AFAIK the tank no longer exists. There is another one though, from the same time frame (Jan 45) at the nearby Belgium town of Houffalize. A Panther of the 116th Panzer Division which was left behind after it overturned and dropped into the river Ourthe. See also: Tank monument Panther at Houffalize - Bulge1944.com
Thank you kindly for this information Stolpi. Im planing retracing steps of the 61st Highland Anti Tank Regiment and ive completed their time in the highlands from 1940 to early 42 when they left Buckie for Aldershot. We have a group dedicated to the regiment mostly relatives of the men who served including my grandfather. Can i ask do you have a connection to the regiment? Kindest Regards Ed Pattinson
5th Bn Black Watch and the fight for Hubermont, Jan 12th & 13th, 45 1. Plan of attack By January 11th, General Rennie’s Highland Division had made considerable progress - such that the rumbling of the guns of the Third U.S. Army could be heard in the distance. With the capture of Hives and Mierchamps, Rennie had gained a footing on the high ground south of La Roche: a high undulating plateau, deeply incised on its edges by the Bronse river and the steep sided valley of the Ourthe and its western branch, the Ourthe Occidentale. It was almost triangular in shape with La Roche at the apex. A narrow winding secondary road, following the base of the triangle, passing through the small farming settlements of Cens, Ortho, Nisramont and Filly, was all that remained as an escape route to the enemy this side of the western branch of the Ourthe. For the past days long enemy columns had slowly toiled eastwards over this track to escape envelopment. In the deep gorge of the Ourthe, between Nisramont and Filly, the enemy, had constructed a provisional bridge spanning the fast-flowing river. Everywhere else the bridges were out and no crossings existed but for a few small fords, blocked up by many a bogged down vehicle. Opposite the 51st HD, rear elements of the 2nd Pz and the Panzer Lehr Division (both belonging to 47.Pz Korps - Von Lüttwitz) were shielding the enemy retreat. By that time both were reduced to mere 'Kampfgruppen', the 2nd Pz Division for example no longer had tanks at its disposal, having lost the last operable Panther on the night to the 12th, when it broke down and was captured by 7th Black Watch at Hives. At the close of Jan 11th, 1945, the 51 Highland Division issued its operation instructions for the following day. A final concerted effort was required to take the last stretch of ground separating the Highlanders from the westward branch of the Ourthe river (aka Ourthe Occidentale), which separated the British from the Third US Army. Using the roads emanating from La Roche to the south and southeast, the Highland Division was to make a main effort up on to the high ground and cut the German retreat. The 154 Brigade was to strike out from Hives to the south with the 7th Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders and seize the tiny hamlet of Beaulieu which lay astride the enemy escape route (an operation discussed in detail above Ardennes 1945, 51st Highland Div). Simultaneously, 154 Bde was also to put in an attack to the southeast of La Roche, along the main road towards Bertogne, and seize the villages of Ortho and Nisramont, both also astride the enemy escape route. For the latter thrust, the 5th Black Watch was attached to the 154 Bde (the battalion was placed under command at 11.1500 hrs). This was with an eye toward inserting the rest of 153 Brigade, which was held in reserve further north in the valley of the Ourthe, as soon as a footing had been gained on the high ground. Meanwhile, 152 Brigade was to guard the division’s right flank and probe with strong fighting patrols in the direction of Erneuville and Champlon. Since the Americans in the south also were making good progress, 51 Highland Division ordered his commanders not to advance beyond the line Champlon – Cens – Ortho – Nisramont. From here reconnaissance patrols were to close up to the river line to make contact with the Americans. The Highland attacks on 12 Jan 45 encountered enemy rear guards consisting of small packets of mechanized infantry supported by Panther tanks who only grudgingly gave way. Thus buying time for the main body of the enemy forces to escape.
The 5th Black Watch, under Lieutenant-Colonel Bill C. Bradford, was to move from La Roche-en-Ardenne on to the high ground to the southeast of La Roche, along the main road leading to Bertogne, known as the Rue d'Ortho (or the N 834). The battalion had to climb out of the deep valley along a narrow neck of ground, the wood covered extension of the Mont Soeret feature, with the ground dropping away to the deep-cut streambeds of the Ourthe River on one side and its small tributary the River Hermeux on the other. The small stretch of ground in between was covered with woods. The terrain initially left virtually no room for manoeuvre except on the road, which was cut into the side of the defile of the Hermeux stream. Only after several miles, near an isolated farmstead - called the Fme du Vivier – did the ground widen sufficiently for units to be deployed. Bradford’s objective was a hilltop just a couple of hundred yards beyond the Fme du Vivier, called the ‘400 contour’ - 400 because of its elevation measured in meters. Once firm, the two Gordon battalions of 153 Brigade were to pass through and push on; the 5/7th Gordons on the right to Ortho and the 1st Gordons on the left to Nisramont. During the first stage of the operation the 5th Black Watch was under command of the 154 Brigade. Tank support would be provided by ‘C’ Squadron of the 144th Regiment RAC, 33rd Armoured Brigade. The infantry would be preceded by the reconnaissance cars of no.3 Troop, of ‘C’ Squadron, 2nd Derbyshire Yeomanry. See also: Bill Bradford (British Army officer) - Wikipedia In the course of the afternoon of 11 January, Colonel Bradford had been informed that a move up on to the high ground was likely, and some preliminary arrangements had been made. The capture of La Roche by 154 Bde took longer than expected and by late in the afternoon Bradford was told that his battalion would not be called upon that day and would remain in its present billeting area at Warizy. However, late that evening, at 22:45 hrs, Bradford received a message that Brigadier Oliver, the CO of 154 Brigade, was on his way to his Battalion HQ, and when the latter arrived some thirty minutes later, he brought with him orders for an attack at first light next day. This left Bradford with very little time to get ready. By the time he and his staff had completed the final arrangements it was 03:00 hrs and reveille was at 04:45 hrs. The battalion moved off in transport from Warizy at 06:20 hrs and after a short ride alighted near La Roche at 07:00 hrs. From here the troops continued on foot to the south-eastern fringe of the town. The move out from the start-line, however, was delayed by the late arrival of the reconnaissance cars of the Derbyshire Yeomanry, and then the leading car, within three minutes, blew up on the first mine found. After this Bradford ordered ‘A’ Company, commanded by Major Eric Mathew, to take over the vanguard and push on. All the time the increasing din of the battle at Hives, higher up in the hills to the south, could be heard. Soldiers of the 51st Highland Division about to enter La-Roche-en-Ardennes. They pass through a rocky defile, locally known as the Trouée du Chalet on the NW corner of the town (see Ardennes 1945, 51st Highland Div) The snow and ice covered roads in the Ardennes severely hampered all vehicular movements.
2. Getting set: move up toward La Roche-en-Ardenne Private Tom J. Renouf of ‘A’ Company: “We were transported by troop carriers along the main approach road to La Roche. I remember disembarking from the carriers and setting off on a march of a few miles. It was early morning and there was a lot of snow on the ground. As we were approaching La Roche there was the sound of distant gunfire but we did not suffer any shelling. Our platoon sergeant was Sgt.Bob Fowler, DCM, an outstanding soldier and a great leader. There was no platoon officer, because our officers were ambushed when out on reconnaissance in Opheusden (on the Island) on 28 November 1944. Bob ordered us to march in staggered sections – he always did things the correct way. As we approached La Roche the skies began to fill with clouds and soon it began to snow. The snow flakes were very, very large. One member of my section, a wiry Lancastrian called Milligan, was carrying the PIAT bombs. He kept falling behind and I had to tell him to keep up. We entered La Roche from the high ground, the road bounded on our right by cliffs. It was dominated by a ruined medieval castle, but now the town itself was in ruins too. I will never forget the sight of the town. It was completely demolished. All the buildings had been razed to the ground, with just a few chimney stacks sticking out of the rubble. It was in a worse state than any other town I had seen, save for Caen. The Royal Engineers were working in the town center, trying to clear the rubble and open the road. As we moved through the town it was snowing quite hard (with big flakes) and the snow on the ground was getting visibly thicker. Another sight I will never forget was three Derbyshire Yeoman walking towards us, the one in the center with his head covered by blood stained bandages and being led by the others. This might have been the reconnaissance car which was blown up by a mine, but there were more Derbyshire Yeomanry casualties to be seen. Our march to the start-line was punctuated by stops and starts.” (1) (1) Letter of Tom Renouf, 1998 The Allied aircraft used "carpet bombing" to destroy the small Ardennes towns that had the misfortune to be located on road junctions used by the enemy. This tactic was successful, in that it delayed and disrupted enemy logistics, but it did mean the almost total destruction of many towns. The town of La Roche was no exception to the rule. It had been an important road center for the enemy advance and consequently had been almost continually shelled by long-range Allied shell fire. It also had been subjected to air raids several times, with the rock-bottom being reached on New Years’ day when the town was the target of successive waves of Allied medium bombers, which turned the center and eastern district of the small town in a pile of rubble. 348 out of the 649 buildings of La Roche were completely destroyed, only few escaped damage, and well over one hundred civilians were killed (photos courtesy:Bataille des Ardennes – Les ruines de La Roche en Ardenne – déc. 1944-janv.1945) .The Highlanders did not move through the bombed out center of the town, but instead followed the road along the left bank of the Ourthe, that led directly to the Faubourg district. The center of the town, situated on the right bank of the river, was within the boundary of the VII US Corps. Upstream from La Roche, the Ourthe River winds through a deeply incised, sometimes canyon-like, valley. The road climbs out of the gorge and no longer follows the river. Just south of Nisramont the main stream of the Ourthe is formed by the junction of its two branches, the Ourthe Occidentale (or westward branch - with its headwaters near Libramont to the SW of Bastogne) and Ourthe Meridionale (eastward branch - which passed through Houffalize and had its headwaters near Gouvy on the northern border of Luxembourg). The Ourthe Occidentale (westward branch) lay astride the path of the 51st HD.
This US Signal photo, taken a few days previously near Verdenne, on Jan 9th, 1945 depicts what appears to be an officer group. They belong to the 5th Black Watch. Does anyone recognize the men in the picture? Officers at the time were: Bn CO Lt. Col. W.C. "Bill"Bradford MBE, DSO, MC (-) 2nd i/c Major G.W. Dunn DSO MC (-) A Coy - Major A. Mathews B Coy - Major Sandy Leslie C Coy - Major Graham Pilcher MC D Coy - Major Donald Wallace Beales (KIA on 12 Feb 45 in Op Veritable) My best guess at the moment is that the man in the white snow-suit, with a binocular, is Major Sandy Leslie (based on similarity of eyebrows), while the man on the right, also carrying a binocular, might be Colonel Bradford (eyebrows, moustache, ears & age, Bradford was 32 at the time of the Ardennes)? Unfortunately this photo, of US Signals origin, surfaced only recently. Had I found it earlier on, I could have shown it to the veterans I met, back in the late '90-ies.
3. Fight for the Fme du Vivier, 12 jan 1945 The road along which the 5th Black Watch advanced had been barricaded at intervals by felled trees and mines. One roadblock consisted of over 30 trees, which had to be cleared by the pioneer platoon of Sergeant Peter Prentice and finished by a bulldozer of the Royal Engineers. This all considerably slowed down the advance. It was not until noon before the leading elements of the battalion - Major Mathew’s ‘A’ Company - reached the forest edge just short of the Fme du Vivier. As the company emerged in the open it came under enemy fire from the direction of the farm buildings and the high ground beyond. The edge of the woods where the leading elements of 5th Black Watch emerged by noon of the 12th, view towards the west, in the direction of La Roche-en-Ardenne (Courtesy: Google Street View). Private Tom J. Renouf: “We left La Roche and continued uphill into the forest. It now was about noon. The sky was heavy with clouds, it was now a dark day, with snow still falling. We travelled up this road for about one and a half miles, ‘A’ Company now in the lead, but not our platoon. There were many stops and starts and there were a few shells coming in our direction. By this time we were beginning to feel the cold. The leading section reached the open ground and was making to the Fme du Vivier when they were fired upon by an enemy tank. One man, Alexander Close, was killed and others were wounded, but the section was able to withdraw. The company was then deployed in defensive position on the left hand side of the road and was told to ‘dig in’. However, the ground was frozen solid, so we had to lay down in the snow among the trees, seeking whatever cover we could find. By now it was beginning to darken. Before long we were mortar bombed. Since we had no adequate protection from slit trenches, several of the platoon were hit, including Stan Suskins - for the third time. Meanwhile, the farm building was shelled by our artillery. An attack was mounted, but the odds were against us, it was ‘A’ Company against enemy armour – and we failed to capture the farm.” (1) (1) Letter of Tom Renouf. 1998
Colonel Bradford called for artillery in support of 'A' Company's assault and from 1220 to 1300 hrs the guns emplaced behind him pounded the Fme du Vivier area and the road leading back from it toward Hubermont. Since enemy tanks were reported, Bradford also called forward the Shermans of no.4 Troop, ‘C’ Squadron, 144th Regiment RAC. The Shermans duelled with the enemy tanks for some time, then one of them – a Sherman 17-pounder – received a direct hit and brewed up. The crew was wounded, but none was killed. The other two tanks kept on firing to allow Major Mathews to make a right flank attack. But this one also was staved off, though a number of infantry and a tank were seen to withdraw. The infantry soon became pinned down in the deep snow, and the two supporting tanks suffered mechanical breakdowns and had to withdraw. Bradford again resorted to artillery fire to engage the enemy tanks. Three ‘Victor Targets’, one on a scale ten, were fired between 14:25 to 15:00 hrs – with every gun within range, zeroed in on the target, each gun in the latter concentration firing ten rounds. As it was obvious that ‘A’ Company could not advance any further, Bradford ordered Major Sandy Leslie’s ‘B’ Company to move round the left, by a forest trail to a track junction just to the north of the Fme du Vivier, in order to outflank the enemy position at the farm. Some 600 yards short of the objective, at a spot where the trail enters an open field, Major Leslie’s troops spotted a machinegun post across the open ground and another at the farmyard, cleverly sited to cover the approaches to the Fme du Vivier. A patrol sent further round through the woods to the left crept up to the track junction, but was not able to dislodge the machinegun post which was covering the track. The rest of Leslie’s company followed the route taken by the patrol and established itself at the track junction. Still the machinegun post could not be dislodged, there was a wide stretch of open ground around it and every move of the troops showed up and immediately brought down a burst of machinegun fire. Meanwhile blocks of felled trees and mines were being removed from the forest track further back, allowing the battalion 6-pounder anti-tank guns to be brought up along the trail, described by the War Diary as 'an awful path which was almost impassable'. The antitank guns were urgently needed, because two Panther tanks had been spotted in the forest near ‘400 contour’, behind the Fme du Vivier. View from the Fme du Vivier towards the west. From the forest edge in the distance the Highlanders had to cross open sloping ground toward the farm, which had been transformed into an enemy strongpoint. Behind the farm, the ground rises again to 'contour 400' . Here two Panther tanks were spotted, lurking within the forest. From this position the enemy tanks had a commanding view of the battlefield in front of them. Major Graham Pilcher, commander of ‘C’ Company, remembers: “While Major Sandy Leslie’s Company was trying to bypass the enemy resistance by moving on the left, I was at Battalion Tac HQ with the commanding officer, Lt.Col. Bill Bradford. It was reported that the two remaining Sherman tanks were stopped with mechanical breakdown. At that point Brigadier Sinclair, the 153 Brigade CO [at 16:00 hrs the 5th Black Watch had reverted to command of 153 Brigade] came on the air to the CO: “Bill why can’t you get on, you’re getting bogged down.” This made the CO furious, as he was already under severe pressure with all that was happening. He retorted: “If you want to know, I suggest you come up and see for yourself!” It was some time before ‘B’ Company reported back. After considerable exchange of fire they had dislodged the stubborn machinegun post at the Fme du Vivier by setting fire to a haystack beside the post with a PIAT bomb and burnt the enemy out. Being outflanked the enemy withdrew from the area and in fading light about thirty of the enemy could be seen withdrawing from the farm. ‘B’ Company now was in a firm position and had secured the left flank from which it could give covering fire for my Company.” (1) (1) Letter of Major Pilcher, 1998
4. Capture of 'contour 400' ('C' Coy against Panthers) In fading daylight, Major Pilcher’s ’C’ Company passed through ‘B’ at the Fme du Vivier and advanced towards the ‘400 contour’ a couple of hundred yards behind the Fme du Vivier. On their objective the company bumped into quite an enemy force of enemy. Though the enemy was taken by surprise, as the War Diary states, 'full advantage of this was not taken, and the enemy withdrew after considerable fighting'. Major Pilcher: “Under ‘B’ Company’s covering fire and artillery support from our gunners my company moved forward in file on either side of a track through the forest. As it was getting dark, the platoons had to be in easy reach of each other to keep in control. No.14 Platoon of Lieutenant Dick Stewart moved in front, closely followed by Company HQ, then followed no.13 Platoon of Lieutenant Alan Foster and last was no.15 Platoon of Lieutenant Philip Smythe. I, obviously, was forward with the leading platoon, leaving the Company Sergeant-Major Geddes in charge of Company HQ. We pushed on and within minutes bumped into a German Panther tank, closed up for the night. Under the circumstances there was no way we could deal with the German tank, so we by-passed it and made for our objective the ‘400 contour’. The leading platoon ran into some German infantry near our objective, who retreated after a short fire fight. We consolidated without further trouble, occupying trenches found or digging into the snow, as the ground was too hard for digging. On consolidation, Battalion Tac HQ and the anti-tank guns moved into the area. Later ‘A’ Company came through.” Company HQ, next in line, was not so lucky. It got caught in a fire-fight with the now alert Panther. As they approached the forest the tank, still buttoned up, suddenly roared into sight and, swaying his gun to and fro, sprayed the fields with machine gun bullets. Some confusion naturally resulted, but Company Sergeant-Major Geddes immediately rallied a party round Company HQ and got them firmly in position. Captain Aldo L. Campbell, ‘C’ Company’s second-in-command: “I was with Company HQ as we moved forward on a night attack. As we approached the forest an enemy tank suddenly emerged out of the trees and started firing. Luckily an alert PIAT-man managed to fire a bomb at it. I remember it just bounced off the tank; either the bomb was a dud, or the firer in his haste forgot to charge it properly – anyway, the startled enemy tank backed into the forest and we didn’t see it again. All went well for a while with the advance, when tragedy occurred. Two shells from our own artillery came whistling overhead and airburst right over my Company HQ, causing several casualties, and killing two of my most experienced signalers. Sergeant-Major Geddes was wounded. This was a severe blow to all of us. There was some fighting in the semi-darkness before we reached our objective, but the enemy suddenly disappeared. It was not until morning, that Major Pilcher suddenly realized that his bat-man, Lance-Corporal Grubb, was missing. He and I went back through the wood and found his body. He had been killed during the night” (1). The intrepid PIAT-man was Private Harry Morgan of ‘C’ Company: “I was with no.13 Platoon. We were following HQ Company when two artillery shells exploded overhead. Two signalers were killed and among the wounded was Willie Barr, my no.2 on the PIAT and an old friend. After getting the stretcher bearers we moved forward again, moving towards a forest line. As we approached, a German tank came out of the trees with machineguns blazing. I was alone at that time on the PIAT, and with Willie Barr on my mind, I placed a bomb in the cradle of the PIAT and fired at the outline of the tank. The bomb bounced off. Fortunately the tank, though quite unharmed, backed into the forest and out of sight. Shortly afterwards we took our objective and the battalion anti-tank guns were brought up. The cold that night was just absolutely numbing, it even seemed to prevent you from thinking properly” (2). (1) Letter Campbell, 1998 (2) Letter Morgan, 1999
4. Night attack on Hubermont, 12/13 Jan 1945. It had been a trying day for Colonel Bradford’s 5th Black Watch and progress had been frustratingly slow. When the battalion finally gained its objective it was getting on toward 21:00 hrs, completely dark and too late to bring the other battalions up. Brigadier Sinclair decided not to give the enemy a break and ordered Bradford to push on during the night. Bradford in turn told Major Mathew’s ‘A’ Company to take the lead. Mathew’s men moved forward and passed through ‘C’ on 'contour 400' at 22:00 hrs. They, however, had not gone far before they ran into tanks and infantry at a road junction some 600 yards in front of ‘C’ Company’s position and could not get forward any further. At an isolated farmhouse, called ´maison Modave` (now-a-days the B&B La Niouche), where the small road from Thimont joins the main road, two lurking enemy Panthers stopped the advance - probably the same tanks 'C' Company previously had bypassed in the forest and had infiltrated around. The tanks fired a lot and sought, several times, to push forward but did not go through with it. They were protected by some 40 to 50 enemy infantry. According to the family that lived in the house, one Panther stood stiffly against the front of the house for cover and occasionally moved forward to fire a shot, literally scraping the facade of the house with its side. A quick plan was developed by Bradford, and the forward observation officer of the 127th Field Artillery Regiment was engaged in arranging a fire plan for the supporting artillery. Gunner Richard Allen was the wireless operator of the OP Jeep working with ‘A’ Company. He remained in his radio-equipped Jeep in a very exposed position and though the vehicle was struck many times by shell fragments and machine gun bullets he stayed at his post and passed orders over the air to enable the fire plan to be carried out. Medium guns were engaged in support, but in the darkness it was nearly impossible to see the results. It was, as one of the veterans told: "a matter of blast away with anything you’ve got, and hope for the best". Mathew’s men attempted several times to get round the enemy or to close with the tanks, but in the open snow covered fields, it was difficult and they had no success, though a few prisoners were taken. There was another road block at the Fme du Vivier and this was removed by the pioneers. It was getting toward 02:30 hrs, 13 January, when Bradford committed his reserve, ‘D’ Company, commanded by Major Donald Beales, sending it round the right to Thimont with the object of outflanking the enemy position at the road junction. The company advanced to the outskirts of the hamlet, but was greeted by fire of approximately one enemy company. Major Beales’ company stood fast and also requested for artillery fire - five batteries of Mediums responded and 240 shells crashed down on Thimont. After this the enemy were leaving the hamlet post haste and the company entered unopposed shortly after and consolidated. Major Beales reported heavy enemy presence just ahead. Possession of Thimont did not dislodge the enemy at the road junction. 'A' Company still was unable to make further progress. There was much noise of enemy tanks moving in the dark all night beyond the Black Watch positions. After a long and exhausting day, the men were getting desperately tired, but there would be no rest for anyone. That night was the coldest of the campaign so far, with temperatures dropping to minus 18 degrees Celsius of frost. The cold was aggravated by the sharp wind that blew across the open plateau. The cold was paralyzing. Weapons froze up and no hot food could be got forward to the weary men, due to the proximity of the enemy units. Finally by 06:00 hrs the enemy tanks were heard rumbling off in the darkness, and ‘A’ Company started to move forward again. They moved cautiously past the road junction of the 'maison Modave' and finally reached the crossroads at the southern end of Hubermont. Private Tom J. Renouf: “A battalion attack was launched across the open ground a little past midnight. ‘A’ Company was again leading. I remember the sight well. An artillery barrage opened the attack, tracers streaked across the open ground, augmenting the fireworks of cannon and flares. We moved forward. Our platoon objective was an isolated farmhouse on the right side of the road about halfway across the open ground. A patrol sent out on reconnaissance earlier had reported it occupied by the enemy. When we reached it we found it unoccupied. The Germans had evacuated it. The farmer and his family were still present and quite unperturbed by the military might of two armies – in fact they lit their lamps by the window. “Regardez les lumières”, I said to them in my school French instead of “Gardez les lumières”. From here another platoon of ‘A’ Company led the attack towards the crossroads. Our no.7 Platoon followed at the rear moving in stops and starts. We did not know what was going on up front, but from time to time we heard firing and felt the arrival of shells close by. We were moving slowly forward, crouched in the ditch by the side of the road in knee deep snow. By now we really began to feel the cold. That night the temperature dropped well below zero. In fact, I believe it was one of the coldest nights of the coldest winter for 40 years. We did not wear our greatcoats in the attack, but had only our oil-skin gas capes, which kept us dry but not warm. Furthermore, we had no rest for over 20 hours, and the exhaustion made us feel even colder. Our bodies were chilled right through and our limbs were beginning to lose all feeling. Only by moving and stamping our feet could we fight the cold. Our hands were completely numb and our rifles were like solid ice, and beginning to be seized up with frozen bolts. When the cold seemed to be at its worst and we seemed to have reached a limit of endurance, we were rescued once again by our wonderful Platoon sergeant Bob Fowler. Like a big St.Bernard, he appeared with a large mug of rum, and dished out two spoonfuls to everyone in the section. After this I began to feel my body again, although I still did not feel my limbs. The forward platoons had reached the crossroads [at the southern exit of Hubermont], where there was a row of cottages, one of them a café. There had been a skirmish and an exchange of fire. The Germans had been driven out but none of them had been injured or taken prisoner. By this time it was nearly dawn, we were still crouched in the ditch and I remember being so tired that as I lay back I fell asleep. I slept for 20 minutes until we moved on. When I awoke I was numb with cold, but much revived. Major Mathew deployed the three platoons in defensive positions at the crossroads. My platoon fortunately occupied the cottages, while the other platoons remained out in the open. My section moved into the café. Day came with clear skies and the sun shining brightly. We had come through one of the worst nights of the campaign, mainly because of the extreme cold and utter exhaustion. Inside the café, we started to relax and lay down to rest.” (1) Lieutenant Chisholm, a platoon leader in ‘D’ Company, 5th Black Watch, remembers the move towards Thimont: “My company was in battalion reserve and waited on the far side of La Roche, sheltering in doorways from the bitter cold. As was our practice, no greatcoats were worn if attacking and we spent a very cold night waiting for the other companies to take their objectives. Sherman tanks sent up the hill were knocked out or broke down – temperatures were given as minus 18 degrees. At some point and after standing around for twelve hours or more, a Major from HQ of the tanks arrived with a ‘rum ration’. Since his three tanks were all abandoned, I suggested the rum ration would serve my men better than his – to which he agreed and my lads got a little inside warmth! Eventually we moved on out of La Roche cutting across to the right, and noticing large numbers of slit trenches which had only recently been vacated we moved on to Thimont. We could not dig any slit trenches because of the frozen ground and had to make use of old German trenches”. (2) At La Roche-en-Ardenne, soldiers of a Black Watch battalion, waiting for their turn to move up towards the frontline, huddle around a small fire for some warmth. The soldiers suffered severely from the extreme cold. Among the shivering soldiers of ‘D’ Company, waiting for their turn to move up, was Private Percy Lawton: “On the 12th we were preparing for an attack, but for some reason we couldn’t move forward and we were waiting outside, with no cover. The snow was very deep and it was intensely cold, something like minus 20 degrees of frost. During the night we had to keep everybody moving, because of the cold. If anybody sat down, you were told that you were to get them up and walk them up and down, not to let anybody sit still. A hot meal was brought up to us and we collected it from our lorries which had brought it up, put it into our mess tins. I remember it was Beef stew. I ate the stew as quickly as I could, because I was cold and hungry. But when I came to the rice pudding which was in my other mess tin, I found that there was already a thin coating of ice on the top of it. It was still quite warm underneath. On the morning of the 13th we did eventually move forward. We moved to a crossroads and were told to dig in. Our picks and shovels would make no impression at all on the ground, it was frozen solid. I managed to find a slit trench which had been dug previously – probably by the Germans – and for the time being I settled in there.” (3) (1) Letter Renouf, 1998; (2) Letter Chisholm, 1997; (3) Letter Lawton, 1998. See also:
The maison Modave at the road junction with the track leading to Thimont. Here an enemy Panther tank opposed the advance of the Highlandres for the better part of the night (photo courtesy Google Street View. Panorama of the former battle site from the Rue de Roupage. The Fme Vivier is hidden from sight by the high ground of the 'contour 400' (Photo courtesy Google Street View) The Rue de Thimont, the small secondary road leading to the hamlet of Thimont was used by Major Beales' 'D' Company during the attack on night to Jan 13th, 1945. The hamlet is behind the trees. The Modave house is to the left (not visible on the photo). Photo courtesy Google Street View.
5. Hubermont (the enemy halftracks incident), Jan 13th, 1945 After ‘A’ Company had established itself at the crossroads at the southern end of Hubermont (position A3 on the map in post #71), Colonel Bradford ordered Major Leslie to take ‘B’ Company forward and clear the rest of Hubermont. But before Leslie’s company reached the village, a reconnaissance party of the 1st Gordon Highlanders, consisting of the commanding officer, the tank officer and the company commanders, motored past in jeeps and entered the village ahead. Major Lindsay, commanding the 1st Gordons, noted in his diary: “It has been an unlucky and unpleasant day. At 0550 hrs this morning we were ordered to start at 0630 hrs. I jeeped on ahead of the battalion, with David Scott-Moncrieff and the two signallers in the back. Bob Secretan, our tank squadron commander, was following in his scout car. We stopped at Brigade HQ in La Roche, where I was given orders to go through Hubermont and occupy Nisramont as quickly as possible. “5th Black Watch are just about in Hubermont now”, the Brigade-Major said. So we continued down the main road into what soon became very open, snow covered country. After three miles I came to the reserve company of the Black Watch, occupying a large isolated farm on the left of the road [the Fme du Vivier]. I enquired of the company commander whether his battalion was in Hubermont and received a reassuring answer, so asked him to send the company commanders straight on when they arrived. We soon came to where there was a turning to the left which led to the north end of Hubermont a quarter of a mile away. The south end of this small village was close to the main road, five hundred yards ahead, and we could see Black Watch there. We turned and drove into the village, passing a German armoured halftrack in front of a house. I assumed it had broken down or run out of petrol. Fifty yards further on we passed another, garaged in a barn. I swung the jeep round, off the road and between two buildings, and Bob lost no time in following me. An old Belgian peasant came out of a house and told us that there were about twenty Huns still in the village on both sides of our little party, which consisted of three officers, one driver and two signallers. I told Bob to talk back to Brigade on his R/T and ask them to tell the Black Watch to hurry up and send a company here. While he was doing so, what did I see but a procession of five jeeps: the four company commanders and the signal officer all driving gaily towards us. We hurriedly pulled them in to where we were, which increased our strength by another five officers. Soon we heard one of the halftracks coming down the lane towards us. As it passed the side-turning where we stood I put down a stonk with my pistol and everybody else fired madly. We had the satisfaction of knocking off three men who were riding on top of a trailer behind, but the vehicle itself turned left and on over the snow towards Nisramont. Soon afterwards the other was driven off in that direction also. Meanwhile the Black Watch were firing wildly at both of them, so wildly in fact that David was shot through the shoulder and in due course departed for the rear on a stretcher strapped to the top of a jeep.” (1) The road junction just short of Hubermont. Here the Officer recce group of the 1st Gordons turned off to the left and followed the track to the north end of Hubermont. The village is almost entirely hidden from sight by the rise in the ground, as is the position of 'A' Coy at the southern end (courtesy Google Street View). Inside the café at the crossroads, at the southern end of Hubermont, Private Tom J. Renouf and the men in his section were still recovering from the ordeal of the nocturnal assault: “Suddenly we heard the sound of what seemed to be tanks coming from the village towards us. We scrambled to grab our guns, but when we checked our rifles we found that they were frozen solid and that the Bren gun, also affected by the extreme temperatures, would not cock. We were at a low morale and not knowing what was heading towards us, our section started to panick. Fortunately Major Mathew rushed us into the cottage and ordered us in harsh terms to get into our defensive positions by the windows. We recovered our arms and manned our position. The German tank turned out to be a large armoured halftrack loaded with troops. They approached the crossroads with all guns firing. They had to pass one of our platoons, which had been able to find some cover. Private Ron Grieve lay at the side of the road with the platoon PIAT, ready for action. As the halftrack hurtled towards him he fired a bomb at it. Although he hit the vehicle, it did not damage the traction and the vehicle continued at all speed, heading south. Next it passed no.8 Platoon which was on open ground, devoid of any cover. The machineguns on the halftrack raked the men in the platoon, who returned fire as best they could. Several of our comrades were hit, and one of them died on the way back to the Regimental Aid Post. Although one of the enemy fell off the halftrack and was killed, it sped off in the distance and back to the enemy lines.” (2) David Reid was in no.7 Platoon of the 5th Black Watch: “We managed to get to the crossroads. There was a house to the left hand side which was not occupied. All of a sudden a German halftrack was coming towards us and we ran to the house for cover. Sergeant Nicholson shouted for the PIAT, an anti-tank weapon carried by the infantry. The platoon PIAT struck the halftrack side on. The vehicle rocked and it nearly put over on its side. One German soldier fell off it and Sergeant Nicholson rushed over and shot him dead with his Sten gun. The halftrack sped away down the road.” (2) Private Percy Lawton of ‘D’ Company – who was in position near Thimont - recalls: “We could see into the village of Hubermont and could see what I believe was one of our companies attacking the village and we could also see the German halftracks scurrying out. I think this was the only time during the campaign that I ever felt any elation – it gave me a tremendous lift to see the Germans actually running. I had a PIAT at the time, which is a anti-tank weapon that could project a bomb something like a hundred yards on a flat trajectory, when you were using it to knock out vehicles or tanks. It could also be used as a mortar which when you fired on a high trajectory would have a range of something like 500 yards. We were in the field in front of a farmhouse firing with rifles from a standing position at any movement we could see down in Hubermont. On the road below us suddenly appeared a halftrack with German troops in it, obviously fleeing from Hubermont. I put my rifle down and grabbed the PIAT and loaded a bomb, but by this time the halftrack had disappeared round a bend. So planting the PIAT down on the ground and firing at a high trajectory, I let go a round where I thought the vehicle might be. Whether I scored a hit or not, I don’t know, I shall never know.” (2) The crossroads with the café at the southern end of Hubermont where Renouf and his companions of 'A' Coy, 5th Black Watch, were surprised by the halftracks. The vehicles sped off in the direction of Nisramont. (1) Lindsay, So few got through; (2) Renouf, Reid & Lawton, letters 1998.
6. 5th Black Watch consolidates at Hubermont, Jan 13, 1945 After the halftrack incident Colonel Bradford deployed his companies around Hubermont. ‘B’ Company moved into the village, while ‘D’ Company took over ‘A’ Company’s position around the crossroads at the southern end of the village, ‘A’ moving back 500 yards. ‘C’ Company occupied the spur southwest of the village and Battalion HQ established itself inside Hubermont. Though there were some occasional shells, all remained quiet until mid-morning. Major Pilcher: “As soon as the situation was stable ‘C’ Company moved on to the ridge to the southwest of Hubermont. Fortunately the visibility was hazy and we got dug into the snow without too much trouble, for later we found we were in full view of enemy tanks ranged on the high ground at Nisramont. Any movement immediately caused heavy shelling from these tanks. ‘C’ Company men, in spite of the cold, kept their heads down, and there was a minimum of movement by the company for the rest of the day.“ (1) Captain Aldo L. Campbell, second-in-command of ‘C’ Company, remembers how even Battalion HQ was not a secure place: “We attended an ‘O’ Group with Lieutenant-Colonel Bill Bradford in an empty cottage at the foot of a bare slope. As the orders were being given for our next operations by our Colonel, there was a deafening, tearing noise and we suddenly saw a hole had appeared on the wall facing the top of the slope, and another on the wall facing the bottom. A shell had gone straight through our room. Miraculously no one present was injured as the solid shell had not exploded. But Colonel Bradford’s orders ended very quickly after that!”.(1) (1) Letters of Pilcher and Campbell, 1998
In early hours of the 13th, Brigadier Sinclair ordered both Gordon battalions to move up on to the high ground. First to arrive were the 5/7th Gordon Highlanders. Setting out on foot from La Roche at 0400 hrs, they reached Roupage at 0730 hrs, without meeting opposition. Later that morning they continued towards Ortho – but we first will deal with the operations of the 1st Gordon Highlanders who followed in the trail of the 5/7th. They were to seize Nisramont, thereby passing through the position of the 5th Black Watch at Hubermont. Major Lindsay’s 1st Gordons left Lignières at 0630 hrs and moved in transport to a debussing point just south of Vecpré, from there they had a seven mile march to the start-line at Hubermont. The order of march was ‘D’ Company, followed by Battalion Tac HQ, ‘B’, ‘C’ and ‘A’ Company and Battalion HQ, with the supporting weapons and tanks making up the tail of the column - with among others a troop of tanks of ‘B’ Squadron of the 144th Regiment RAC and a troop of self-propelled 17-pounder guns. The battalion moved through La Roche, and up the road past the Fme du Vivier without incident until it passed the ‘400 contour’ and moved down into the village of Hubermont. By that time it was mid-morning and the morning haze had lifted sufficiently for the last rifle company in the column to get spotted by the Germans at Nisramont. When some shells started to fall, the infantry at once dispersed and moved in extended formation through the fields into Hubermont. However, when the vehicles, making up the tail of the column, appeared over the crest, they were hit by accurate fire and unable to continue. Three of the supporting Shermans and one self-propelled 17-pounder gun were knocked out. Two of the tank crews were killed, as were three of the gunners of the self-propelled gun and several crewmembers were wounded. The rest of the vehicles withdrew behind the ridge. Major Charles A. Napier, the Brigade-Major of 153 Brigade, remembers: “On 13 January, when 5th Black Watch and 1st Gordons were sorting themselves out at Hubermont, the Brigade Intelligence Officer, Captain James Ritchie, and I went forward to see how things were going on. Whilst we were leaning up against a Sherman tank, talking to the tank commander it received a direct hit from an enemy tank which was a good 2000 yards away on the opposite ridge. Although the missile must have passed within a few feet of us, neither Ritchie nor I were affected. Unfortunately the Sherman brewed up and the crew, apart from the commander, were badly wounded. Ritchie and I were able to be of some assistance in taking a couple of them in our jeep to get their wounds attended to. Fortunately the offending tank turned its attention elsewhere and our rescue efforts remained unmolested - two more Shermans and a self-propelled gun were knocked out in quick succession.” (1) Major Lindsay quickly dispersed his rifle companies under cover in the barnyards of Hubermont, while his Battalion HQ moved into one of the larger farm buildings at the southern end of the village. Major Lindsay: “The country between Hubermont and Nisramont was open and devoid of cover – “Quite like the desert,” Hastings remarked. I did not like the look of it one bit. I chose a building for a command post, and told the other company commanders to study the ground.” (2). The heavy and accurate fire from the area of Nisramont, now supported by long range artillery shell fire, continued and forced the battalion to halt. Nisramont covered the enemy’s last escape route and he therefore was very sensitive to any threat in this direction. The 1st Gordons’ commanders decided to postpone the attack until after dark. Major Lindsay: “From now till 1915 hrs we had a steady stream of shells and mortar bombs upon the village. It was quite obvious that no attack could be launched from it in daylight, especially since artillery smoke does not work in snow, which has the effect of extinguishing the chemical. About this time the Brigadier arrived at the Black Watch HQ at the far end of the village. I sprinted three hundred yards down the lane and sat on some straw beside him. At that moment a shell landed somewhere very close outside. “This is perfectly bloody, ” he said, and I agreed. He told me to push on directly it was dark. I ran all the way back and spent the next two or three hours planning the operation.” (2) All through that afternoon enemy shells continued to crash down on the little village of a dozen or so farmyards and at some point a direct hit was scored on a barn which accomodated a platoon of ‘B’ Company, causing 13 casualties, one of them was killed. Another shell landed just outside the 1st Gordons Battalion HQ, wounding the Artillery Officer and killing a sergeant of ‘B’ Company. From time to time the British guns responded and artillery concentrations shot up the ridge and woods around Nisramont. Each time a Panther tank was spotted, Medium artillery was called for, but the guns made very little impression and only caused them to change position. Unfortunately, the 5th Black Watch, too, had some casualties, among them two killed, Lieutenant Fraser and Private Burke, of the Intelligence Section, both had been with the battalion since El Alamein. Private Percy Lawton of ‘D’ Company 5th Black Watch: “After the Gordons had arrived we settled into one of the farm houses near the southern end of Hubermont. My friend, Ian Campbell, and I decided that we would like a wash and shave. There was no water in the house, so we had a glass bowl which we put on top of the stove and we started to gather snow. At this time the Germans started to shell the area and it was a case of after a shell had fallen we would go out to gather two hands full of snow, virtually, quickly back inside and pop them into the bowl until we had sufficient water. We were heating the water at the backside of the farmhouse . However there was no room in there to strip off and get a wash and shave, so we took the bowl into one of the front rooms and started to get ready. We were just taking off our tunics when a shell hit the edge of the window. Ian was badly wounded. He received a wound in the head, which had broken his skull. I received a slight wound in the chin. We managed to get hold of the CO’s driver, a private called Watt, and he took us down to the Gordons Regimental Aid Post. The Gordon Medical Officer told me that my friend had very little chance. It was doubtful whether he would survive as far as the Main Dressing Station. He said: “Anyway, I’ll send you back with him, even if your wound is not very bad. You will be all right in a day or two”. So I went back with Ian to the MDS. I was kept there for I think was about a week and meanwhile Ian carried on. Three weeks later I received a letter from him. He was in a hospital in Oxford, England. He had a metal plate put in his head and was being fitted with a glass eye, but apart from that he seemed to be okay.” (1) (1) Napier and Lawton, letter 1998 (2) Lindsay, So few got through
Footnote: the self-propelled 17-pounders were 'Archers'. As always, I am really enjoying your posts. The veterans' quotes really put one in the picture. I have a very abbreviated account of this action in my book, which is heading to print now. (I think that, whether intentionally or not, I used the phrase "devoid of cover"... I hope that doesn't constitute plagiarism.)
7. Nisramont captured (night to Jan 14th, 1945) A first indication that the enemy was pulling out of Nisramont came at 1645 hrs, when in fading daylight a light artillery observation plane, which had ventured under the low ceilings, spotted six Panthers moving east out of Nisramont, along the winding road leading down to the Ourthe River. Five batteries of Medium guns promptly responded, sending a total of 120 rounds onto the road, but the failing light made it impossible to see the results. Meanwhile, the postponement of the 1st Gordon’s attack against Nisramont turned out to be a very fortunate decision. The leading companies moved off at 2000 and at 2200 hrs reported to have reached their objective without meeting opposition. Within an hour the other companies and Battalion HQ arrived and consolidated the village. Major Lindsay: “At 1720 hrs the enemy was still there and sniping at a company of the Black Watch. It was dark by 1800 hrs, and soon afterwards George Morrison brought some transport over the hill with a hot meal which did everybody good. The last shelling was at 1915 hrs and at 2000 hrs our advance started. As I stood in the snow at the corner of the lane, watching the two leading companies start, I heard the rumble of tracks moving through our objective, which in fact was the ‘Bosche’ pulling out. So, though we did so slowly and with caution, we all moved into Nisramont without any more shooting taking place. The following morning I looked from my bedroom window across the snow-fields to Hubermont and realised once again how hopeless an attack from there would have been in daylight. Yesterday there were two hundred Germans with nine tanks in this village, or so the Belgians say” (1). Thus at the close of 13 January, after two days of continuous fighting, 153 Brigade finally cut the German avenue of retreat. However, the bag was almost empty. As ever, the Germans proved to be masters in the art of withdrawal. Benefiting from terrain and weather they had held the Highland Division at bay long enough for most of their forces to escape across the Ourthe. The enemy amoured rearguards fought a clever delaying action. In the heavily compartimented terrain, where there was virtually no room to out-manoeuvre the enemy defences, the Panther tank had proven itself the enemy’s chief asset, especially when protected by an infantry screen and in a concealed position. Its powerfull 75-mm high velocity gun was deadly accurate and could knock out a Sherman from a distance of 2000 yards with ease. Its sloped frontal armor was so tough that most Allied guns could not deal effectively with it. Since the deep overcast had prevented the use of air support, not a single tactical plane could interfere at any time during these days, only patient infantry attacks could force the enemy back. On Jan 14th contact was established along the Ourthe Occidentale with units of the US 3rd Army coming from the south. This signaled the end of the Ardennes operation as far as the Highland Division was concerned. An anbandoned German SPW (halftrack) in the main street of Ortho, view in the direction of Nisramont. The Germans lost a whole range of vehicles in the Ortho and Nisramont area. A post-battle inventory, which was appended to the Divisional War Diary, shows that on the high ground south and south-east of La Roche alone 7 tanks (4 Mk V’s, 2 Mk IV’s and 1 Mk III), 7 self-propelled guns, 24 halftracks, 12 trucks, 3 guns and a lot more small equipment were captured (photo © IWM B 13737). (1) Lindsay, So few got through
An abandoned enemy halftrack (SPW P107) of French manufacture near Ortho (Photo IWM B 13736) A damaged 'Zugkraftwagen' left behind near Ortho (Photo IWM B13740).
