Lancaster R 5625 622 Squadron lost 9/7/44

I am researching the service history of Philip Bamford pilot of Lancaster R5625 of 622 squadron RAF that was lost on a mission to bomb V1 sites at Linzeux in France on 9th July 1944. The Squadron Operation Record just states “ nothing heard from this aircraft after takeoff”. Does anyone have any idea what could have caused this aircraft to have been lost? Much of the route was over the sea so I assume that engine failure could be a possibility but surely it would have to lose 2 or more to cause a crash. Does anyone know if communication between aircraft was forbidden during flight. How could nobody have heard from it after takeoff? Did squadrons fly in formation enroute to targets or did they fly separately and join up again? I expect that the reason for the loss may be lost to the mists of time but having some viable theories for the reason may offer some comfort to his remaining relatives. Any suggestions would be appreciated. I have already obtained the operation records of 15 and 75 squadrons who were on the same mission and they don’t say much other than that there was light AA and no enemy fighters noted

 

This is the Loss Card - information from the time but completed near end of war as part of audit.

RAF Loss Cards 7 - 12 July 1944
Card 40

Gives route from base to target and return.

Aircraft flew on night operations not as formation but as a multiheight, multi squadron stream only a few 1000 yards either side of track.

Concept was that german nightfighter/aa defence operated in boxes and the stream would dense a single box with lots of aircraft eg 600 to 1000 in space of 30 to 50 min.

Kammhuber Line - Wikipedia

This was a daylight loss but as this was what the night bombing squadrons were used to operating the tactic was retained.

Ross

 

Only other record, which doesn’t add any new information

The only reason I post the record is usually when I find it, I enhance the photo to ‘try’ and give you a better screen shot (a little easier to read) than the original on the source.



And I also found the Loss Card that RAF Commanded indicated above, No additional info from that either



Source:; Same as RAF Commanded listed above

 

A defective fuel pump can lead to the failure of both engines on one side, which in turn can provoke an “uncontrolled flight attitude” (i.e. a crash)
In the report described, it appears to have been an operating error, but a mechanical defect can also have similar consequences:
Examination of the fuel system controls revealed that the "booster pump” for the tank in use on the righthand side was in the OFF position. If one engine fails, and the electric fuel pump is OFF, air may be drawn back into the main fuel system through the carburettor of the stopped engine, before the master engine cock of the failed engine can be selected OFF, thus causing the other engine on that side to fail.
source: https://asn.flightsafety.org/wikibase/220351

 

The Interception and Tactics report (No, 162/44 AIR 14/3377) records this was the only aircraft lost that day that included a number of operations on Crossbow sites over France. It was a part of a force of 50 aircraft from 3-Group and 7 from 8-Group, bombing from 1425-1444. The I & T report gives the location as Linzeux, 5021N and 0212E. These coordinates would put it a bit west of Linzeux. "Flak was nowhere more than slight, with only a small percentage of a/c damaged. The missing a/c was not seen to fall and the cause of its loss is unknown. Owing to cloud, most of the bombers were diverted on return"

I am uncertain as to the structure/tactics/flight plan of the force to the target. This attack was likely before the Gaggle tactic was used, but more research would be required to understand what crews actually did. "As one stream left France another arrived and they were over the coast continuously for 1 hr 50 minutes. Spitfires covering them throughout. This was the last of the targets to be attacked that day.

Jim

 

Thanks. Can you please post a copy of the I&T report if possible? They aren’t available for download at the NA.

 

I'll see if this posts.

Jim

 

Well received thanks Jim. Yes it does post.
Regards
Steve

 

The 8-Group ORB summary from AIR 25/153 1944.

 

I also have the 8-Group Operational Order (Form B 902) for this. It's messy and tricky to interpret because the targets are given Alpha-Numeric codes, rather than locations so you need to dig down as to what these refer to. As they are sent to the stations by Teleprinter, there are frequent mistakes and revisions.

Jim

 

I’d like to have a look at it please Jim if you can post it.
Thanks
Steve

 

As requested, Form B 902 which is for all the Crossbow Targets on the 9th. I have attempted to exclude Form B 903, which is for a different target. I am uncertain as to which alpha-numeric codes apply to which specific targets identified in the 8-Group ORB and the 100-Group I & T report. If noone on this forum can confirm them, perhaps someone on the RAF Commands Forum might be able to help.

Jim

 

Steve. You really should try an obtain the 3-Group ORB for this operation as it may have more details on their specific flight plan which would be different from the 8-Group one. From that you may be able to determine if they used different tactics navigating to the target and back (i.e., early precursor to the gaggle formation).

Jim

 

I have looked at this more carefully with a colleague off-line and I have: Montcandon, Z3246; Ardouval II, Z3261; Les Cantelliers, Z3283; Chateau Bernapre, Z3244; L'Hey Z3216; and Linzeux, Z3211. Some of this is by process of elimination. Please let me know if anyone has any revisions.

Jim

 

Many thanks for your help Jim. Much appreciated
Regards
Steve

 

Yes. You need to confirm these, Steve.

Jim

 

I have had a look on the NA and 3 Group ORBs are available but not for download. If anyone reading this has a copy of 3 Group ORB covering 9/7/44 could they please post a copy? TIA.
Steve

 

This is the 6-Group Form B, which confirms the 3-Group target, Linzeux is Z3211.

 

source: https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collections/document/34232

 

Thank you
Steve