestone, round 'Hell Corner' to Margate saw the twisting and snaking black dots against the grey overcast with many cheered if they recognised a German plane spiral down into the sea.
Park had reshuffled a number of his squadrons during the lull of the last few days so that Hurricanes and Spitfires could work in pairs. With most of the German raids following a similar pattern whenever crossing the Channel on a bombing mission, Park was now better prepared than ever for any raid coming in from the Thames Estuary or over the Channel between Dungeness and Ramsgate. This, coupled with the fact that most aerodromes had now been repaired and were 95% operational, radar stations were all back to normal, and all telephone lines connecting the radar stations, Observer Corps, Fighter Command HQ and 11 Group HQ were all repaired and functioning properly.
Vectored to the Thames Estuary were 41 Squadron Hornchurch (Spitfires), 66 Squadron Gravesend (Spitfires), 73 Squadron Debden (Hurricanes), 222 Squadron Hornchurch (Spitfires), 504 Squadron Hendon (Hurricanes) and 1RCAF Northolt (Hurricanes).
Vectored to the Kent coast near Deal were 72 Squadron Biggin Hill (Spitfires), 92 Squadron Biggin Hill (Spitfires), 229 Squadron Northolt (Hurricanes) and 253 Squadron Kenley (Hurricanes).
1600hrs: Most of the action took place over the Estuary or over north Kent near Maidstone by the time that the British fighters made contact with the enemy. Even though the raids were small by previous standards, it was noticed that there were more Bf109s than usual indicating that the Luftwaffe were trying to draw as many fighters in the air as possible. A number of Do17s were shot down but also quite a few Bf109s also suffered. I/KGr.606 was to suffer most when two Dorniers were classed as write offs, while two others were damaged.
For Fighter Command, 73 Squadron Debden (Huirricanes) was to suffer most after losing three aircraft and four others were damaged but were repairable, but only one pilot was killed. There were casualties amongst other squadrons.
1800hrs: There had been a sighting over Bournmouth just prior to the evening attack, but they turned back before any British fighters could intercept. Now a number of separate raid seemed to be approaching the coast in formations of 10+, 12+, 15+, 20+ and 30+. All aircraft were detected at between 17,000 and 20,000 feet. Many of Fighter Commands squadrons had only been back a short while after the afternoon raids when they were scrambled again. The formations were intercepted just as they crossed the southern coastline and a running battle took place as far as London, but many of the raiders had turned back before their destination had been reached.

CASUALTIES:
1605hrs: Tonbridge. Hurricane P2542. 73 Squadron Debden
Sgt J.J.Brimble killed. (Shot down by enemy aircraft and crashed at Parkhurst Farm Chart Sutton)
1615hrs: Rochford. Spitfire X4275. 222 Squadron Hornchurch
Sgt S.Baxter killed.(Badly damaged by gunfire from Bf109s and crashed attempting to land)
1620hrs: Orsett (Essex). Spitfire R6625. 19 Squadron Duxford
Sgt F.Marek killed. (Crashed during routine patrol. Possibly oxygen failure. No other details)
1800hrs: Bredgar. Hurricane P5184. 253 Squadron Kenley
Sgt W.B.Higgins killed. (Shot down in flames after combat with Bf109. Pilot did not bale out)
2 x Hurricanes of 253 and 610 Squadrons shot down but no details are known except the pilot of the Hurricane of 610 Squadron is listed as missing. The Hurricane of 253 Squadron was shot down near Faversham Kent.
[1] Wood & Dempster The Narrow Margin McGraw-Hill 1961pp347-8
[2] Hough & Richards The Battle of Britain-A Jubilee History Hodder & Stoughton 1989 p272
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http://www.battleofbritain1940.net/0040.html

 

The Airmen's Stories - Sgt. F Marek

Frantisek Marek was born at Ceske Budejovice, Czechoslovakia on 30th April 1913. He was serving with the Czech Air Force when that country was occupied by the Germans. He joined a Czech unit serving with the Polish Air Force and subsequently joined the French Air Force after the fall of Poland.
By June 1940 he was in England and he joined 310 Squadron at Duxford on 6th August. On the 29th August he was attached to 19 Squadron at Fowlmere.
Marek was killed on 14th September 1940 when his Spitfire R6625 came down near Orsett, Essex. The cause was almost certainly a failure of his oxygen supply.
Marek is buried in Eastbrookend Cemetery, Barking, Essex.




http://www.bbm.org.uk/Marek.htm

 

Sunday September 15th 1940
Details of the mornings action

Sunday September 15th 1940, was not only the turning point of the Battle of Britain, it was the turning point of the whole war. Every Fighter Command aerodrome in 11 Group was in some way involved, every squadron within 11 Group participated as well as the Duxford Wing from 12 Group and a number of squadrons in 10 Group were called upon to protect areas in the south west. Ground crews at all 11 Group airfields had to make efficiency a top priority in getting aircraft refueled and rearmed in between sorties, while at 11 Group Headquarters Air Vice Marshal Keith Park busily controlled the situation drawing on all his experience and expertise under the watchful eye of visiting Winston Churchill who saw first hand the development of activities on this important day. Air Chief Marshal Hugh Dowding remained at Fighter Command Headquarters keeping silent vigil over the large map below indicating to him the events and the unfolding battle that was taking place over the south-east of England.
For Adolf Hitler and the German commanders, time was now running out. If an invasion was to take place on September 17th as planned, the lead-up would have to commence no later than today.....September 15th. The weather had shown, just how quickly it can turn at this time of year, and with winter not too far away, the German forces would have to take advantage of the better conditions that now seemed to prevail. Göring had sent out the instructions the day previous to all bomber and fighter bases that preparations for an all out assault on England was to be made on this day September 15th, bomber units were given times and flight paths of their attack. Over the last few weeks, the Luftwaffe had experimented with different flying formations, needless to say, none had really been successful, losses had still been high, but they had discovered that on the occasions that they had kept at high altitudes, they had on a number of occasions surprised Fighter Command.
This was mainly due to the fact that the British radar was ineffective above 20,000 feet, and by flying at a height above this level they could cross the Channel undetected, but, the Germans did not know this. All that they were aware of, was the fact that those formations that flew at higher altitudes were not intercepted until they were usually well over the English coast. The most logical reason for this, thought the Germans was due to the fact that it took the British fighters much longer to gain the required height to intercept.
The sending of advance Ju87 and Bf110 units to bomb the radar stations along the southern coastline was, in the opinion of the Luftwaffe, a waste of time. As fast as they seemed to be destroyed, they were back in operational use again, and mobile units too were brought in to replace any radar station damaged. Over the last few days, the Germans had practiced at electronic jamming, this, they believed was successful and plans were made to intensify the jamming procedure in an effort to further reduce detection.
The spirit of the German aircrew, was still far from high. Time and time again, they had been told that the 'Glorious Luftwaffe' is ready to strike the final blow. But they had been told that in July, and again in August when Adlerangriff had been announced, and it was to be repeated yet again this September 15th. Early in the Battle of Britain, the Luftwaffe aircrews were told that the Royal Air Force would be wiped out in two or three weeks, now, whenever they fly over the British countryside they are still met with masses of British fighters in the hands of pilots that were gaining in skill and techniques. Many firmly believed that they were no nearer victory than they were two months previous.

The "hour of destiny" was September 15th, a date thereafter commemorated as "Battle of Britain Day". The title has been disputed; Alfred Price, for one, says that September 15th "has singularly little to commend it.....the day when the British victory claim was furthest from the truth....." Yet, forgetting the "numbers game", it is hard to dispute Churchill's verdict that it was, in fact, "the crux of the Battle of Britain". He made that judgment in the light of his knowledge of what happened to Operation SEALION - which was, of course, from beginning to end, what the Battle of Britain was really about. The Official History sums up with clarity:
"If 15th August showed the German High Command that air supremacy was not to be won within a brief space, 15th September went far to convince them that it would not be won at all."

John Terraine The Right of the Line Hodder & Stoughton 1985 pp210-211
In Britain, things were slightly different. Most of the pilots were relatively fresh unlike their German counterparts. Combat action had been very infrequent, with only one really heavy day. As mentioned previously, Fighter Command was now stronger than it had been for weeks, aerodromes repaired, planes and personnel had replaced many that had been shot down and the radar stations were all functioning at 100%.
Park meanwhile, was prepared. He had learnt just a few days previous that there was to be a large scale attack prior to the impending invasion, only that he was unsure as to the exact date or time. Whatever attack that the Germans planned, he was sure, that 11 Group was ready even though the Luftwaffe commanders could not agree as to the actual strength of Fighter Command at the time.

Failure to achieve any notable success, constantly changing orders betraying lack of purpose and obvious misjudgment of the situation by the Command, and unjustified accusation had a most demoralising effect on us fighter pilots, who were already overtaxed by physical and mental strain.
Adolph Galland Commander

I think one of the problems with German intelligence was, was that it simply did not help the Germans to fight the battle, partly because of the problems we've mentioned with their inability to tell the truth even when they knew it, but the results of this can be seen only in September when there is a conference for senior German commanders attended by Göring himself, and Bepo Schmidt. And you have the commander of one Luftwaffe unit giving his opinion that there are at least one thousand RAF fighters left in Fighter Command, and the commander of another Luftwaffe unit giving his opinion that Fighter Command is beaten.
So the degree of confusion in the German High Command as to what was actually happening is quite obvious whereas the British, at least they knew what they were trying to achieve. The British had a slightly simpler problem. Their main objective was survival. Both intelligence organizations seriously overestimated the number of enemy aircraft they shot down, the Germans by a factor of between three and four. The British right towards the end of the battle did get slightly puzzled by the fact that they could only find the wreckage of some eight hundred aircraft whereas the numbers claimed were far in excess of that. Instead of drawing the correct conclusion which was that the fighter pilots for quite understandable reasons were over claiming the number of enemy aircraft lost.
They tried to work out where the missing, in inverted commas, aircraft might be, and that is to why did they crash in France or in the English channel or wherever. They didn’t correctly identify the problem which was that a German aircraft shot down was often claimed by more than one pilot in the confusion of the air fighting.

Sebastian Cox Air Historical Branch regarding the Battle of Britain
To survive any intense attack that may be instigated by the Luftwaffe, Keith Park had, in the last few days rearranged some of his squadrons, carefully placing them in the best strategic position to provide the best defence of London that he possibly could. Of course, we must remember, that the pilots of Fighter Command had no idea of any large scale attack being made by the Luftwaffe. This information was only known by a selected few in radio interception (the "Y" Force) and the Air Ministry and of course, Dowding and Park himself. To the pilots, any change they thought was the usual relieving of tired squadrons.
[ Document 52. ] September 15th Order of Battle
It was not long after breakfast that Keith Park new that today was to different from all others, for the first time in a week, he had been notified that there was a build up of German formations along the enemy coast. 'This, I think is what we have been waiting for' he said, ' I think that it is about to happen.'

WEATHER:
Heavy cloud and rain periods overnight was expected to clear and the forecast for the day was fine in most areas with patchy cloud. No rain was forecast but some areas could expect an odd shower to develop. The cloud was expected to clear during the afternoon giving way to a fine and clear evening.
OPERATIONS IN DETAIL:
0900hrs: Unaware of what was about to unfold within Fighter Command, the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and his wife decided that he would call upon Air Vice Marshal Keith Park at 11 Group Headquarters at Uxbridge.

During the morning of 15 September Park received a visit from Churchill, accompanied by his wife and one of his private secretaries. He had no wish to disturb anyone, he said, but as he happened to be passing, he thought he would call in to see if anything was up. If not, ‘I’ll just sit in the car and do my homework.’ Naturally, Park welcomed the Prime Minister and his companions and escorted them down to the bomb-proof operations room, fifty feet below ground level. Churchill sensed that something important might happen that day. (Park’s wife had the same sense: when he apologized at breakfast for forgetting that 15 September was her birthday, she replied that a good bag of German aircraft would be an excellent present.)
Once they were in the operations room, Park tactfully explained to Churchill — not for the first time — that the air conditioning could not cope with cigar smoke. As the day’s dramatic events unfolded, the Prime Minister was therefore obliged to observe them with no better consolation than a dead cigar between his teeth. He had met Park several times and regarded him highly, recognizing (as he wrote after the war) that his was the group:
on which our fate largely depended. From the beginning of Dunkirk all the daylight actions in the South of England had already been conducted by him, and all his arrangements and apparatus had been brought to the highest perfection.

Vincent Orange Sir Keith Park Methuen 1984 pp109-110

Keith Park took his visitors to the operations room, and as he began to explain some of the complexities of the operations, a radar report had come through that a number of enemy aircraft had been detected building up in the vicinity of Dieppe, another smaller formation had been detected over the the Channel off the coast near Dover. Park told the Prime Minister that he was lucky because it looked like that he could witness the activities of operations because a couple of German formations had been spotted. Winston Churchill replied that he would let the C-in-C carry on with his job and that he would just sit and watch.
The C-in-C called up some of his station commanders, mainly at Biggin Hill, Kenley and Hornchurch and ordered that they each place a couple of squadrons on 'Stand By' *. All eyes were concentrated on the large map table below. The smaller formation seemed content on staying out of reach in the centre of the Channel and made no move towards the English coastline. "Feelers," said Keith Park, "no doubt trying to entice our squadrons into the air." He knew that there was something strange about this morning. A small formation, possibly Bf109s flying parallel to the coast while a larger formation was gathering behind them. These tactics had not been employed since they used to make attacks on his airfields.
The markers indicating the position of the enemy force near Dieppe on the map table were now pushed into a position near the centre of the Channel, their strength was forty plus, and he now noticed that another marker had been placed slightly behind and to the left of the first marker. This also read forty plus but for both markers, there was no height reading. Another call to his station commanders, and more squadrons were to be placed on 'Stand By' * while others were placed at 'Readiness' ** Should the detected formation decide to abort or pose no further threat the order of "Stand Down" *** would be given to any, or all squadrons. [1]
* "Standby" (pilots strapped into their aircraft with all connections intact ready for immediate take off.)
** "Readiness" (pilots should be prepared to take off with five minutes.)
*** "Stand Down" (pilots to ignore previous order and await further orders)
0930hrs: The two formations had spread themselves out and were detected near the coasts off Dover, Harwich and in the Thames Estuary. Squadrons were dispatched from Hornchurch, Gravesend and Croydon. But most of the German formations were ordered to turn back. The Fighter Command squadrons were recalled. The only other activity was just off the Devon coast were a lone reconnaissance aircraft was detected and a flight from 87 Squadron Exeter (Hurricanes) was "Scrambled". It turned out to be a He111 on weather reconnaissance and was shot down by P/O D.T.Jay.
1030hrs: New formations were detected positioned between the towns of Calais and Boulogne. The markers on the map table at 11 Group HQ indicated that the enemy strength was 100 plus, but within moments, another marker was placed just behind the first and indicated 150 plus. It appeared that the German formations were in no great hurry and were forming up very slowly, this worked to the advantage of Keith Park as it gave him the chance to organize his defence forces. "This, Mr. Prime Minister looks like the big one." said Park, eyes glued to the map. The C-in-C gave a few orders then asked for someone to get Observer Corps HQ on the telephone, then he ordered his assistants with him to get the various sector station controllers "on the blower" with the order for all squadrons to, "Stand By". During a lull in Parks orders, Winston Churchill, standing beside him said quietly, "There appear to be many aircraft coming in." Keith Park answered in the same low tone "And we are ready for them.......there'll be someone there to meet them."
1100hrs: The picture now of this morning attack was clearer. There was at least 200 plus bombers and an unknown number of Bf109 and Bf110 escorts just off the coast near Calais. They were flying in a nor' nor' west direction and in a straight line this would allow them to cross the English coast in the vicinity of Dungeness. The expected time over the English coast would be between 1145 and 1200hrs if they were carrying heavy bomb loads, which it was expected they were.




Park was expecting a heavy engagement, but the map showed no other detection of enemy aircraft, just this one coming towards Dungeness, and this was big enough. He asked his assistants to get the sector controllers on the phone again and in the next thirty minutes, the following squadrons were scrambled:


1105hrs 72 Squadron Biggin Hill Spitfires 1105hrs 92 Squadron Biggin Hill Spitfires 1115hrs 229 Squadron Northolt Hurricanes 1115hrs 303 Squadron Northolt Hurricanes 1115hrs 253 Squadron Kenley Hurricanes 1115hrs 501 Squadron Kenley Hurricanes 1115hrs 17 Squadron Debden Hurricanes 1115hrs 73 Squadron Debden Hurricanes 1120hrs 504 Squadron Hendon Hurricanes 1120hrs 257 Squadron Martlesham Hurricanes 1120hrs 603 Squadron Hornchurch Spitfires 1120hrs 609 Squadron Warmwell Spitfires
1130hrs: Just as the first Fighter Command squadrons approached the southern coast of Kent, the leaders of the German formation still had a few miles to go before they crossed the tall cliffs of the British coastline. The enemy bombers consisted of practically the whole of 1/KG76 flying Dornier Do17s, these had met up with the Do17s of 111/KG76 and KG3 behind Calais and now the combined force, escorted by Bf109 escorts formed a vast armada almost two miles wide crossing the coast. All the enemy aircraft were thought to have departed from bases in the Brussels and Antwerp areas. The heights of the enemy formations were between 15,000 and 26,000 feet and the Observer Corps reported that they were crossing the coast just north of Dungeness, to the south of Dover and at Ramsgate.
The bombers came across the coastline in a number of vic formations, some of these consisted of three aircraft, some in five while others were in vics of seven, but as they crossed the tall cliffs they looked something like a giant herringbone. The bombers, which consisted of Dorniers, Heinkels and Junkers were escorted by Bf110 aircraft flying in close support while the Bf109s flew top cover high above the bombers.
Keith Park reckoned that the advance squadrons should make the initial interception and slow the advancing formation down. He knew that it would be asking too much to turn such a large force around and it would be obvious that these squadrons would have to be replaced as fuel and ammunition became low. The relieving squadrons then would leave London defenseless so Park decided to bring in the 'Duxford Wing' from 12 Group and wanted to vector them to be over London just prior to the estimated ETA of the enemy formation should they manage to get through.
In the next fifteen minutes, the following squadrons were scrambled:



1140hrs 41 Squadron Hornchurch Spitfires 1135hrs 242 Squadron Duxford Hurricanes 1135hrs 302 Squadron Duxford Hurricanes 1135hrs 310 Squadron Duxford Hurricanes 1135hrs 19 Squadron Duxford Spitfires 1135hrs 611 Squadron Digby Spitfires 1135hrs 249 Squadron North Weald Hurricanes 1135hrs 46 Squadron Stapleford Hurricanes 1140hrs 1(RCAF) Squadron Northolt Hurricanes 1140hrs 605 Squadron Croydon Hurricanes 1142hrs 66 Squadron Gravesend Spitfires


1200hrs: The German formation was making slow progress and 72 Squadron Biggin Hill (Spitfires) and 92 Squadron Biggin Hill (Spitfires) were vectored to intercept the enemy between Maidstone and Ashford. Some of the other squadrons that had been vectored further south were now re-vectored. These included the Hurricanes of 253 Squadron Kenley and 501 Squadron Kenley, with the Spitfires of 66 Squadron Gravesend, 603 Squadron Hornchurch and 609 Squadron Warmwell and within minutes reinforced 72 and 92 Squadrons. Soon after the initial interception, 229 Squadron Northolt (Hurricanes) and 303 Squadron Northolt (Hurricanes) met the raiders between Rochester and South London while 17 Squadron Debden and 73 Squadron Debden (Hurricanes) met the bombers over Maidstone. Fighter Command had eleven squadrons engaging the German armada. The heavy bomber formation was still stepped between 15,000 and 25,000 feet with a massive Bf109 fighter escort above and slightly to the rear of the main formation.
The combat action was exceptionally heavy, and most of the defending British fighters managed to keep the Messerschmitt escorts from providing the cover for the bombers. The using of paired squadrons as requested by Keith Park was working. The Spitfires harassed the Bf109s, criss-crossing them at every opportunity, and one by one they were sent spiraling towards earth trailing plumes of smoke. The Bf109s tried to continue to escort the bombers who now were being attacked by the Hurricane squadrons. The British fighter pilots were slowly breaking up the formation with a steady application of force causing the bombers to straggle out of formation. [2]


From the time that we had been over Maidstone until reaching the outskirts of London, we had been under extreme pressure. The British fighters had been with us since we had first crossed the English coast and had gathered in intensity all the time. Our escort had been doing a grand job with the Spitfires at keeping them away from us, and we thought that should things remain like this, then this bombing run would be made easy.
We saw the Hurricanes coming towards us and it seemed that the whole of the RAF was there, we had never seen so many British fighters coming at us at once. I saw a couple of our comrades go down, and we got hit once but it did no great damage. All around us were dogfights as the fighters went after each other, then as we were getting ready for our approach to the target, we saw what must have been a hundred RAF fighters coming at us. We thought that this must have been all the RAF planes were up at once, but where were they coming from, as we had been told that the RAF fighters were very close to extinction. We could not keep our present course, we turned to starboard and done all that we could to avoid the fighters and after a while I am sure we had lost our bearings, so we just dropped our bombs and made our retreat.

Luftwaffe Do 17 Front Gunner Hans Zonderlind
The hundreds of Bf109s covered a wide area and they too were having their successes. Two Hurricanes of 229 Squadron were shot down over the Sevenoaks area, with P/O G.Doutrepont aircraft being shot up badly and he was killed as the Hurricane went down and crashed on Staplehurst Railway Station. Another member of the squadron, P/O R.Smith managed to bale out of his bullet riddled aircraft also over Sevenoaks and he suffered severe leg injuries. Over Tunbridge Wells, F/O A.D.Nesbitt of 1 (RCAF) Squadron was swooped on by Bf109s and he baled out as his aircraft spiraled to earth. F/O R.Smither was not so lucky, as he went down with his aircraft also over Tunbridge Wells.

The combat area now covered a wide area, and as the minutes ticked by, the intensity of the battle increased as more fighters of Fighter Command arrived on the scene. 501 Squadron Kenley (Hurricanes) was one of them. They intercepted the enemy over northern Kent and mixed it with both bombers and fighter escort.

‘The bombers were coming in towards London from the south-east and at first we could not tell how many there were. We opened our throttles and started to climb up towards them, aiming for a point well ahead, where we expected to contact them at their own height. As we converged, I saw that there were about twenty of them, and it looked as though it was going to be a nice party, for the other squadrons of Hurricanes and Spitfires also turned to join in. By the time we reached a position near the bombers, we were over London — central London, I should say. We had gained a little height on them, too, so when I gave the order to attack we were able to dive on them from their right.
‘Each of us selected his own target. Our first attack broke them up pretty nicely. The Dornier I attacked with a burst lasting several seconds began to turn to the left away from his friends. I gave him five seconds, and he went away with white smoke streaming behind him. As I broke away and started to make a steep climbing turn, I looked over the side. I recognised the river immediately below me through a hole in the clouds. I saw the bends and the bridges and idly wondered where I was. Then I saw Kennington Oval, and I thought to myself, “That is where they play cricket”.

Squadron Leader J.Sample 501 Squadron September 15th 1940
Squadron Leader John Sample went on to say, that soon after this, he came across another Do17 that had been hit by a Spitfire and a Hurricane who were following closely and was trailing white smoke. Not that one could really get bored up there, but he had nothing else to attack, so he climbed up above the Dornier and then made a diving attack. As the distance between himself and the bomber narrowed, he noticed a red light in the rear-gunners cockpit, but as he got even closer, he saw that he was looking through the whole length of the inside of the Dornier to the pilot and observers cockpit. The red light that he saw, was in fact the red glow of fire. He gave another short burst, and as he turned and went past the aircraft, the inside was nothing but a red hot furnace inside. He then saw it go into a spin after the tail section broke away, followed by the wing sections beyond the engines. The narrow fuselage with short stubbs of wing roots fell though the cloud to oblivion, John never saw it crash.
Another pilot of 504 Squadron, Sergeant R.T.Holmes, decided that he would take on no less than three Dorniers at the same time. The first, after a short burst bellowed smoke, but as he flew past he got a spray of black oil on his windscreen. But that did not deter him from going in on a second Dornier ahead. Another short burst as the Do17 was lined up in his sights, and smoke and flames came from the stricken bomber and it dived away. He then took on a third, but soon afterwards, his Hurricane banked sharply and he lost all control, he started to go into a wild spin. It is not known as to whether he collided with the third Dornier, or was hit by enemy gunfire but he found it difficult to extract himself from the doomed fighter. Suddenly, he managed to free himself and jumped, the parachute breaking his fall just twenty feet or so above the rooftops of some houses in fashionable Chelsea. His backside hit the sloping roof of one of the houses, and he began to slide down the roofless, fall off over the guttering and straight down into the garden below, and into a garbage bin. The Dornier came down about a mile away crashing into the forecourt of Victoria Station, practically demolishing a small tobacconist's shop. [3]
1215hrs: The Bf109s were being held over the northern area of Kent with only a few managing to escape the onslaught by the Spitfires. The bombers which consisted of He111, Do17s and Do215s were being harassed by the Hurricanes, and one by one they began to turn away smoke trailing from engines and desperately trying to evade any further attack by the British fighters. Others dropped their bombs at random. Some of the more courageous tried in vain to make it to their target, riddled with bullets, crewmen either dead or injured at their posts. But more was in store for them as they approached London. Keith Parks timing of requesting the Duxford Wing to cover the airfields of Hornchurch and North Weald was to perfection, as was everything else that was taking place. It seemed that Fighter Command could do no wrong.
As the German bomber formation, with about only one third of its Bf109 escorts, approached the outskirts of London the enemy was in disarray. The Bf109s peeled away one by one, some had sustained damage but most were now low on fuel. With the city now in their sights, they were confronted by the most awesome sight of the four squadrons of the Duxford Wing. Three squadrons of Hurricanes with the two Spitfire squadrons about 5,000 feet higher. As the Duxford Wing closed in, they were joined by 41 Squadron Hornchurch (Spitfires), 46 Squadron North Weald (Hurricanes), 504 Squadron Hendon (Hurricanes) and 609 Squadron Warmwell (Spitfires). The Bombers were confronted by British fighters on all sides, and one of the biggest combat actions ever seen over London developed. Sergeant D. Cox of 19 Squadron wrote in his combat report:


I was Green 3, when we dived to attack some Me109s, which had dived down on us. I did not get my sights on any enemy aircraft. I pulled out and climbing, flew south. After a few minutes I saw six Me109s flying in line astern just above me. They saw me and attacked. I got on the tail of one of the enemy aircraft, but he half rolled away. Four of the enemy aircraft then flew off to the south. I turned to find the other enemy aircraft attacking me head-on. As he passed above me and climbed, I turned, and climbing steeply, came up underneath him and gave him a couple of bursts, stalling as I did so. Next, I saw him in a flat glide, which gradually steepened as he went through some cloud. When I came through the cloud I noticed a fire just beginning below, which I found to be his wreckage. He crashed about five miles east of Crowborough.
Sergeant D.G.S.R.Cox 19 Squadron 1215-30hrs September 15th 1940

Hurricanes came in to deal with the bombers. They did this in an unusual way, head-on in a shallow climb, claiming three of them, and later two 109s.
Others joined in, and in such numbers and with such aggression that it was like gulls mobbing an albatross. Seven more Dorniers were claimed as destroyed before the Duxford Wing, in all its multiple glory, hurling itself into the whirling mêlée. The raid had now entirely broke up over south London, and any idea the bomb-aimers identifying let alone attacking their assigned target had disappeared, like so many of their own kind.

Hough & Richards The Battle of Britain - A Jubilee History Hodder & Stoughton 1989 p276
We turned and crossed beneath them but the squadron got split up. I followed three of our Hurricanes climbing up on the left of the bombers for a head-on attack, lost patience and turned to do a beam attack on the leader......I opened fire with more than full deflection and let the Dornier fly into the bullets like a partridge. I came back and did a short quarter attack. The Do215 then broke away from the formation and I saw the engines were just idling as it glided down. Then about eight of our fighters set on the lame duck at about 3,000 feet below me. On landing I claimed this as a "probably destroyed".
P/O R.G.A (George) Barclay 249 Squadron North Weald on September 15th 1940

Where everything was running in favour of 11 Group, for once, Douglas Bader's 'Duxford Wing' also ran to perfection and in unison. Bader stated later, that being called up with time to spare made all the difference. His squadrons were able to take off as ordered, and the formation collected perfectly over Duxford and 56 fighter aircraft made the steady climb towards their vectored area, and had time to position themselves at the correct height and head towards Gravesend. As they approached the Thames, the Hurricanes stepped between 25,000 and 26,000 feet with 19 and 611 Squadron Spitfires at the rear climbing to 27,000 feet, they could see the little black specks, like a small formation of little ants in the sky. Douglas Bader led his 'wing' in a partial semi-circle allowing them to arrive at Gravesend with the morning sun behind them, and the Germans in front. But it was not until reaching the western boroughs of London did the 'Duxford Wing' manage to engage the enemy.
Perfectly positioned, with the bombers 3,000 feet below them they were about to make their attack, when a formation of Bf109s came out of the sun. Bader immediately ordered the Spitfires of 19 and 611 Squadrons to take on the German fighters, which they did so effectively, scattering them by a surprise attack that they left the bomber formation and flew off to the south-east. While the 'Duxford Wing' were holding, the Hurricanes of 257 Squadron Martlesham and 504 Squadron Hendon (Hurricanes) attacked the German bombers. Bader waited for them to complete their sweep, then instructed his three Hurricane squadrons to fall into line astern and prepare to attack. Bader selected the most westerly of the three enemy formations, while 302 Squadron took on the middle formation while the remaining formation was left to 310 Squadron. [4]


Coming in from astern of the westerly formation in an almost vertical dive, Bader’s leading Red Section went for the last section of three bombers, Neil Campbell for the left-hand bomber, Douglas Bader for the centre one and Dicky Cork for the right-hand machine. The three bombers had lost cohesion when they had turned. Now, the three fighters dived steeply on them. Bader’s first burst caused his targets wing to burst into flame. He flashed past, pulled up and attacked a Dornier ahead, but a Spitfire was in his way and he broke off. Bader fired at a few Dorniers in the mêlée but was not sure if he hit any of them as be had constantly to watch out for other fighters; in front of him, a Spitfire smashed into a Dornier and the pair fell earthwards. There were many Spitfires and Hurricanes and many bombers in the same airspace, trying to get in their own attacks — there was no co-ordination, no sequence, fighters jostling to be first. Either the Germans were outnumbered or the British had committed too many fighters: it depends upon how the ‘Big Wing’ is viewed.
Michael G.Burns Bader-The Man and his Men Arms & Armour 1990 p91
There was not much for the bombers to do, the pressure on them was intense. They would be attacked by a couple of squadrons of RAF fighters, then as soon as they broke off the engagement, another couple of squadrons were ready to pounce at an already decimated enemy force. The bombers began to drop their bomb loads at random hoping that this would lighten their load and they could make as hasty retreat as possible without any further damage to their aircraft. South London was the worst affected, with Lewisham, Lambeth, Camberwell and a couple of the bridges across the River Thames all recording bomb damage. One high explosive bomb fell in the grounds of Buckingham Palace causing slight structural damage to the building but a bigger hole in the lawns at the rear as it failed to explode. A power station in Beckenham was also hit.

The German formations headed out towards the west, turning south near Weybridge. 609 Squadron Warmwell (Spitfires) chased them as they headed for the coast and took on 15 Dornier Do17s, a formation of Bf109s saw the desperate situation that their bombers were in and joined in as did a few Bf110s. Over Ewhurst in Surrey, 605 Squadron Croydon (Hurricanes) came in to assist and as the mêllée continued fierce action over the town of Billingshurst just west of Horsham they were joined by 1(RCAF) Squadron Northolt (Hurricanes) who took on the troublesome Bf109s. In the other direction, some eighty German bombers were trying to make good their escape towards the Thames Estuary. Fighter Command attacked in large numbers with squadrons attacking any of the escorts while others took on the merciless bombers. The first, and the morning battle had been a disaster for the Luftwaffe, many cashed, others blew up in mid-air, while the remainder struggled for the safety of the French coast. [5]
For the Germans, after about ten minutes over London, there was now no such thing as the formation. German bombers were at all levels of altitude and most were scattered over an area fifteen miles wide. To give an example of the intensity of this morning battle, the combat area was approximately 80 miles long by 38 miles wide, and up to six miles high. Total combat actions numbered as many as 200, one third of these were settled within the combat area with one of the aircraft submitting either by being destroyed by his enemy or a disabled aircraft managing to break away and head for safer pastures. The other third was with German aircraft being chased away from the combat area by British fighters and often crashing on English soil or going down into the watery graveyard of the English Channel.
Because of the intensity and aggression shown by the pilots of Fighter Command, the bombers dropped most of their bombs randomly over a wide area. Damage was done, but not as much as was intended by the Luftwaffe commanders. For the Luftwaffe, the raid was doomed to failure the moment that the first formations had crossed the Channel. This time, everything had gone right for Fighter Command and 11 Group. Timing, position and height was all on the side of the RAF. Keith Park and his pilots had won the first round of the day.


1230hrs: As the clocks in Britain showed 12.30pm, the first battle of the day had finished. Most of the German bombers who had intentions of again dropping hundreds of tons of bombs on the city had been fought off by Fighter Command. In scattered areas of Kent and Sussex the odd skirmish still took place as patrolling squadrons observed a few Dorniers and Heinkels desperately trying to make their way back to their bases in northern France and Belgium. The pilots of the Hurricanes and Spitfires showed no mercy. It made no difference whether the bombers were crippled or not, some, which it was obvious that they would never make it back, were shot down, the broken hulks of German aircraft could be seen from the outskirts of London to the Channel coast.
To many Londoners, many were out and about on this fine day in September, and went about their business as usual, the dog- fighting high above being little more than entertainment value.

.
[ Document 50 ] The Daily Telegraph reports
There is no doubt, that again the Luftwaffe were their own worst enemies on this mornings raid. Too many aircraft being dispatched from a rather enclosed area of Calais, the manner in which they organized their formations over the Channel, it was too cumbersome and too slow, and again, Göring did not value the worth that radar had for the British. All the time the enemy bombers and their escorts were forming up, Fighter Command had a birds-eye view of the proceedings that was going on across the Channel. It allowed Keith Park the time he needed to organize his squadrons, paying particular attention to which squadron was to be vectored where. Of course, it also allowed him to call on the 'Duxford Wing' giving them more than the time required to form and be in the right position at the right time when they made their interception.
As battle weary fighter pilots returned from the mornings operations, they were unaware that a second attack by the Luftwaffe would be made early that afternoon. As each squadron landed back at their bases, the normal rearming and refueling procedure was carried out, pilots, after being interviewed by the intelligence officer lay back in the midday sun, to relax, unwind and to share experienced of the morning success. For come, it would be less than an hour before they would be called on again as the next wave of enemy aircraft had been detected.

[1] Vincent Orange Sir Keith Park Methuen 1984 pp109-110
[2] Michael G.Burns Bader- A Man and his Men Arms and Armour 1990 p89
[3] John Frayn Turner Battle of Britain Airlife 1998 p128
[4] Michael G.Burns Bader- A Man and his Men Arms and Armour 1990 p90
[5] John Foreman Fighter Command War Diaries Air Research Publications 1998 pp25-26
http://www.battleofbritain1940.net/0041.html

 

Sunday September 15th 1940 (Afternoon)



This is the date after which I believe Hitler's chances will rapidly dwindle. The weather holds good in a miraculous manner but there are faint premonitory puffs of wind from the South- West and a chill in the air. Dispatches received through Switzerland say that there are the beginnings of a press campaign in Germany breaking the news to the people that England is to be subdued by blockade and bombing. If this is true, Hitler is on the downgrade. I can’t for the life of me puzzle out what the Germans are up to. They have great air power and yet are dissipating it in fruitless and aimless attacks all over England. They must have an exaggerated idea of the damage they are doing and the effects of their raids on public morale. . . . Just as I finish writing this, the heavy guns commence giving tongue and the little Irish maid comes in to turn down the bed. She went over to Victoria to see the plane which crashed there and is very pleased because she saw the dead German crew extracted from the wreckage.
RAYMOND LEE, United States Military Attaché in London, 15th September 1940
SUNDAY SEPTEMBER 15th 1940 (afternoon)
WEATHER:
The fine conditions of the morning was expected to give way to incoming cloud although it was expected to remain dry. This cloud was expected to be strato-cumulus providing about 8/10ths cover at a height of 5,000 feet. Wind was expected to be slight and from the north-west.
OPERATIONS IN DETAIL:
1300hrs: The radar stations along the Kent coast pick up movements across the Channel. It was the commencement of German bombers busily forming up for yet another raid on the British capital. Fighter Command are notified, but as there is no indication yet that the bombers are heading across the coast, it was just a 'wait and see' game, and Keith Park was content at this stage just to know the various squadron strength after the mornings combat action.

1330hrs: It is now evident that there is a massive build up west of the Calais-Boulogne area, and it seemed that this was to be a repeat of the Luftwaffe's morning performance. The question here was......would the Luftwaffe use a greater number of bombers for this second raid. After all, the mornings raid was nothing short of a disgraceful attempt, although one must give full credit to Fighter Command in forcing the Luftwaffe to submit and return back to their bases.
If the Luftwaffe was to use greater numbers in the afternoons raid, they would have to use a maximum fighter escort not only all the way on the outward journey, but on the homeward leg as well. They should stay in position higher and behind the bombers for the duration of the raid at the expense of the usual feints that were normally carried out as this would only consume additional fuel which, for the Bf109s was a precious commodity. The German shortage of fighters compelled the division of the attack, so that some would be used twice and so that the second attack could, and with lick, catch many of Park's fighters on the ground, re-arming and refueling. [1]
All squadrons that had been involved with the mornings action, were again placed at readiness and this included the Duxford Wing and the two squadrons from 10 Group. As time progressed, radar had reported that the formation had broke up into three distinct groups, and that it was possible that each group was following a short distance behind another.

1400hrs: Even though all the squadrons had been brought to readiness, some squadrons, especially those some distance from London were still being re-armed and refueled, and quite a few pilots were not with their squadrons. These had been shot down or baled out of their stricken aircraft and had made their way to other airfields and had telephoned in to their home bases, while some were being ferried back but had not yet arrived. Those that had got back, found the time to have a bit of lunch while their aircraft were in the hands of the ground crews. This was one of the reasons that the Luftwaffe had made this second raid so soon after midday, as they knew that it would take Fighter Command to take at least two hours to get all their squadrons back to full strength. The hoped that by the time that they crossed the English coast that most of the RAF fighters would still be on the ground.
The German formations that were approaching the Kent coast was made up of three distinct formations. All consisted of Dornier Do17s, Heinkel He111s and Dornier 215s from KG/2, KG/53 and KG/76. Smaller gruppes came from KG/1, KG/4 and KG/26 which made up a total bomber force of 170 aircraft. These were supported by Bf110 and Bf109s as escorts and their number was in excess of 300. [2]
Most of the bomber formations had come from airfields in the Beauvais and Antwerp areas.
Park scrambled squadrons in almost the same order as he had done so only three hours earlier, but because the German formation had taken less time in 'forming up' the 11 Group commander had less time to get his fighters into the air, coupled with the fact that some squadrons were still re-arming and refueling, the efficiency was not as good as it had been during the morning period.
1410hrs: Keith Park could see the incoming raid building up quickly and immediately his sector controllers of the afternoon raid. The station controllers then notified the squadrons who were placed on "standby". 12 Group were called up by 11 Group who again requested maximum assistance just as they had done during the morning period. The same applied to 10 Group. Within a couple of minutes, following a similar pattern that had proved so successful during the morning, 11 Group "scrambled " eleven squadrons and placed the rest on "standby". At the same time, Wing Commander Woodall at Duxford, "scrambled " his Duxford Wing which comprised 19 Squadron (Spitfires), 242 Squadron (242 Squadron (Hurricanes), 302 Squadron (Hurricanes), 310 Squadron (Hurricanes) and 611 Squadron (Spitfires). The only change that Park made that differed from the morning attack, was that he held more of his fighters back giving orders that they patrol areas to the east, south and west of London. The squadrons that were vectored to the forward areas were mainly instructed to attack the enemy fighters. This was probably due to the fact that by forcing the enemy escorts into combat early, they would use up far more fuel, and the morning raid had showed him that the bombers were far more vulnerable when the reached the outskirts of London, and the net result was that Fighter Command inflicted far more damage to aircraft over London than over the Kent coast.
1415hrs: The first of the bomber formations crossed the Kent coast between Dungeness and Dover, with the other formations behind and flying at 15 minute intervals. The actual times of the bombers crossing the coast was at 1415hrs, 1430hrs and 1440hrs. The combined formation was mainly He111s, Do17s and Do215s. The Observer Corps estimated that the total enemy bomber force was between 150 and 200 bombers. The escorts, flying as close escort and high altitude cover were the usual Bf110s and Bf109s and it is estimated that these numbered approximately 400. In total, a combined force of 600 plus aircraft heading north towards London on a front some thirty miles wide.
1430hrs: The first engagements took place over Kent. Squadrons from Hornchurch intercepted a large formation of Dorniers south of Canterbury. Diving down in line astern they managed to destroy two of the bombers and another couple were wheeling away leaving behind a trail of thick black smoke. But they were jumped upon by Bf109s and intense combat took place between the fighters of both sides allowing the Do17s to continue their journey. Two aircraft of the Hornchurch squadrons were damaged.
Another formation consisting of Dornier Do17s and Heinkel He111s was detected south of Maidstone, and without any Bf109 protection, they became the targets for 73 Squadron Debden (Hurricanes) who managed to destroy three of the bombers without loss to themselves. West of this attack near Dartford, 66 Squadron Gravesend (Spitfires) and 72 Squadron Croydon (Spitfires) intercepted another column of enemy aircraft where again, as with the others the combat action was intense. The Spitfires weaved in and out of the bombers managing to avoid collision in the huge traffic jam that was forming. Bombers started to take evasive action by banking either left or right. Just as another bomber formation was approaching from the south, the mêlée was joined by 249 Squadron North Weald (Hurricanes) and 504 Squadron Hendon (Hurricanes) and the large colossus of enemy bombers went into a frantic flight pattern. 73 Squadron who had engaged the formation from the outset, had now been entwined into the huge dogfight as well as 253 Squadron Kenley (Hurricanes).
The western flank saw Do17s, He111s and Ju88s which numbered about eighty curve right from Kent, across the outskirts of Surrey and heading towards the western side of London. A terrific battle ensued as fighters from 213 Squadron Tangmere (Hurricanes) and 607 Squadron Tangmere (Hurricanes) which had been vectored to cover Biggin Hill intercepted the large formation. Again, Bf109s were seen to the south of London, but decided not to come to the aid of the bomber formation which managed to get mauled by the Hurricane squadrons. This was one of the most intense battles. The British fighter tore into the enemy like hungry cats to a flock of wounded birds.


I started to chase one Dornier which was flying through the tops of the clouds. Did you ever see that film "Hells Angels?" You'll remember how the Zeppelin came so slowly out of the cloud. Well, this Dornier reminded me of that. I attacked him four times altogether. When he first appeared through the cloud—you know how clouds go up and down like foam on water —I fired at him from the left, swung over to the right, turned in towards another hollow in the cloud, where I expected him to reappear, and fired at him again. After my fourth attack he dived down headlong into a clump of trees in front of a house, and I saw one or two cars parked in the gravel drive in front. I wondered whether there was anyone in the doorway watching the bomber crash. Then I climbed up again to look for some more trouble and found it in the shape of a Heinkel III which was being attacked by three Hurricanes and a couple of Spitfires.
I had a few cracks at the thing before it made a perfect landing on an RAF aerodrome. The Heinkels undercarriage collapsed and the pilot pulled up, after skidding 50 yards in a cloud of dust. I saw a tall man get out of the right-hand side of the aircraft, and when I turned back he was helping a small man across the aerodrome towards a hangar.

Squadron leader John Sample 501 Squadron Kenley
1450hrs: Even though most of the attacking bombers had been thrown off their planned flight path, many of them managed to get through to the southern areas of London. If they thought that most of Fighter Commands fighters were behind them and still engaged in combat over Kent and Surrey, they were in for a big surprise. Now, as in the morning session, they were met by 49 fighters of Bader's "Duxford Wing". Combine this with a number of other squadrons that had followed the leading bombers and two other squadrons that had just joined the action, a total of some 150 more fighters awaited them.

Every squadron in 11 Group had intercepted, and at that moment I saw Douglas Bader's wing of five squadrons coming in from Duxford. This was the day that Goering had said to his fighters the RAF was down to their last 50 Spitfires. But they'd run up against twenty-three squadrons for a start, when they were on their way in, and then, when they got over London, with the Messerschmitt 109s running out of fuel, in comes Douglas Bader with sixty more fighters....."
Flight Lieutenant R.W.Oxspring 66 Squadron Fighter Command
Again, Bader ordered the Spitfires to attack the Bf109s, who for some strange reason had not left their bombers early as on previous occasions, while the Hurricanes attacked the bombers. They were at a disadvantage as they were still climbing and had not had the time to get into position. The "Duxford Wing" leader complained later that it was the case again of being called on far too late, but the real reason this time was that the Germans had formed up much quicker this time that almost caught even Keith Park off guard.
But this was not to be the best of afternoons for Bader:


......the Wing was scrambled again to patrol North Weald, and Bader led them through a gap in the clouds.
At 16,000 feet, flak bursts ahead, and in moments he saw the bombers; about forty of them, some 4,000 feet above the Hurricanes. Damn! Everything risked again because they were scrambled too late. Throttle hard on, the thundering Hurricane had her nose steeply lifted, nearly hanging on her propeller at about 100 m.p.h.
A voice screamed: “109’s behind.”
Over his shoulder the yellow spinners were diving on them and he yelled as he steep-turned, “Break up!” Around him the sky was full of wheeling Hurricanes and 109’s. A yellow spinner was sitting behind his tail, and as he yanked harder back on the stick an aeroplane shot by, feet away. Bader hit its slipstream and the Hurricane shuddered, stalled and spun off the turn. He let it spin a few turns to shake off the 109 and came out of it at 5,000 feet. All clear behind.
Far above a lone Dornier was heading for France, and he climbed and chased it a long way, hanging on his propeller nearly at stalling speed again. Near the coast he was just about in range and fired a three-second burst, but the recoil of the guns slowed the floundering Hurricane till she suddenly stalled and spun off again. He pulled out and searched the sky but the enemy had vanished.

Paul Brickhill Reach for the Sky Collins 1954 pp221-222
When Bader had first spun out, he almost collided with P/O Denis Crowley-Milling, and it was while in Crowley-Milling's slipstream that he went into the spin and did not pull out until 5,000 feet. Bader was annoyed, possibly only with himself that it had happened, but not being able to gain height to attack another bomber only rubbed salt into the wound.
The combat action over the southern and south western areas of London was intense. The formation that had been intercepted as far away as Maidstone somehow managed to straggle through, many of the Bf109s managed to stay as long as they could, but with fuel tanks getting into the danger zone, they had to break off and leave many of the bombers at the mercy of the British fighters. The German bombers, who had intended to drop their bomb loads on London itself, had jettisoned them in scattered areas in London's eastern and southern suburbs that suffered most. The most severe damage was done in West Ham, East Ham, Stratford, Stepney, Hackney, Erith, Dartford and Penge. Fighter Command now had everything that they possessed in the air, even the Station Commander of Northolt Group Captain S.F.Vincent.
1500hrs: 303 Squadron had been ordered up at Northolt at 1420hrs and were vectored to cover the north Kent coast along the Thames. The squadron consisted of nine Hurricanes and was led by S/L R.Kellett when they sighted a large formation coming towards them. Interception was made over Gravesend. The Squadron Intelligence Report describes the action on this day:


S/L Kellett was ordered to patrol Northolt at 20,000 ft. and took off with the nine serviceable machines. The other Squadrons had left sometime previously and 303 operated throughout alone. On reaching a height of 6000 ft. the Squadron was vectored 100 degrees and climbed over the l.A.Z. When still 2,000 ft below their patrol level, they sighted coming head on from the southeast a very large formation of bombers and fighters. The Bombers were in vics of three sections line astern with Me11Os in sq formation between the vics of Bombers. To the flanks and stepped up above to 25,000 ft. were many formations of Me1O9s. Blue Section had got rather in front of the others, and wheeling round to let them come up. S/L Kellett had to deliver a quarter frontal attack instead of head on. This he did initially with only the other two members of Blue Section - Sgt.Wojciechowski and P/O Zak. Probably as there were a lot of clouds about, the enemy imagined that this was the advance guard of a large force and began to wheel towards the east, and when the other two sections came in they turned completely to the east. After the first rush the Me11Os and the 109s fell upon the nine Hurricanes which were compelled to defend themselves individually as best they could, and escaped destruction in the clouds. As it was, four of the aircraft which returned were slightly damaged by enemy fire, one, Sgt Adruszkow’s, was destroyed, the pilot baling out unhurt at Dartford, and Sgt Brzezowski is missing.
Intelligence Report of 303 Squadron Northolt 11 Group Sept 15th 1940

303 Squadron was in the air just one hour and ten minutes before they returned back to Northolt. In this time, they had destroyed three Dornier Do215's, two Messerschmitt Bf110's and one Bf109. One Do215 was seen to break away from the combat action trailing smoke and losing altitude, but its fate is not known and the squadron was also credited with a probable. But only seven of the nine Hurricanes returned, with one pilot missing and another Hurricane crashing near Dartford with the pilot managing to bale out of his aircraft.
Flying Officer R.H.Oxspring of 66 Squadron Gravesend (Spitfires) said later that every squadron in 11 Group and the five squadrons from Duxford had in some way intercepted raiders and engaged combat. For the enemy bomber crews, it was now a no win situation. They were outnumbered over their target area, so much so that accurate bombing was virtually impossible. More and more squadrons were moving into areas to cut off any retreat so that when they did decide to abort, trying to get into the protection of the cloud cover would be their only hope of survival. Group Captain Vincent wrote in his report:


I was climbing over Northolt to watch the Northolt Wing in action, and saw approximately five miles S.W. and west of base, streamers from very high enemy fighters. When at 20,000 feet, I saw approaching from the south I saw a formation of about 18 He111s at approx. 17,000 feet with a very large number of Me109's, on each side, above and behind, mostly about 2,000 feet above the bombers.
I was therefore able to carry out a head on attack on the bombers, breaking away below, and then one from vertically below and stalling away - I was unable to see any possible result of either attack owing to the Me109's. The bombers then turned back to the south.
I climbed up towards the sun and tried to attack a Me109 but had to leave it owing to others coming down onto me from above, but saw three Me109's chasing a Hurricane at right angles to me from left to right, and when the Hurricane dived away (straightening out 5,000 feet below) and the Me's turned back onto their course. I was able to get in a good position on the tail of the third one. Before I opened fire I saw No.1 burst into flames, and the pilot jump out in a parachute; he had obviously been shot down by No.2 who was close in astern of him.
I gave one very short burst of about one second at No.3 at about 200 yards and immediately pieces came off from the port side of his fuselage, I estimate, to the south of Farnborough. I could not then see No.2 as my attention was diverted by the two parachutes.
All Me109's had light blue undersurfaces and dull grey mottled top surfaces with black crosses on fuselages.

Group Captain S.F.Vincent Station Commander Northolt 11 Group Sept 15th 1940
One of the Luftwaffe pilots who had to make a rather ungracious landing was the veteran Professor von Wedel. Like most of the Bf 109 pilots, they stayed with the Dorniers as long as possible, but the fuel situation forced them to leave early leaving the bombers in a very vulnerable position. On the return journey, his flight of Bf 109s were attacked by 605 Squadron Croydon, 1 RCAF Squadron Northolt and 229 Squadron Northolt all flying Hurricanes. It is believed that one of the Hurricanes of 1 RCAF Squadron followed von Wedel down, the veteran not being able to out maneuver the Hurricane, was hit and his Bf 109 had lost its controls. He tried in vain to make a landing on Romney Marsh, but the controls did not respond, and he made a heavy wheels up landing at a farmhouse, destroying a shed in which a mother and daughter were sitting in a car awaiting the father who was about to take them out on a Sunday drive. Both mother and daughter were killed instantly. A local policeman arrived on the scene to find a battered and bruised von Wedel wandering around in an almost tearful state, and as he apologized to the policeman for what he had done, the constable simply asked " would you like a cup of tea sir !!!!".

Sgt P.R Eyles 92 Squadron Biggin Hill (Spitfires) picks up a Do17 heading south and attacks. A short burst at first has no impact and he has to circle round and decides to have another attack. He gains a little height then sweeps down preparing to make an astern attack. Another short burst and pieces fly off the starboard side of the bomber and the tell tale smoke from the starboard engine indicates damage. As the Spitfire banks away he jumped on from above by Bf109 but the Biggin Hill pilot reacts quickly and take evasive action. He starts to climb and has lost sight of the German fighter, and looks for the crippled Dornier below. It continues its journey and could not have suffered too much damage as it it still flying straight and level.
The sergeant lines up his Spitfire to make another attack when he spots the Bf109 on his port side coming at him. He turns and attempts a beam attack on the 109. As they close in at an impact speed of something over five hundred miles an hour, both seem to fire at the same time, the Spitfire vibrates slightly, but does not seem to be damaged too severely, it is still responsive and all dials and controls seem to be behaving normally. Smoke poured from the engine area of the Messerschmitt and it starts to lose altitude in graceful fashion then levels out. Sgt Eyles pulls back on the stick and gains altitude. The recognizable wake of smoke heading out over the Kent coastline indicates the Dornier is making progress. The Spitfire heads in that direction, gaining height all the time. No other aircraft seem to be in the area to impede his next attack.
His combat report states that he was well across the Channel before he caught up with the bomber where he made another attack and saw more pieces fly off the fuselage and the other engine catch fire, but seeing a number of small specs coming at him from the French coast, decided to call it a day and head back towards base only claiming the Do17 as a probable.
Sgt Eyles was to try a similar action three days later, but was shot down by Major Moelders off the coast near Dungeness and was never seen again.


The bulk of the fighting took place over London and its outskirts from Dartford westward, where five pairs of squadrons from 11 Group and the wing from 12 Group were all in action between ten minutes to three and a quarter past, mainly with the third formation but probably also with survivors of the other two. In the course of the action the enemy distributed a big bombload over London and its outskirts, scoring several lucky hits on public utilities and railways. At East Ham a gas-holder and a telephone exchange were wrecked; and considerable damage was done to a variety of targets on both banks of the river at West Ham and Erith. Many other riverside boroughs reported hits; but the harm done was nothing like as great as that sustained eight days before in the first of the big daylight raids on London. Again retiring by two distinct routes, the attackers were engaged on the way out by another four squadrons, including two from 10 Group. Guns of the inner artillery zone and the Thames and Medway defences were also in action and claimed a number of successes."
Basil Collier, The Defence of the United Kingdom, HMSO, 1957
Meanwhile, Flight Lieutenant W.G.Clouston of 19 Squadron Duxford (Spitfires) took the two sections of his squadron to attack a formation of Do17s over Shoeburyness. Making their attack in line astern they made their attacks before any Bf109s arrived. F/L Couston lined up one, and gave a series of short bursts, one of the engines of the Dornier exploded in flame and smoke. Before he lost sight of it, ten feet of the bombers wing broke away and fell earthwards causing the bomber to roll over and spiral down to a watery grave below.
1600hrs: As the last of the bombers were being chased back across the Channel, and many of the squadrons who has fought one of the heaviest air combats of the Battle of Britain retired to their respective aerodromes, another small raid had been detected and was approaching the Dorset town of Portland. It was just a small force of about ten He111s and 10 Group scrambled 152 Squadron Warmwell (Spitfires), 607 Squadron Tangmere (Hurricanes) and 609 Squadron Warmwell (Spitfires). The enemy target was the Woolston Spitfire factory which was hit, the bombing was not accurate and severe damage was kept to a minimum. 602 and 609 Squadrons both intercepted after the bombers attacked their target, and both claimed that they had destroyed two aircraft each.
1800hrs: A small formation of Bf110s from Erpro 210, once the crack dive bombing gruppe of the Luftwaffe, made an attack again on the Woolston factory complex. Most of the British fighters that had been up on constant sorties during the afternoon had returned to their bases and by this time were busy being rearmed, refueled and many were undergoing their usual repairs from damage sustained during the hectic afternoon. Therefore the Bf110s were free from any attack or interception by Hurricanes or Spitfires. The task of defence was by the AA gun batteries who put up a tremendous fight in defence with accurate gunfire, which although they did not shoot down any enemy aircraft, the barrage that they put up was so aggressive that not a single bomb was dropped onto the Spitfire factory.
As the afternoon attack came slowly to an end, one by one the often tired and exhausted pilots returned to their bases. It had been a long and hectic day, Many of the pilots stated that 'they had very close to buying it' but such was their determination that saw them through, yet each one still had to remember that he was not invincible, the thought of death was still a reality, but many put it to the back of their minds.


Some of us would die within the next few days. That was inevitable. But you did not believe that it would be you. Death was always present, and we knew it for what it was. If we had to die, we would be alone, smashed to pieces, burnt alive, or drowned. Some strange, protecting veil kept the nightmare thought from our minds, as did the loss of our friends. Their disappearance struck us as less a solid blow than a dark shadow which chilled our hearts and passed on.
Squadron Leader Peter Townsend 85 Squadron RAF (later Group Captain)
But the day belonged to Royal Air Force Fighter Command, they were unaware of it then, but they had achieved something on September 15th 1940 that would go down in world history. Their guts, determination and courage was at long last to pay off, they would turn the tide in controlling the skies over south-east England. This day was to belong to them, and in future years was to become known as "Battle of Britain Day".

"This time, for a change, we outnumbered the hun, and believe me, no more than eight got home from that party.
At one time you could see planes going down on fire all over the place, and the sky seemed full of parachutes. It was sudden death that morning, for our fighters shot them to blazes.
Squadron Leader Douglas Bader 242 Squadron RAF Fighter Command

CASUALTIES:
For this day only, to indicate the severity of the days combat actions the full casualty list is displayed.
Aircraft shown in red are those that were lost or destroyed
1140hrs: Croydon. Hurricane L2122. 605 Squadron Croydon
P/O R.E.Jones unhurt. (Shot down in combat with Do17s and Bf109s. Pilot baled out of damaged aircraft)
1150hrs: Sevenoaks Kent. Hurricane N2537. 229 Squadron Northolt
P/O G.L.D.Doutrepont killed. (Crashed onto Staplehurst Railway Station after being shot down by Bf109s)
1200hrs: Sevenoaks Kent. Hurricane V6616. 229 Squadron Northolt
P/O R.R.Smith wounds to leg. (Baled out after combat with Do215 and Bf110s)
1210hrs: Tunbridge Wells. Hurricane P3080. 1 RCAF Squadron Northolt
F/O A.D.Nesbitt wounded. (Shot down by Bf109. Baled out)
1210hrs: Tunbridge Wells. Hurricane P3876. 1 RCAF Squadron Northolt
F/O R.Smither killed. (Attacked and shot down by Bf109. Pilot failed to bale out)
1215hrs: London. Hurricane P2725. 504 Squadron Hendon
Sgt R.T.Holmes unhurt. (Baled out after aircraft damaged by Bf109 crashed in Buckingham Palace Rd)
1215hrs: Canterbury. Spitfire R6767. 92 Squadron Biggin Hill
Fl/Sgt C.Sydney unhurt. (Returned to base with damage to wing after combat with Bf109s)
1220hrs: Maidstone. Hurricane P3865. 73 Squadron Debden
P/O R.A.Marchand killed. (Crashed into farm at Teynham after being shot down by Bf109s)
1225hrs: London. Hurricane L1913. 504 Squadron Hendon
F/O M.E.A.Royce unhurt. (Returned to base with oil cooler problem after combat action)
1230hrs: Thames Estuary. Hurricane P3642. 257 Squadron Debden
P/O C.F.A.Capon unhurt. (Made forced landing at Croydon after combat action)
1230hrs: London. Spitfire R6690. 609 Squadron Warmwell
P/O G.N.Gaunt killed. (Crashed in flames near Kenley after being hit by gunfire from Bf110)
1230hrs: London. Hurricane N2599. 46 Squadron North Weald
Sgt C.A.L.Hurry unhurt. (Returned to base with damage to mainplane)
1230hrs: Thurrock Essex. Spitfire P9324. 41 Squadron Hornchurch
P/O G.A.Langley killed. (Crashed into building after being shot down by Bf109s)
1230hrs: Middle Wallop. Spitfire K9997. 609 Squadron Warmwell
P/O E.Q.Tobin unhurt. (Crashed into airfield truck on landing approach)
1235hrs: Thames Estuary. Hurricane P3620. 257 Squadron Debden
Fl/Lt P.M.Brothers unhurt. (Landed at Biggin Hill for safety check with damage sustained in combat)
1235hrs: Ashford. Hurricane V7433. 501 Squadron Kenley
S/L H.A.V.Hogan unhurt. (Damaged in cooling system after combat with Bf109s. Made forced landing)
1245hrs: London. Hurricane V6576. 242 Squadron Coltishall
Fl/Lt G.E.Ball unhurt. (Made forced landing with damaged aircraft after combat action)
1245hrs: Ashford. Hurricane P2760. 501 Squadron Kenley
P/O A.E.A von den Hove d'Ertsenrijck killed. (Aircraft exploded in mid-air after hit by gunfire from Bf109)
1245hrs: Kent. Hurricane P2903. 303 Squadron Northolt
P/O W.Lokuciewski leg wounds. (Returned to base after receiving damage by Bf109)
1258hrs: South London. Hurricane N2481. 504 Squadron Hendon
P/O J.T.Gurteen killed. (Shot down by enemy aircraft and crashed at full throttle into residential house)
1430hrs: Marden. Hurricane L2012. 605 Squadron Croydon
P/O T.P.M.Cooper-Slipper injured. (Hit by gunfire from Do17. Collided with E/A losing wing. Pilot baled out)
1430hrs: Thames Estuary. Hurricane R4087. 310 Squadron Duxford
Sgt J.Hubacek slight injuries. (Baled out after aircraft was hit by Bf109 gunfire)
1435hrs: S.E.London. Hurricane V6566. 249 Squadron North Weald
P/O K.T.Lofts unhurt. (Crash landed at West Malling after attacked by Bf109 while attacking He111)
1440hrs: Rye Kent. Hurricane P2884. 242 Squadron Coltishall
Fl/L G.ff Powell-Sheddon slight injuries. (Shot down by Bf109 while attacking Do17 and baled out)
1445hrs: North Weald. Hurricane P2954. 302 Squadron Duxford
Fl/Lt T.P.Chlopik killed. (Shot down by enemy aircraft. Baled out but died on landing)
1445hrs: Thames Estuary. Hurricane R4085. 310 Squadron Duxford
P/O A.Hess unhurt. (Shot down in flames by enemy aircraft and pilot baled out safely)
1445hrs: S.E.London. Hurricane N2705. 504 Squadron Hendon
F/O M.Jebb died of injuries 19.9.40. (Crashed at Dartford after combat with enemy aircraft)
1445hrs: South of London. Hurricane L1973. 1 RCAF Squadron Northolt
F/O A.Yuile wounded. (Returned to base with severe damage after combat with He111 and poss Bf109s)
1450hrs: Ashford. Spitfire R6606. 92 Squadron Biggin Hill
P/O R.H.Holland slight injuries. (Injuries sustained on landing after baling out of damaged aircraft)
1450hrs: S of London. Spitfire II P7303. 611 Squadron Digby
F/O T.D.Williams unhurt. (Returned to base with severe damage after combat with He111)
1500hrs: Dartford. Hurricane P3939. 303 Squadron Northolt
Sgt T.Andruszkow unhurt. (Baled out after being hit by gunfire from Bf109)
1500hrs: Ashford. Spitfire P9513. 92 Squadron Biggin Hill
P/O A.C.Bartley unhurt. (Returned to base with damage after combat with Do17)
1500hrs: Over Channel. Spitfire R6991. 19 Squadron Duxford
Sub/Lt A.G.Blake unhurt. (Made forced landing in Kent after combat action)
1500hrs: Maidstone. Hurricane P3515. 242 Squadron Coltishall
Sub/Lt R.J.Cork unhurt. (Made landing at Rochford. Damage to cockpit and wings in combat with Bf109)
1500hrs: North Kent. Hurricane R2685. 303 Squadron Northolt
P/O M.Feric unhurt. (Returned to base after aircraft damaged by gunfire from Bf109s)
1500hrs: North Kent. Hurricane V7465. 303 Squadron Northolt
S/L R.G.Kellett unhurt. (Returned to base with damaged aircraft after action with Bf109s)
1500hrs: Hawkhurst. Hurricane P3113. 213 Squadron Tangmere
Sgt R.T.Llewellyn badly wounded. (Shot down in combat with Bf110s and baled out)
1500hrs: Kenley. Hurricane P2836. 238 Squadron Middle Wallop
Sgt L.Pidd killed. (Baled out after being shot down by enemy aircraft but was dead on landing)
1500hrs: Kenley. Hurricane L2089. 238 Squadron Middle Wallop
P/O V.C.Simmonds unhurt. (Returned to base with damage to aircraft tailplane after combat)
1500hrs: Off Gravesend. Hurricane V6673. 303 Squadron Northolt
Sgt M.Wajciechowski unhurt. (Returned to base after aircraft damaged by gunfire from Bf109s)
1505hrs: West Malling. Hurricane P3920. 238 Squadron Middle Wallop
Fl/Lt M.V.Blake unhurt. (Aircraft damaged in combat and had to make a forced landing)
1505hrs: Gravesend. Hurricane P3577. 303 Squadron Northolt
Sgt M.Brzezowski Listed as missing. (Believed crashed in Estuary after combat with Bf109s)
1505hrs: North Weald. Hurricane P3935. 302 Squadron Duxford
Sgt J.Kowalski unhurt. (Aircraft damaged by enemy aircraft and returned to base)
1505hrs: Kingswood Kent. Spitfire X4324. 603 Squadron Hornchurch
F/O A.P.Pease killed. (Shot down by unknown enemy aircraft. Pilot did not bale out)
1505hrs: Over Channel. Spitfire X4070. 19 Squadron Duxford
Sgt J.A.Potter taken POW. (Ditched damage aircraft off French coast and captured by German military)
1505hrs: Gravesend. Hurricane V6684. 303 Squadron Northolt
F/O W.Urbanowicz unhurt. (Returned to base after aircraft damaged by gunfire from Bf109s)
1505hrs: Gravesend. Hurricane L2099. 303 Squadron Northolt
F/O W.Zak unhurt. (Returned to base after aircraft damaged by gunfire from Bf109s)
1510hrs: Kenley. Hurricane P3462. 238 Squadron Middle Wallop
F/O C.T.Davis unhurt. (Managed to return to base with damaged aircraft)
1510hrs: Kent. Spitfire R7019. 603 Squadron Hornchurch
S/L G.L.Denholm unhurt. (Hit by gunfire from Do17. Baled out of damaged aircraft)
1510hrs: Rye Sussex. Spitfire R6922. 609 Squadron Warmwell
F/O J.D.Dundas unhurt. (Returned to base with severe damage after combat with Do17)
1510hrs: Over Channel. Spitfire P9431. 19 Squadron Duxford
Sgt H.A.C.Roden slight injuries. (Crash landed after combat with Bf109)
1515hrs: Appledore. Hurricane V6688. 607 Squadron Tangmere
P/O P.J.T.Stephenson injured. (Collided with E/A after attack on Do17. Pilot baled out)
1520hrs: Beachy Head. Spitfire X4412. 602 Squadron Westhampnett
Sgt C.F.Babbage unhurt. (Made forced landing at Shoreham with damage by gunfire from Do17)
1530hrs: Over Channel. Hurricane V6698. 253 Squadron Kenley
P/O A.R.H.Barton unhurt. (Damaged in combat with Do215s. Forced landing at Hawkinge)
1635hrs: Kenley. Hurricane P3833. 238 Squadron Middle Wallop
P/O A.R.Covington unhurt. (Exhausted fuel tank and made forced landing near East Grinstead)
Unknown time: Boscombe Down. Hurricane P3660. 56 Squadron Boscombe Down
Sgt T.R.Tweed killed. (Failed to come out of spin during dog fight practice over base)

http://www.battleofbritain1940.net/0042.html

 

Friday September 20th 1940


Today, like most mornings the pilots on all the forward sector and forward aerodromes woke up wondering just what the day would bring. The day previous was exceptionally quiet, but this did not place anybody into a sense of false security. Yesterday, operations were relitively easy, spasmodic attacks by lone aircraft during the day while more concentrated attacks occurred after dark as would be expected. But even though the Luftwaffe only lost some six or seven aircraft, Fighter Command did not lose a single aircraft or pilot which shows the inactivity of the day.
WEATHER:
The morning would be reasonably fair with scattered cloud with showers expected by midday and these would continue throughout the day.
OPERATIONS:
It was another of those mornings where there was an abundance of blue sky and scattered cloud, but the radar screens at the south coast radar stations were totally clear. Pilots at most of the airfields had checked out their aircraft and waited patiently lazing around. Some flights from individual squadrons made routine patrols of the south coast.........but nothing. But it is in these quieter moments that many of the newer pilots are given further training by the more experienced pilots. Fighter Command had taken the opportunity in reinforcing many of the squadrons with fresh aircraft and an influx of new pilots. New pilots maybe, but with very little experience.

Two further pilots have come to us straight from a Lysander squadron with no experience on fighter aircraft. Apparently demand has now outstripped supply and there are no trained pilots available in the Training Units, which means that we will just have to train them ourselves. However it remains to be seen whether we can spare the hours, as we are already short of aircraft for our own operational needs. It seems a very funny way to run a war.
Sandy Johnstone 602 Squadron - a comment made during early September.

1050hrs: The queit of the early morning was broken at 1030hrs when radar had picked up a German formation that was coming across the Channel from the direction of Calais and by 1100hrs a formation of 20 plus Bf109s at 15,000 feet crossed the coast at Dungeness, with other formations of 50 plus Bf109 aircraft crossing the coast in the region of Dover. The radar at Foreness picked up another formation that had stayed out to sea and came in through the Thames Estuary. This was another change of tactic by the Luftwaffe, although it was not the first time that they had sent in Bf109s en masse on daytime attacking raids.
Fighter Command released fifteen squadrons including 72 Squadron Biggin Hill (Spitfires), 92 Squadron Biggin Hill (Spitfires), 222 Squadron Hornchurch (Spitfires), 253 Squadron Kenley (Hurricanes) and 605 Squadron Croydon (Hurricanes). The Luftwaffe in this attack had the upper hand by sheer weight of numbers.


It was always exciting watching the dogfights over the Kentish fields and the English Channel, I suppose little did we realise then that men were up there fighting for their lives and many of them were being killed or seriously wounded. The long twisting white vapour trails left a messy woven pattern in the skies, while most of those that were going to crash trailed columns of black smoke although there were times when you saw just a single dot slowly get bigger and bigger going straight down to crash into the sea with a giant plume of white spray.
I remember on this occasion the mellee commenced just as the planes of both sides came over the cliffs, they were high and the vapour trails started to get more and more intense. One plane dived straight down going round and round with little puffs of smoke that appeared to be coming from the back of the plane, then it crashed into the ground with an almighty bang. Then a German plane came down from a great height and levelled out just above the ground. He was closely followed by a Spitfire, a plane that we all got to know. The German plane weaved left and right but the Spitfire seemed to stick to him like glue, and we had to duck as we felt that they were so low that they would have taken our heads off. Then they turned and flew out to sea, we waited to see if the German was going to crash but they disappeared.

Pamela Watson - Reading. Talking of childhood memories.

Is was a possiblity that both waves of German fighters were targetting London, but over the Kentish countryside, what the RAF fighter pilots lacked in numbers they made up for in skill even if they did sustain many casualties. The combat action was sustained over the fields of Kent and at the mouth of the Thames near Southend and Sheppy with neither formation making much progress towards their objective.
One of the first aircraft of Fighter Command to go down was the Spitfire of P/O H.L.Whitbread of 222 Squadron Hornchurch at 1115hrs. A Bf109 came from above and took him by surprise and the Spitfire crashed at Higham near Rochester killing the pilot. At about 1130hrs, 253 Squadron Kenley had three Hurricanes shot down between Ashford and Maidstone. All three pilots, P/O A.R.H.Barton, Sgt A.R.Innes and an unnamed pilot all escaped serious injury. P/O W.J.Glowacki was unhurt as his Hurricane of 605 Squadron Croydon was hit by gunfire from a Bf109 but was one of the lucky ones in being able to return to base. By 1135hrs, 92 Squadron Biggin Hill lost two pilots when they became seriously involved in combat in the Dover/Dungeness area. One Spitfire crashed at West Hougham and another crashed in the Channel, both the victims of Major Moelders.
It should be noted here that although mass daylight attacks had occurred with the use of Bf109 fighters only, they were causing more than a headache for Fighter Command. The sheer weight of numbers were causing all sorts of headaches for both Hurricane and Spitfire squadrons. The techniques involved when fighter was against fighter and were quite different to those when the German Bf109s were involved with providing escort.

We in JG52 were very inexperienced. In two months our strength fell from thirty-six pilots to just four. We relly wasted our fighters. We didn't have enough to begin with, and we used them in the wrong way, for direct close escort. We were tied to the bombers, flying slowly - sometimes with flaps down - over England. We couldn't use our altitude advantage nor our superiority in a dive. Of course, the Spitfire had a marvellous rate of turn, and when we were tied to the bombers and had to dogfight them, that turn was very important.
Gunther Ball 8/JG52,
The mornings attack was the only main combat of the day. But is had been a terrible blow to Fighter Command. Of the five pilots killed in the attack, four of them at least were experienced seasoned pilots, pilots that were still badly needed. The Bf109 pilots, whether experienced or not had this day gained a slight advantage by downing more British fighters than they had lost themselves. Maybe the Luftwaffe would learn by this result, and that in the days to follow, more Geschwaders of Bf109s would make the daylight attacks and try to make up for the disaterous losses that they had so far they experienced. We will have to wait and see.
CASUALTIES
1020hrs: Canterbury. Spitfire X4410. 72 Squadron Biggin Hill
P/O D.F.Holland Killed. (Baled out after being shot down by Bf109s. Died on admission to hospital)
1115hrs: Rochester. Spitfire N3203. 222 Squadron Hornchurch
P/O H.L.Whitbread killed. (Shot down by Bf109s and crashed at Pond Cottage. Thrown clear but dead)
1130hrs: Amesbury. Hurricane L1595. 56 Squadron Boscombe Down
Sgt C.V.Meeson killed. (Crashed during formation flying practice)
1134hrs: West Hougham. Spitfire X4417. 92 Squadron Biggin Hill
P/O H.P.Hill. Killed. (Shot down by Major Moelders in Bf109 and burst into flames on crashing)
1134hrs: Dungeness. Spitfire N3248. 92 Squadron Biggin Hill
Sgt P.R.Eyles Posted as missing. (Crashed into the Channel after being shot down by Major Moelders)
http://www.battleofbritain1940.net/0047.html

 

Saturday September 21st 1940


WEATHER:
The day opened to scattered cloud although along the Estuary and the River Thames as far as London there was considerable haze. Once this cleared, most of the south was fine with scattered cloud but by midday cloud had started to build up. In the north there was cloud with sunny spells but it remained dry.
OPERATIONS:
Early morning dawned with cloudless skies as no sign of the enemy. It was to remain that way for most of the day. Radar picked up an occasional aircraft, but these were believed to be on reconnaissence flights as they kept clear of the English coast. This was to be one of the quietest days of the battle, with more action being seen behind the scenes than in the air.
The invasion of German troops on the island of great Britain was called "Cromwell" and all stations had been placed on standby as the possiblity was always there that an invasion was always a possiblity. But just as the Battle of Britain in the air seemed to be slowing down, so was the possiblity of any German invasion for at least this year. Now, almost into the month of October, the days would be becoming shorter, the weather would soon deteriorate with the waters of the Channel becoming rougher and the signs from the German held Channel ports indicated that Bomber Command had all but destroyed any hope of the German infantry using the ports as a dispersal point for the Channel crossing.




No hint of relaxation of alertness against the threat of invasion was allowed to percolate through to the armed forces, nor the civilian population. It was premature for that. But the view of the War Cabinet and of the most senior officers in all the Services was that with the days shortening, the weather deteriorating and the equinox approaching, it would now be most foolhardy of Hitler to attempt a crossing in 1940.
On 21st September ‘Cromwell’ was cancelled and Alert No. 2 reinstated. Anthony Eden, while relaxing one morning at Elham, was therefore all the more surprised to hear from Churchill by telephone on 22nd September that he had just received a call from the American President that, for sure, the Germans would invade that very day. Eden took a walk to the Dover cliffs. He peered down through the fog and noted an exceedingly choppy sea. He then returned home and telephoned Churchill. An invasion, he said, seemed highly unlikely, and in any case they would all be sea-sick by the time they arrived by barge.
The next day Roosevelt telephoned again, this time to apologise. ‘I’m so sorry,’ he said. ‘The codes got mixed. It was Indo-China, not England, and Japan, not Germany.’ And that, indeed, was the case.

Hough and Richards Battle of Britain A Jubliee History Hodder & Stoughton 1989 p294


But if one was to get the impression that tensions were easing, what with a day of very little combat action and "Cromwell" being cancelled. Fighter Command was in fact strengthening its commitment to battle with the introduction of 421 Flight.
One of the problems that Fighter Command encountered was the fact that when radar picked up approaching enemy aircraft and formations, it was not known as to what type of aircraft they were until clarified by spotters or the Observer Corps. With the approach of German bombers, Keith Park had just enough time to scramble his fighters, get to the correct height to attack and intercept the enemy as it crossed the coast. But with this new tactic of sending formations of Bf109s, often in Geschwader force, there was not enough time to scramble the fighters and meet them as they crossed the coast. As experienced over the last few days and on those occasions that Bf109 formations made their intended attacks on British targets, they generally would be well over the coastline and much closer to London before they were intercepted by British fighters.
It was on this day that Air Chief Marshal Hugh Dowding was to authorise the formation of a new unit that was to become known as 421 Flight. This was instigated in colaboration with Keith park because it was now felt that with Bf109 formations that could cross the Channel quicker than the bombers that they once escorted, their would be no chance of British fighters intercepting them in time once they had been positively identified.
The task of 421 Flight that was equipped with Hurricanes, was to fly in small formations on reconnaissence missions over the Channel to report on any build up and composition of these formations prior to them reaching the English coastline. This way, as well as the detection being made on radar stations along the coast of their location, 421 Flight would be vectored into a position where they could provide details back to their sector station of type and strength of the enemy much earlier than if it was left to the Observer Corps alone. Initially, the flight was formed at Gravesend in mid October and on October 31st was posted to West Malling and before the end of 1940 they had been moved to Hawkinge.
The formation of 421 Flight (which was later to become 91 Squadron) was naturally too late for the Battle of Britain. Some authorities say that such a squadron should have been formed earlier so as to provide early indications of strength and composition of the enemy. But again, this would have been another of the many debatable points that arose during the Battle of Britain.
In general, this was an exceptionally quiet day. Small nuisance raids by small formations of enemy aircraft had attacked both Kenley and Biggin Hill aerodromes but these were thwarted by fighters from Kenley, Biggin Hill and Croydon. 238 Squadron had accounted for one destroyed while the Spitfires of 602 and 611 Squadrons accounted for one each destroyed. One of the Do17s damaged by 802 Squadron managed to get back to the French coast, but was to crash land at Landerneau killing all on board.
The usual night raids continued on London and Liverpool which was now becoming a regular occurence. Although the East End of London still came under constant bombardment, other targets in and around London were now being hit. Spasmodic raids around Tynemouth and County Durham also occurred but records indicate that no casualties were recorded.

CASUALTIES
There were no casualties on either side on this day.
http://www.battleofbritain1940.net/0048.html

 

Monday September 23rd 1940


WEATHER:
Mist and fog patches were to be expected in most areas but this would give way to a mainly fine day. Some patchy cloud could be expected, but generally mainly fine weather should prevail over most areas.
OPERATIONS:
The rather peaceful periods that the aircrews had experienced over the last few days was about to end, much like the cloud and rain periods as the bright ball of the sun could be seen above the low lying mist and fog layers. Some aircrews may have been thrown into a false sense of security as the month's combat actions had melted down to almost nothing.
But by 0840hrs radar stations from Foreness to Rye had detected four separate formations close together coming in from the Channel towards Dover. As they approached the Kent coastline they appeared to fan out with the outer formations coming in from Ramsgate and Brighton while the centre ones came in over Deal and Folkestone. Again, as in the previous few days, they were Geschwaders of Bf109s and the Observer Corps estimated their numbers as two hundred plus. Fighter Command is said to have released twenty-four squadrons, although later authorities have revised this to fourteen. Again the problem of The British fighters not being able to get to the desired height and position because of the time taken to gain height in a Bf109 attack as they approached at a much faster rate than the bombers.
The formations of Bf109s crossed the coast at about 0915hrs and eight of 11 Group squadrons managed to make an interception of the enemy when they were over North Kent. 257 Squadron (Hurricanes) Debden and 92 Squadron (Spitfires) Biggin Hill were among the first to intercept and a fierce dogfight took place off the coast near Herne Bay and Margate. One of the other formations were intercepted by 73 Squadron (Hurricanes) Church Fenton, 229 Squadron (Hurricanes( Northolt and 303 Squadron (Hurricanes) Northolt.
1000hrs: An area from Dartford to Margate became a mass of twisting, whirling white vapour trails as the fighters from both sides weaved and spiraled against the backdrop of now bright blue sky. A spitfire of 92 Squadron Biggin Hill piloted by P/O A.J.S.Patterson, engaged in aerial combat over Gravesend was hit, forcing the pilot to break away from the action. He tried to make for the aerodrome at West Malling, but in an attempted forced landing the Spitfire crashed into the ground wounding P/O Patterson in the upper leg. Sgt D.J.Aslin of 257 Squadron Debden suffered burns when his Hurricane sustained a hit from one of the Bf109s and caught fire over the Thames Estuary. He managed to bale out with his aircraft crashing near Eastchurch.
1100hrs: The action continued as other British pilots come to grief. were four Hurricane's from 73 Squadron (Church Fenton) had engaged combat over the Thames between Sheppy and Southend being jumped on by Bf109s of IIJG/26 which were shot down in flames over the Isle of Sheppy and Thames Estuary, a Spitfire of 72 Squadron which crashed at Sittingbourne, a Spitfire II of 74 Squadron Coltishall which was shot down while in single combat with a Bf109 and a Spitfire flown by P/O W.Beaumont of 152 Squadron but it is not known if he was engaged in combat over north Kent.




Over London my Schwarm met a formation of Englishmen, around sixty fighters .......... I made a head-on attack on a Spitfire. The enemy tracer flew past my canopy, but the Englishman went spinning down in flames. Perhaps he had lost his nerve. Now a wild dogfight began. It was best to break away. Now I had four Spitfires on my tail. I was 18000 metres, and I pushed the stick forward and dived away at full speed, pulling out at ground level with my wings fluttering. No British fighter could have followed my wild dive. I looked behind me. Damn! There were two Spits on my tail again. There was no time to draw breath. My only chance of escape lay in my flying ability at low level, hedgehopping to the Channel over houses and around trees. It was no use, one of them was always there and I couldn’t shake him off. He hung a hundred metres behind me. Then we were over Dover. I thought: He can’t keep this up as I fled out over the wavetops but the Spitfire stayed behind. I jinked to right and left as the pilot opened fire and the bullets splashed into the water in front of me. I blinked the sweat out of my eyes. The French coast was now in sight. My fuel was getting low. I kept squinting behind so as not to miss the moment when he broke away. Wait, my friend, I thought. ‘You must return soon, and then I will be the hunter. Cap Gris Nez loomed up in front, and I skimmed over it one metre above. Suddenly the Tommy climbed steeply and slowed down. . . . At once I turned my Me 109 and zoomed up in a tight bank, engine howling, straight at him. I fired one burst from close range I nearly rammed him and the Spitfire went straight into the sea. He flew fantastically.
WILHELM BALTHASAR,III/JG3, 23 September 1940

But is was not just the fighters of Fighter Command that were having a bad day. The Luftwaffe suffered just as bad. F/Lt Brian Kingcombe of 92 Squadron Biggin Hill managed to score a direct hit on a Bf109 near Maidstone. The pilot baled out and was captured. Another of the 92 Squadron Spitfires being flown by P/O J.F.Drummond damaged the cooling system of a Bf109 north of Maidstone and it was forced down finally finishing up in a pond where the pilot also was taken prisoner. 72 Squadron also claimed credit for destroying a Bf109 that was to dive into the Channel off Folkestone. The Poles of 303 Squadron also increased their tally by another two when they claimed two Bf109s over the Thames Estuary while 257 Squadron and 605 destroyed one each. In all, ten Bf109s either crashed on English soil, or crashed on landing due to battle damage and were all destroyed while four managed to return back to their French bases with sustained battle damage.
A lone Ju88 on a photo or weather reconnaissence mission was detected over the Channel south of the Isle of Wight and 234 Squadron from Middle Wallop sent one flight to intercept. The Junkers was shot down and made a belly landing in the sea. All the crew managed to get out of the sinking aircraft and were captured by British authorities.
Another small number of enemy aircraft got through and according to the station records book at Fowlmere, they came under attack at 1530hrs. One Spitfire was destroyed and a number were damaged. There was no damage to any buildings or to the airfield. There is a possiblity that the attack on Fowlmere, was by the Bf109s that were detected earlier over London, but this cannot be said for any certainty.
The afternoon was again peacefull after a busy morning, much to the delight of the aircrews, although one station commander stated to one of his squadron leaders "....that if things remain this quiet, you sure you won't get bored?" But during the evening, as usual, things started to change. Wave upon wave of Heinkels, Junkers and Dorniers threw everything at London. The city had many heavy nights of bombing, but this was by far the heaviest. By midnight, it looked as if there was a sunset over London, the night sky was that red.
Fighter Command sent up a number of Defiant and Blenheim night fighters, but with Britain night fighting ability still in its infancy, and about a dozen 'nighties' up against an estimated 125 bombers, their task was almost an impossiblity. After forty five minutes they returned to their bases.
But the night time attacks on the British capital and other major centres around Britain, the intensity of the night attacks remained heavy. The British War Cabinet decided to retaliate and ordered indisciminate attack on Berlin with parachute mines. But, the Air Staff issued the directive that only targets that comprised any military value should only be attacked and that areas of civilian and residental areas should not be targeted.

CASUALTIES
1100hrs:Over Channel. Spitfire R6896. 234 Squadron St Eval
P/O T.M.Kane Confirmed P.O.W. (Was flying routine patrol but believed crashed in Channel off French Coast)
1130hrs:Over Channel. Spitfire P9371 74 Squadron Coltishall
Sgt D.H.Ayers Listed as missing. (Chased Bf109 to French coast but was shot down and crashed into sea)
Unknown Time: Spitfire R7016. 152 Squadron Warmwell
P/O W.Beaumont Listed as missing. (Failed to return from operational sortie. Last seen over the Channel)

http://www.battleofbritain1940.net/0050.html

 

The Battle is Won



For the last two months, the great air battle that had raged over south-east England was to go down in history as one of the most important battles that Britain had to overcome. We cannot argue that the German Luftwaffe was by no means an inferior opponent, on the contrary, as far as men and machines were concerned, they were a far superior force. The Luftwaffe, as the attacking force had a combined strength of bombers, fighters and fighter-bombers. There were huge numbers of aircrew both trained and straight out of flying school, and they had the advantage of flying by both day and by night.
Fighter Command on the other hand, as the defending force had only front line fighters that combined did not equal the number of their enemy. They were also at a disadvantage as far as aircrew were concerned, often not enough to man the operational squadrons, who were also losing valuable aircraft daily. The biggest advantages that Britain had over German was the fact that they had the English Channel as a natural form of defence and the advantage of flying most of the time over home territory. Germany had carried out many blitzkrieg invasions with great success. Warsaw and Poland, Norway, Holland, Belgium and finally France. But to make an invasion of Great Britain the German military forces could not use their normal course of events such as pushing in advance columns of Panzer troops, and providing them with the required support of bombers, fighters and dive bombers. The English Channel had first to be negotiated.
Any attempt at crossing the Channel would be nothing short of disastrous. Aircraft of the Royal Air Force would pick out the sitting targets one by one and the invasion forces would be annihilated before they even got to the English coastline. Hitler had only one option, and that was to destroy the Royal Air Force before he could even make a positive date to commence the invasion. That attempt to destroy the RAF, and in particular Fighter Command is what this web site is all about. From courage to casualties, Fighter Command defended with everything that they had even though the odds were far against them.
September 15th 1940 was the turning point even though the Battle of Britain was to go on until the end of October. The Luftwaffe threw everything that they had into the attack, morning, afternoon and in the evening, but they could not succeed. Disillusioned and demoralized, Germany had to revise its tactics. Even Adolph Galland stated that ".....September 15th proved that penetrating the British defences and the taking of London was now as far distant as ever." But as the battle continued into October, the Luftwaffe was to lose a further 320 aircraft against Fighter Commands 144. The heavy bombers would continue to attack London by night and the smaller Ju88s with Bf109s now carrying a single bomb were to attempt to do as much damage during small daylight raids.
Looking back, we can often wonder as to why Hitler did not follow up with attacks on Britain at the time of the Dunkirk operations. At this time Britain was weak, they had succumbed to a demoralizing defeat and Fighter Command at this time was nowhere near ready being short on both pilots and aircraft. Instead, Hitler turned his attentions on Paris and the taking of France. We could also look at why Hitler did not continue with attacks on Fighter Command instead of his "eye for an eye" attitude when RAF Bomber Command dropped their first bombs on Berlin. Fighter Command was at this time, after being worn down with exhausted pilots and tremendous loss of aircraft, yet London was to be destroyed "at all costs".
The possible answer was in the chain of command and decisions by those in authority. The Luftwaffe leaders did have a free reign as far as the decisive factors were concerned within their own departments, but they were governed by the decisions of Hitler. The Führer was in total command. In Britain, while Churchill exercised his position as Prime Minister, much of the decision making was left to his military commanders. Dowding and Harris were in charge of Fighter and Bomber Commands respectively and Churchill, knowing full well that they had more knowledge of the situation than he had, and had every faith in the decisions that they made.

At Fighter Command Headquarters the previous day, Air Vice Marshal Keith Park showed a sense of relief and praised his pilots for the job that they had done. He acted almost like a football supporter that had just seen his team score a victory over the opposition. But now he took a slightly different view of the whole matter.
He had time overnight to study the figures, tactics and the behavioral patterns of his men. He now had had time to analyze the events of the previous day. He indicated that he was far from impressed with the overall performance of 11 Group. He maintained that there were in excess of 1,600 enemy bombers and fighters that had come across the Channel, and all his pilots could do was to shoot down 56 of them. He stated that he would have expected the number to be more like the 180 that the press had claimed, or even more. He went on to say that if each individual attack could be taken as an example, then with the 300+ fighters that his controllers had put into the air, the pilots could have shot them down at a ratio of one to one. He emphasized that we had the advantage of fighting in our own air space, they were fighting within range of their bases were they could refuel and rearm, an advantage that the Luftwaffe did not have.
So, was Park justified in his criticism. After all the encouragement that he had given them since the battle had begun, after the many times that he had shared in their successes and sorrows, was this statement of dissatisfaction warranted. One pilot stated "what does he want of us?......we stopped them successfully bombing their targets, we stuffed up all their plans, we threw them into utter confusion and to top it all off, we won the battle of the day." But Park did not see it that way, a coach would have been happy with a one nil victory, a win is a win. Parks vision was that the more planes shot down now, the less that would be coming over later.
But the reality of it was, that many of the veterans and experienced pilots had either been killed or had been posted elsewhere or were recovering from injuries. Many of the newer pilots, although by September were receiving more training than they were when the battle commenced were not all combat experienced, this was a contributing factor as to why the professionalism and skill of the pilot had declined over the last few months.
It is therefore quite safe to say as to why Park expected perfection, but a pilot can only do his best which I believe that this was done on September 15th. But no, I think that he should have been out there congratulating those pilots, giving them added encouragement that now, they had devastated an air force who were far more experienced than themselves.
On the other side of the Channel, Göring was still not ready to admit failure. He believed that providing that he could have a few more days of good weather, and this now was going to become a gamble as the autumn would soon give way to winter and all hopes of successful attack would be out of the question, he could still demoralize the RAF and crush Fighter Command and with continued bombing of all major cities and factories compel Britain to surrender, even without the now aborted invasion.
In the morning of September 16th Göring orders a conference between his Luftflotten and Fliegerkorps commanders. He maintains that the RAF will be wiped out within four or five days, a statement that the commanders had heard many times before and regarded it as just a comment rather than a statement. He orders his bomber commanders to dispatch smaller formations if weather conditions are not favourable, only on days when the weather could be termed as ideal should large formations be dispatched. He stated that he wanted attacks to be made on London, the aircraft factories and the important seaports around Britain, and that these are to be carried out by both day and by night. To his fighter commanders, he stated that he wanted absolute maximum fighter protection on all bombing raids so that as many RAF fighters can be shot down as possible.
Six aircraft of 600 Squadron Hornchurch (Blenheims) is moved to Redhill, mainly because of the now frequent night attacks and would be better positioned to intercept any night formation that appeared. To strengthen this, a radar equipped Beaufighter is transferred from 25 Squadron also to Redhill. This move had success on the very first night, when a lone enemy aircraft was seen on radar, and Flight Lieutenant C.A.Pritchard scrambled and climbed to his vectored position to intercept the raider. A number of searchlights located the bomber, and their long shafts of light stayed with it enabling the Blenheim to get into a favourable position, and at close range after identifying it as a Heinkel He III, fires a number of short bursts causing the bomber to erupt in flame and crash into the sea. The bomber was later identified as a Junkers Ju88.
Because of the inclement weather conditions during the day, very little combat activity took place, but at night, London was bombed and so was the Merseyside towns of Liverpool and Preston.

Again weather conditions on September 17th are regarded as poor, any chance of a mission taking place was out of the question. Spitfires on photo-recon based at Heston return with aerial photographs showing that the invasion barges are still intact and have not yet been removed. Other Spitfires bring back photographs also showing that the invasion barges are still moored in most of the Channel ports. A count of the barges depicts 600 are moored at Antwerp, 270 at Calais, 230 at Boulogne, 220 at Dunkirk, 200 at Le Havre and 200 at Ostend.
By the afternoon, the weather lifts enough for Luftflotte 2 to send two formations Bf 109 fighter planes across the Channel. They cross the coast between Lympne and Dover at 1530hrs, Fighter Command responds by scrambling 73 Squadron Debden (Hurricanes), 17 Squadron Debden (Hurricanes) and 257 Squadron Martlesham (Hurricanes). All these squadrons were ordered to avoid contact when it was learnt that the formation consisted of only Bf 109s and no bombers had been detected. All squadrons aborted and returned back to their bases without making contact.
Unaware that Hitler had postponed Operation Sealion, Churchill, after being informed of the landing barges at the French Channel ports, informed the Parliament:
"....At any moment a major assault may be launched upon this island. I now say in secret that upwards of 1,700 self-propelled barges and more than 200 sea going ships, some very large ships, are already gathered at many invasion ports in German occupation."
Winston S.Churchill to Parliament September 17th 1940

Inclement weather over the next few days does not see much action by either the RAF of the Luftwaffe. The Hampdens of Bomber Command make a small raid on the docks at Antwerp and Dunkirk during the early hours of the 18th September. Photo Recon Units (PRU) later that morning report that over 150 of the landing barges have been destroyed. Two of the Hampdens fail to return.
An enemy formation is detected by radar forming over the French coast at 0900hrs, and Fighter Command HQ orders some 15 squadrons into the air. Included are 17 Squadron Debden (Hurricanes), 46 Squadron Stapleford (Hurricanes), 73 Squadron Debden (Hurricanes) and 257 Squadron Martlesham (Hurricanes). These Hurricane squadrons are ordered to maintain contact with the enemy when it was realized that the formation consisted only of Luftwaffe fighters. The Spitfire squadrons were told to return to their bases, 46 Squadron also was recalled.
During the afternoon, a number of Ju 88s are spotted flying in from the Thames Estuary and heading for London. 11 Group orders up about 14 squadrons, and requests assistance from 12 Group again.
Little damage is done, with anti-aircraft fire and 11 Group breaking up the forward formation. Baders "Big Wing" attacks the second formation which sustained heavy casualties from accurate firing by the Hurricanes.
London is heavily bombed on the night of September 18th, and the 'blitzkrieg' last through to 5.30am on the 19th September. Damage is done to both sides of the Thames with Southwark and the financial sector of London namely Mansion House, Leadenhall Street and the area around St Pauls taking a heavy battering. Central London also suffered, Piccadilly, fashionable Bond and Regent Streets also suffered considerable damage with most of the main roads closed. Many are killed and trapped and Police, rescue units and the Civil Defence are kept busy in rescue operations.
At the onset of daylight, the overcast turns to rain and the only air activity during the morning happens when a formation of Junkers Ju 88s are detected and 249 Squadron North Weald (Hurricanes) and 302 Squadron Duxford (Hurricanes) flying as a paired squadron has the advantage of height and successfully turns the German bombers back. Two Ju 88s are destroyed.
Right through September and into October each day was very similar, and carried the same stories carried through day after day. Up to and including September 15th, Britain was battling for survival, like a game of chess that was going down to a stalemate unless one of the two sides cracked or made a stupid move. The 15th was as if Britain moved all its pawns into position and then brought in the knights and bishops and had the opposition in retreat with checkmate not very far off. This bravado move by the British was the climax of the battle.
From September 17th through to the end of the month The luftwaffe done everything in its power to pound London while at the same time making spasmodic attacks on other places such as Merseyside, Birmingham, Swansea and Southhampton. Many of these attacks were made by day, but by far the greatest damage was done during the night bombings. London was to experience night bombing every night for over two months. The three raids of September 18th, 27th and the 30th were by far the most intense, considerable damage was inflicted on the capital city but had it not been for the British fighters who by now were gaining valuable experience every day the damage would have been much worse. Each of these days, the German bombers sustained many casualties. In total 120 German aircraft were shot down or severely damaged while Fighter Command lost only 60.
The sad saga continued for the Luftwaffe, from September 15th German losses were mounting, but still Göring did not understand that he could ill afford to lose aircraft at the rate that he was. Although his aircraft establishments were producing more aircraft, Britain too was producing just as many. In fact newer models of the Hurricane and Spitfire were being produced that were to prove far more deadly than the earlier versions. Between September 7th and September 30th, Fighter Command had lost 242 aircraft compared with the Luftwaffe loss of 433. Nearly twice that of Britain.
October 1940 saw the beginning of Phase 4 of the battle, and a change in the Luftwaffe attacks. The night attacks continued on London, South Wales, the Midlands and Coventry. While London continually burnt and blazed night after night, the other raids elsewhere were concentrated on the industrial areas.
Göring had now realized that sending in an advance squadron of fighters and fighter bombers was not luring the RAF fighters into the air, and that strongest reaction by the British was concentrated bombing attacks. For this reason, Bf 109s were laden with a small bomb load, and that after the release of the bombs they could then revert to being fighters. Although this move only proved marginally effective, the 109s, because of the extra weight, used up more fuel and their stay over enemy territory was made even shorter.
With the introduction of the Bf 109E-7 Jabos, it was to set new tactics for the Luftwaffe and a new headache for Fighter Command. The German High Command issued orders that at least one Gruppe in every Jagdgeschwader was to be equipped for Jabo operations. The problem that Keith Park was now faced with was that these Jabos would fly at extremely high altitudes and come in at great speeds. The Hurricane was a great aircraft at lower altitudes, did not perform well at 25,000 feet. So the job of taking on the Jabos was left to the Spitfire squadrons which was a good performer at high altitudes.
October 7th saw a small but ineffective raid on Portsmouth and the west country. But 10 Group responded. The heaviest attack came as Ju 88s attacked the Westland Aircraft factory at Yeovil in Somerset. 609 Squadron Middle Wallop (Spitfires) responded at the order of AVM Brand, as well as 152 Squadron Warmwell (Spitfires), 238 squadron Middle Wallop (Hurricanes) and 601 squadron Filton (Hurricanes). 152 spots the formation first, there is a formation of 25 Junkers Ju88s escorted by 50 Bf 110s who are flying above and behind the bombers. Warmwells Spitfires are in front and above, and dive into the bombers splitting them up before the 110s can move in and give the bombers protection. 601 joins in and dogfights the 110s while the Spitfires attack the bomber formation.
Some of the bombers get through and succeed in causing some damage to the Westland factory by dropping over 80 high explosive and 6 oil bombs onto the complex. Over 100 people are casualties when one of the bombs scores a direct hit on an air-raid shelter. 2 Ju 88s and 7 Bf 110s are shot down at the expense of five British fighters destroyed and two badly damaged. The casualty list of aircraft may have been higher had not a squadron of Bf 109s came to the rescue of the bombers and the 110s as they retreated.
Raids and attacks continued as October wore on, the introduction of the Jabos was not as successful as Göring had hoped. The Spitfires had their measure, they maintained speed and contact and as their greatest advantage was their diving speed, the Spitfires seemed to round them up forcing them into a dive and into the waiting Hurricanes below. October 15th was one of the busier days.
The initial flight of Bf 109s get through to London. They drop their 250kg bombs on the factories of South London and Waterloo Station, one of the main railway stations in London gets a direct hit bringing all of the Southern Railway to a halt. Squadron from Biggin Hill and Hornchurch intercept them, but not before the damage has been done.
149 Squadron who had recently come down from Dyce got caught up in combat over the Channel and one of their Hurricanes manage to get a Bf 109. 609 Squadron Warmwell (Spitfires) also gets some action as they encounter Bf 109s and 110s who are attempting a raid on Portsmouth, but they are thrown into confusion over Southampton. The Luftwaffe fighter climb for the clouds and disappear while a formation of Bf 109s come down on the Spitfires. 609 Squadron too make for the safety of cloud cover and make a hasty retreat back to Warmwell.
By nightfall, yet another raid was made on London, still the RAF had no answer to the night raids of the Luftwaffe. They had a few Blenheims and Beaufighters that were equipped for night duties, but these were only good for attacking an odd recon plane or observation aircraft, they were not strong enough to take on a whole formation of heavy bombers. London suffered badly on October 15th when 520 civilians were killed, over 1,000 of them were injured and it is estimated that 10,000 more were made homeless.
By the 27th October, daylight raids were spasmodic, they were considered more of nuisance raids than anything else. There seemed to be no absolute pattern to the German attacks. Raids were conducted only by small groups of planes that were usually turned back by the intercepting British fighters.
The only change of any difference was on the 26th October, after the Italians had entered the war, a flight of Fiat BR 20s attacked the port of Harwich on the Essex coast causing only minor damage. On the 27th October a number of the airfields came under attack again. Hawkinge, still a forward airfield and of only minor importance, Martlesham, Kirton-on-Lindsay, Driffield and Honnington are also attacked, but serious damage is kept to a minimum.
On October 29th, the Luftwaffe launched what was possibly their last and final raid of any importance on London during the Battle of Britain. 40+ bombers are intercepted by RAF fighters but a number of them get through and manage to drop bombs on London. Park again asks that 12 Groups fighters to intercept the bombers, but it takes over twenty minutes before the Duxford Wing to form and is again too late to attack the bombers.
Near mid day, 100+ bomb carrying Bf 109s are intercepted by nine squadrons of British fighters. The Hurricanes and Spitfires have height advantage and dive onto the approaching 109s. 8 of the Messerschmitts are shot down in less than ten minutes, and the others drop their bombs at random and turn back in retreat. Other attacks were made at Harwich, Portsmouth, and North Weald is attacked by dive bombing Bf109s.
The 31st October is wet with limited visibility. Only minor attacks are made which are nothing more that nuisance raids interrupting dinner of many of the RAF pilots. Many thought that it may have been a repeat of the previous day when 80 German bombers in the morning session and 130 in the afternoon made feeble attempts at London, but poor visibility and closing weather, especially in the afternoon hampered all raids. The Luftwaffe lose eight aircraft to the RAFs 5, while on the 31st October, no aircraft are lost by either side.

The Battle of Britain has been under the intense scrutiny of historians and others for half a century. Aided by hindsight, they have been able to raise various controversial issues. Criticism is all too easy for those who come after. To touch on but one issue, it is known that both sides overclaimed by a considerable amount. (The British claimed that they had destroyed 2,698 aircraft. The German claimed they they had shot down 3,058. Post war investigation proved that the RAF had actually shot down 1,733 German aircraft and that the Luftwaffe had shot down 915 British fighters.) No-one who has not experienced air fighting can possibly imagine the confusion. Neither can they judge. Relative scores are an effect, not a cause. What is clear is that the Battle of Britain was won by Fighter Command because it defeated the Luftwaffe in the battle to control the air over southern England.
Mike Spick. The Height of the Battle/Battle of Britain Salamanda 1990

And the aircrew, Dowdings "chicks" - a term which delighted him when Churchill used it, though one he would have been far too reserved to coin for himself - what more should be said of them? Nothing, perhaps, except that without their skill, their transcendent courage, their devotion and their sacrifice, the scientific system would have been designed in vain. Together, they enabled Britain to escape the devastating clash of armies and the horrors of Nazi occupation.
Hough & Richards.The Battle of Britain. Hodder & Staughton London 1989

October 31st 1940 now goes down as the official date as the end of the Battle of Britain, even though Germany add the additional phases that include the bombing of London. We may ask ourselves now, that even though the British won the battle, where do we place the credit.
As far as combat action was concerned, the latter part of September and on into October 1940, were far less intense than the days leading up to September 15th. The combined efforts of Air Chief Marshal Hugh Dowding, Air Vice Marshal Keith Park, Air Vice Marshal Trafford Leigh-Mallory, the Air Ministry, the 2,935 pilots that took part as well as the thousands of personnel that manned the radar stations, filter rooms and the operation rooms. The refuellers and armourers and fitters that kept the fighteraircraft in the air. All the combined efforts of these people proved that by working as a team, they could attain victory over an enemy that was fighting for all the wrong reasons.
My own opinion is that it was teamwork, teamwork of all those who had even the slightest portion of responsibility. Fighter Command themselves, in particular Dowding and Park, but let us not forget the other Group leaders, Leigh-Mallory, Brand and Saul. The whole responsibility of Fighter Command lay on the shoulders of Sir Hugh Dowding. We must admire him even those who would not agree with many of his decisions. His task was not an easy one, taking on the might of the German Luftwaffe when it was at its peak, with an air force that that had had no experience in combat, pilots that had had too little training and with not enough planes. With Keith Park in charge of 11 Group, they together weathered the storm, between them they had done their best with what little they had. But their ideas, tactics and decisions would not have borne fruit if it were not for the pilots who were there to carry them out. I can say no more than what Dennis Richards and Richard Hough have said above.
But let us not forget others who made this victory possible. The radar plotters at the Chain Home and Chain Low radar stations, the WAAF who worked tirelessly at operations HQ, the telephonists, the armourers, the refuelers, the army who had to repair signaling equipment and the damaged airfields, right down to the batmen, the fitters, the mechanics and the cooks. The Battle of Britain was epic that had no planned script, yet it had a cast of thousands, and each person that took part must be given credit for its success.

http://www.battleofbritain1940.net/0052.html

 

Other Commands
"They also serve who only stand and wait."
John Milton "On His Blindness" (1665)
The significance of other commands in the Battle of Britain is often overlooked.
The Army's Anti-Aircraft Command manned around 4000 searchlights, 1280 medium, and 517 light anti-aircraft guns in July 1940. Despite being significantly under their recommended numbers the guns claimed approximately 300 Luftwaffe aircraft shot down during the Battle.
RAF Balloon Command operated Britain's barrage balloon defences, which in July 1940 consisted of 1466 balloons, including some 450 over London. The balloons played a significant role in Britain's anti-aircraft "umbrella" defences as they restricted the freedom of Luftwaffe aircraft often forcing them to fly different routes to a particular target or at higher altitudes and therefore within the range of anti-aircraft artillery. Along with the anti-aircraft guns their highly visible presence boosted the morale of the civilian population.
RAF Coastal Command's maritime reconnaissance patrols maintained a continuous watch over German preparations for the invasion of Britain and provided a defence of British merchant shipping from attack by German aircraft, submarines and surface vessels.
During the height of the invasion scare there were outlandish ideas to counter the German forces - some, such as airborne gas attacks, more practical than others. If German landings had taken place all RAF Commands would have involved. For many these would have been suicidal attacks in obsolete aircraft.
A Short Sunderland on patrol.
"Watching water" was a major occupation for Coastal Command during the Battle. It was important that German U-boats did not stop vital supplies reaching Britain.
Hawker Hector - Battle of Britain
Hawker Hectors had been involved in desperate attempts to resupply the British garrison at Calais at the end of May.
Since then many had been involved in anti invasion patrols. If the German fleet had set sail then the RAF would have thrown everything into the battle. This would have included these obsolete aircraft.
A Fairey Albacore of the Fleet Air Arm.
When they were on shore many of the Fleet Air Arm squadrons were placed under the control of Coastal Command to assist them in maritime operations.

http://www.rafmuseum.org.uk/research/online-exhibitions/history-of-the-battle-of-britain/other-commands.aspx

 

The Squadrons of Fighter Command
Fighter Command was divided into four specific groups, within each of these groups were the main airfields generally positioned well inland called Sector Stations, each of these Sector Stations had what is known as forward airfields or satellite stations positioned further towards the coastline. Each of these airfields were allocated a number of squadrons, the number varied depending as to the intensity of the combat action in any one designated area. Squadrons could be shifted around from one airfield to another to rest them from main combat areas to airfields where there was less action.
For example, 11 Group was divided into a number of sectors: Debden, North Weald, Hornchurch, Biggin Hill, Kenley and Tangmere. Open up the map then minimise and open it as required:

Take the "Hornchurch Sector" as an example. Close to London you will see Hornchurch aerodrome, this is the sector station for the Hornchurch Sector. The sector controller would be stationed at Hornchurch and would be in communication with 11 Group headquarters. You will also see that there are a number of other airfields within the Hornchurch sector, these included Rochford, Gravesend and Manston. The controller would move a number of his squadrons to some of these forward bases or "satellite" airfields as they were often called. These forward airfields formed an integral part of the Fighter Command system. Being usually closer to the coast than the main sector station, they could intercept the enemy much quicker than the squadrons based at the sector station, especially just prior to the Battle of Britain when the Luftwaffe was attacking the channel convoys. But later their important task was to intercept and disperse the incoming Luftwaffe formations slowing down their progress, so that when the squadrons from the main sector stations arrived air combat often became so intense that in a number of instances they caused the Luftwaffe missions to be aborted. Careful placement of the squadrons by the Sector Controller was critical, especially as the Luftwaffe was maintaining varied attacks and not concentrating on any one target area for any long period of time.
Squadrons attached to these forward airfields did not have the luxuries that the squadrons had at the sector stations. Pilot accommodation was often in tents with bedboards as beds, often they did not even have these. Meals on the station were often non-existent and many pilots preferred the local pub or cafe. These forward airfields did not have an operations room, usually just a wooden hut that was equipped with a telephone that linked them with their main sector station. Most of these airfields were not designed with the comforts of home in mind, priorities were given to fuel and ammunition dumps so that aircraft could return, refuel and rearm quickly and efficiently. But, some of the forward airfields were almost as good as their sector stations, but these were far and few. But as primitive and uncomfortable that they were, the squadrons that operated from these forward airfields were often the first to engage the enemy, and quite often suffered many casualties and loss of aircraft.
Squadrons that did come in for some heavy punishment, could be withdrawn back to the main sector airfield by the Station Controller and fresh squadrons or portions of a squadron (called flights) moved forward to replace tired and weary squadrons. Life was not easy for the squadrons at the forward stations, but they served well and often under the most difficult of situations maintained the task at hand.
It has always been the basic organisational structure within the Royal Air Force and one that was maintained during the Battle of Britain that each squadron would be equipped with twelve aircraft and that these would be flown by the squadron strength of eighteen pilots. Depending on as to how close each of the airfields were to the main combat action, each Sector Station could have been allocated three or four squadrons at any given time, and combined together they were known as Wings. It was normal practice within Fighter Command that squadrons fly individually unless called upon by the Station Controller to assist another squadron should the situation arise where combat action was exceptionally heavy. It would be more likely that should a squadron require assistance, then Group headquarters would use another squadron from another airfield so as not to deplete any airfield of all of its squadrons. The only time that squadrons flew as a Wing was in 12 Group and became was was later to be known as "The Big Wing".
But squadrons did not fly together as one unit, each of the squadrons was further divided up into two sections called 'Flights' generally called A and B flights with each of the Flights consisting of six aircraft divided into two sections of three aircraft. To distinguish one Flight from another, each of these Flights was given a coded colour, maybe red, blue, yellow or green. Each Flight was given a Flight Leader and he would always be known as number one, although during communications he would be known by his Flights coded colour and the word leader, hence Red Leader. The other two pilots/aircraft would be known as one and two respectively, hence Red 1 or Red 2.

As the Battle of Britain progressed, it was realised the disadvantages of the three aircraft 'vic' formation. It was proved difficult in sudden changes in direction and many pilots had agreed that the 'vic' formation used early in the battle was the cause of many losses. They did however use a formation later in the battle based on the Luftwaffe 'schwarme' and called by the RAF as 'The Finger Four' because in plan view, if you laid out an outstretched hand, there would be an aircraft at the tips of each of fingers. The leader would take up position at the tip of the longest finger, his number two would be at the tip of the index finger while number three and four would be at the tips of the other two fingers. This formation was adopted by all squadrons with greater success for the rest of the battle.

SQUADRONS THAT TOOK PART IN THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN

1 SQUADRON: Hurricanes, Coded JX, Operated from Northolt & Tangmere
1RCAF SQUADRON: Hurricanes, Coded YO, Operated from Croydon & Northolt
3 SQUADRON: Hurricanes, Coded QO, Operated from Kenley & Wick(Scotland)
17 SQUADRON: Hurricanes, Coded YB, Operated from Debden & Martlesham Heath
19 SQUADRON: Spitfires, Coded QV, Operated from Fowlemere & Duxford
23 SQUADRON: Blenheims, Coded YP, Operated from Colyweston & Wittering
25 SQUADRON: Blenheims & Beaufighters, Coded ZK, Operated from North Weald
29 SQUADRON: Blenheims & Beaufighters, Coded RO, Operated from Debden
32 SQUADRON: Hurricanes, Coded GZ, Operated from Biggin Hill & Acklington(Rest)
41 SQUADRON: Spitfires, Coded EB, Hornchurch & Catterick
43 SQUADRON "China-British": Hurricanes, Coded FT, Operated from Tangmere & Northolt
46 SQUADRON "Uganda": Hurricanes, Coded PO, Operated from Stapleford
54 SQUADRON: Spitfires, Coded KL, Operated from Hornchurch & Catterick(Rest)
56 SQUADRON "Punjab": Hurricanes, Coded US, Operated from North Weald & Boscombe Down
64 SQUADRON: Spitfires, Coded SH, Operated from Kenley, Hornchurch & Biggin Hill
65 SQUADRON "East India": Spitfires, Coded YT, Operated from Hornchurch & Turnhouse(Rest)
66 SQUADRON: Spitfires, Coded LZ, Operated from Coltishall & Kenley
72 SQUADRON "Basutoland": Spitfires, Coded RN, Operated from Drem & Biggin Hill
73 SQUADRON: Hurricanes, Coded TP, Operated from Church Fenton
74 SQUADRON "Trinidad": Spitfires, Coded ZP, Operated from Hornchurch & Biggin Hill
79 SQUADRON "Madras Presidency": Hurricanes, Coded NV, Operated from Acklington & Biggin Hill
85 SQUADRON: Hurricanes, Coded VY, Operated from Debden & Croydon
87 SQUADRON "United Provinces": Hurricanes, Coded LK, Operated from Exeter
92 SQUADRON "East India": Spitfires, Coded QJ, Operated from Hornchurch & Biggin Hill
111 SQUADRON "Treble One": Hurricanes, Northolt & Drem(Rest)
141 SQUADRON: Defiants, Coded TW, Operated from West Malling & Biggin Hill
145 SQUADRON: Hurricanes, Coded SO, Operated from Tangmere & Westhampnet
151 SQUADRON: Hurricanes, Coded DZ, Operated from North Weald
152 SQUADRON "Hyderabad": Spitfires, Coded UM, Operated from Warmwell
213 SQUADRON: Hurricanes, Coded AK, Operated from Exeter & Leconfield
219 SQUADRON: Blenheims, Coded FK, Operated from Catterick & Redhill
222 SQUADRON: Spitfires, Coded ZD, Operated from Kirkon-in-Lindsay(Rest) & Hornchurch
229 SQUADRON: Hurricanes, Coded HB, Operated from Wittering & Northolt
232 SQUADRON: Hurricanes, Coded EF, Operated from Sumburgh
234 SQUADRON: Spitfires, Coded AZ, Operated from Church Fenton & Middle Wallop
235 SQUADRON: Blenheims, Coded LA, Operated from Thorney Island & Bircham Newton
236 SQUADRON: Blenheims, Coded FA, Operated from Thorney Island
238 SQUADRON: Hurricanes, Coded VK, Operated from Middle Wallop & St Eval
242 SQUADRON "Canadian": Hurricanes, Coded LE, Operated from Coltishall & Duxford
245 SQUADRON "Northern Rhodesia": Hurricanes, Coded DR, Operated from Aldergrove
247 SQUADRON "China-British": Gladiators, Coded HP, Operated from St Eval
248 SQUADRON: Blenheims, Coded WR, Operated from Dyce
249 SQUADRON "Gold Coast": Coded GN, Operated from Church Fenton/Boscombe Down/Nth Weald
253 SQUADRON "Hyderabad": Hurricanes, Coded SW, Operated from Turnhouse & Kenley
257 SQUADRON "Burma": Hurricanes, Coded DT, Operated from Northolt & Debden
263 SQUADRON: Whirlwinds, Coded HE, Operated from Drem
264 SQUADRON "Madras Presidency": Defiants, Coded PS, Operated from Fowlmere & Hornchurch
266 SQUADRON "Rhodesia": Spitfires, Coded UO, Operated from Wittering & Hornchurch
302 SQUADRON "Poznan": Hurricanes, Coded WX, Operated from Northolt & Westhampnet
303 SQUADRON "Warsaw": Hurricanes, Coded RF, Operated from Northolt & Leconfield(Rest)
310 SQUADRON: Hurricanes, Coded NN, Operated from Duxford
312 SQUADRON: Hurricanes, Coded DU, Operated from Speke
501 SQUADRON "County of Gloucester" Auxiliary Air Force
Hurricanes, Coded SD, Operated from Middle Wallop/Gravesend/Kenley
504 SQUADRON "County of Nottingham" Auxiliary Air Force
Hurricanes, Coded TM, Operated from Wick/Hendon/Filton
600 SQUADRON "City of London" Auxiliary Air Force
Blenheims, Coded BQ, Operated from Northolt
601 SQUADRON "County of London" Auxiliary Air Force
Hurricanes, Coded UF, Operated from Middle Wallop & Tangmere
602 SQUADRON "City of Glasgow" Auxiliary Air Force
Spitfires, Coded LO, Operated from Drem & Westhampnet
603 SQUADRON "City of Edinburgh" Auxiliary Air Force
Spitfires, Coded XT, Operated from Drem/Turnhouse/Hornchurch
604 SQUADRON "County of Middlesex" Auxiliary Air Force
Blenheims/Beaufighters, Coded NG, Operated from Middle Wallop
605 SQUADRON "County of Warwick" Auxiliary Air Force
Hurricanes, Coded UP, Operated from Wick & Croydon
607 SQUADRON "County of Durham" Auxiliary Air Force
Hurricanes, Coded AF, Operated from Usworth & Tangmere
609 SQUADRON "West Riding" Auxiliary Air Force
Spitfires, Coded PR, Operated from Middle Wallop & Warmwell
610 SQUADRON "County of Chester" Auxiliary Air Force
Spitfires, Coded DW, Operated from Biggin Hill & Acklington(Rest)
611 SQUADRON "West Lancashire" Auxiliary Air Force
Spitfires, Coded FY, Operated from Digby
615 SQUADRON "County of Surrey" Auxiliary Air Force
Hurricanes, Coded KW, Operated from Kenley & Northolt
616 SQUADRON "South Yorkshire" Auxiliary Air Force
Spitfires, Coded YQ, Operated from Leconfield/Kenley/Coltishall/Kirton-in-Lindsay

SQUADRONS OF THE ROYAL AIR FORCE
The Royal Air Force drew its men for flying training with the purpose from a number of sources. The final outcome would be that the RAF could at any time call upon these men if ever the need was to arise.
Fighter pilots are not made, they are created. One of the ways was a commonwealth training scheme where anybody wishing to fly for their country could be trained in flying, navigation, communication and combat. As early as 1935 the British government discussed the possibility of the Empire Training Scheme where future pilots could be created in the dominions of Australia, Canada and New Zealand. Both New Zealand and Australia welcomed the idea and gave it all their support, but the largest and closest commonwealth country Canada, through its Prime Minister Mackenzie King refused to discuss the proposal even though British Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin offered to pay for both the training and the aircraft. It was not until 1939 that Canada agreed to the scheme and commenced in all three dominions on April 29th 1940, far too late to train pilots for the Battle of Britain.
Before the war the RAF trained men in the Volunteer Reserve (RAFVR) and in the Auxiliary Air Force (AAF). Many of Britain's prestigious universities also had flying schools known as University Air Squadrons which later were to be swallowed up within the Auxiliary Air Force. Short Service Commissions were another form of training where pilots done their basic training with the air force of their own country, then the Royal Air Force would offer a limited number of these pilots to join the RAF in Britain to undergo more comprehensive training with one of the RAF squadrons.
ROYAL AIR FORCE VOLUNTEER RESERVE: Introduced in 1936, the RAFVR was formed and allowed young men from civilian life between the ages of 18 and 25 to learn to fly in their spare time. They were paid during training by the government which meant that it was funded at the taxpayers expense. All training was carried out at weekends at local flying schools and during evenings to carry out basic fundamentals needed for the purpose of becoming a pilot.
UNIVERSITY AIR SQUADRONS: Many of Britain's universities such as Oxford, Eton, Winchester and Cambridge had their own prestigious flying clubs known as University Air Squadrons. Learning to fly at university was not compulsory and was to include only student volunteers. Most of these pilots of the University Air Squadrons were to join the Auxiliary Air Force at the outbreak of war and many of these once student pilots were to become legends in their own right during the Second World War.
AUXILIARY AIR FORCE: This was formed as early as 1926 as part of Lord Trenchard's plan for the rebuilding of Britain's air force after WWI. When such a formation was suggested by Trenchard, there was considerable opposition to its instigation stating that military flying and operations was far too dangerous and complicated for weekend and part time fliers. Trenchard argued back that even the regular pilots of the Royal Air Force had to commence training at some stage and if the RAF could train potential pilots in an auxiliary capacity they would become an important asset to the regular squadrons if the time and need arose.
The AAF when ahead despite the opposition and commenced with just four squadrons. These young men were trained at weekends both at a desk and for more practical training, and by 1939 the AAF boasted no less than twenty squadrons. Many of the squadrons attracted a special type of man, one who was well educated, wealthy or had a prominent position in a large company.
More than one pilot was less enthusiastic about the AAF squadrons. Skilled RAFVR Sergeant pilots such as "Ginger" Lacey posted to an AAF squadron, sometimes found them "a rather snobbish preserve of the rich." "Johnnie" Johnson another of the RAF's top fighter aces, remained convinced that he had failed to get into an AAF squadron when the interviewing officer discovered that he was not a fox-hunting man. On another AAF squadron there was always 'a social test' in which a prospective officer candidate would be given Sunday lunch, and "several glasses of sherry" to discover "if his parlance was no longer that of a gentleman." Said one of them, "Auxiliaries are gentlemen trying to be officers. Regulars are officers trying to be gentlemen. VRs are neither trying to be both......

.....At the outbreak of war the "millionaires" [601 Squadron] were concerned with the prospect of petrol rationing and how it would affect their private transport. An officer was assigned to the task of buying petrol. He came back having bought a service station but announced that the pumps were only half full. This situation was remedied when another pilot remembered that he was a director of Shell [the Shell Oil Company]. His secretary promptly arranged a delivery of fuel.
Len Deighton Fighter pp44-45 Pimlico

THE ROYAL AIR FORCE: The regular squadrons of the Royal Air Force were the full time members most who had signed on for a pre-determined period. At the outbreak of the war, those aircrew on short service commissions were placed into regular squadrons, and members from the dominion countries serving in Britain had to stay in Britain to continue service as long as the duration of the war.
SHORT SERVICE COMMISSIONS: In Great Britain the minimum age for a short service commission was eighteen years and once accepted a period of five years had to be served. For dominion countries a selection was made for a limited number of pilots to be transferred from the air force of the country that they were serving in to the RAF. They too had to serve the minimum of five years and those that were accepted thought it to be a great honour to have been selected.
Although Canada sent their own Canadian squadrons to Britain, countries like Australia and New Zealand did not. This was possibly due to the fact that there was considerable unrest in the Oceanic area because there was always the possibility of Japan entering the war as an ally to Germany. Those Australian and New Zealand pilots serving in Britain seemed to be 'in the wrong place at the wrong time'. Many became aces or heroes during the Battle of Britain, never to be forgotten and live on to become household names.

http://www.battleofbritain1940.net/0005.html

 

The Battle of Britain – 20 October 1940: Daytime fighter bomber attacks in London and the south east and heavy bombing at night aimed at London and the Midlands were the major Luftwaffe activities.
Coventry was hit, although the terrible night for that city, named (in English) “Operation Moonlight Sonata” by the Germans would not occur until 14 November.
At 1.45 pm a Bf 109 flying as a fighter bomber escort exploded over Woolwich during an attack by RAF fighters. Oberfeldwebel Friedemann fell to the ground, his parachute unopened.
The front part of his aircraft came down at Wickham Street, Welling, among temporary homes built for Londoners who had been bombed out. The Evening News caught the scene as a crowd inspected the wreckage.
By now, sheltering from the bombs in London tube stations was becoming commonplace and refreshment services were beginning to develop, including food deliveries by specially arranged underground trains.
http://www.battleofbritainmemorial.org/the-battle-of-britain-as-it-happened/

 

How RAF Coastal Command Defended Britain During The Second World War








By Ian Carter







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RAF Coastal Command played a pivotal role in the Allied war effort, most notably against Hitler's U-boats during the Battle of the Atlantic – a role which has been largely obscured by the more famous achievements of Fighter Command, and Bomber Command's costly and controversial offensive against German industry. Yet the war to protect Britain's Atlantic life-line and secure safe shipping routes for men and materiel from North America was perhaps the most important struggle of all.
From weak and feeble beginnings, and in the face of massive competition for resources, Coastal Command built a formidable force of anti-submarine aircraft. Armed with effective new weapons and the latest radar technology, these could hunt and attack U-boats by day or night, off Britain’s shores or out in the vast expanses of the Atlantic Ocean.
Coastal Command patrolled a vast area of the Atlantic from the Arctic Circle to North Africa – some ten million square miles of ocean. To extend its reach, squadrons were based at Gibraltar, Iceland, West Africa and in the Azores.
A small number of long-range aircraft made a huge difference in the convoy battles, which was fortunate as Coastal Command was denied its fair share of home-grown aircraft.
Instead, it relied mostly on American-built Liberators, Catalinas and Flying Fortresses, and the obsolescent cast-offs from RAF Bomber Command. Ironically, aircraft numbers only reached satisfactory levels after the Battle of the Atlantic had been won, but U-boats were pursued until the very end of the war.
A lesser-known facet of Coastal Command's war was its campaign against German shipping operating along the coast of occupied Europe. After a costly and ineffective start, Coastal Command's offensive arm grew strong, so that in the last year of the war the powerful Beaufighter and Mosquito Strike Wings halted much of Germany's traffic of raw materials.

http://www.iwm.org.uk/history/how-raf-coastal-command-defended-britain-during-the-second-world-war

 

How Bomber Command Helped Win The Battle Of Britain





http://www.iwm.org.uk/history/how-bomber-command-helped-win-the-battle-of-britain

 

PATTULLO, WILLIAM BLAIR

Rank:

Pilot Officer

Trade:

Pilot

Service No:

43379

Date of Death:

26/10/1940

Age:

21

Regiment/Service:

Royal Air Force



46 Sqdn.

Grave Reference:

Row 2. Grave 8.

Cemetery:

NORTH WEALD BASSETT (ST. ANDREW) CHURCHYARD



Additional Information:

Son of Patrick William and Jessie Hood Blair Pattullo, of Eaglescliffe, Co. Durham.


















http://northwealdairfieldhistory.org/2009/06/22/william-blair-pattulo/

 

Battle of Britain Day by Day
70 years on, a part contemporary, part historical record of Britain's finest hour, day by day
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Day 114 – 31st October 1940
October 31, 2010 in 73 Squadron, October 1940
Weather: cloud and widespread drizzle

FIGHTER COMMAND SERVICEABLE AIRCRAFT AS AT 0900 HOURS:

Blenheim – 40
Spitfire – 227
Hurricane – 399
Defiant – 10
Gladiator – 8
Total – 684
It seemed that the weather was putting an end to the battle by day. This was in fact, officially, the last day of the Battle of Britain. The effort put in by the enemy that day seemed half-hearted. However, October as whole was far from representing a gradual decline in enemy activity. On the contrary, it had put RAF fighters to perhaps the sternest test of the whole encounter. The switch by the Luftwaffe to attacks by fighters and fighter bombers and its abandonment of the twin-engined bomber as its main weapon increased the odds against the RAF. Furthermore, the tactic of sending many of the attacks at what was in those days extreme altitude put a serious extra strain on RAF pilots. All this had resulted in many more fighter-to-fighter combats. The physical strain on pilots of this new form of combat was beginning to tell on RAF capacity to hold their own. The Battle had also taken its toll on the civilian population with the total casualties from the bombing in October being 6,334 civilians killed and 8,695 seriously injured.

However, the RAF kept up its ability to absorb the lessons of every new tactic employed by the Luftwaffe. Whatever the Luftwaffe threw at them, RAF pilots always rose to the challenge. They were doing so on the last day of the Battle as they had done on the first day on July 10th.

73 Squadron Operational Record Book -31 October
Weather terrible – impossible to do any flying, everyone getting ‘brassed off’ with the mud and general bad conditions.

Reported Casualties (RAF Campaign Diary 31st October 1940):

* Enemy: 0 confirmed, 0 probable, 0 damaged
* Own:Nil


http://battleofbritainblog.com/2010/10/31/day-114-%E2%80%93-october-31st-1940/

 

DIXON, FREDERICK JOHN POWELL




Rank:

Sergeant

Trade:

Pilot

Service No:

742124

Date of Death:

11/07/1940

Age:

21

Regiment/Service:

Royal Air Force Volunteer Reserve



501 Sqdn.

Grave Reference:

Plot 8. Row C. Grave 14.

Cemetery:

ABBEVILLE COMMUNAL CEMETERY EXTENSION



Additional Information:

Son of Frederick Alfred Dixon, C.M.G., D.S.O., and Ethel Howard Dixon, of Aldwick, Bognor Regis, Sussex.