Nederlands May 1940 website.

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Is it worth trying to get some discussion going on the Netherlands in 1940 ?
Are any of the Dutch members actually interested in the campaign ?

It does seem odd the the Dutch Army gave the fallschirmjäger a rather good bloody nose in 1940 and dutch members seem quite focused on other countries armies rather than there own-Why is that?

After reading Jean Paul's BITW I've often thought about doing a visit and doing a 'Then and Now' thread on some of the fighting but no one seems that interested in what happened in Holland. Whenever 1940 Holland comes up I always think of the After The Battle account of a officer/NCO in a armoured car on the edge of an airfield defending it as the Germans were landing until they ran out of ammo-they went and re-supp'd and came back for more-Now thats devotion IMO when many a man would have justifiably retreated before their ammo had expired the first time round.

 

I was born in Holland, but grew up in Canada.
Can't speak for the others, only for myself.

I don't think the men themselves are forgotten, just not broadcast outside Holland.
Army Command shared the same ideas as the Belgians and French, play defense
along lines, similar to WW1. We all know how well that worked out.

No mobile forces, no tanks.

Bit of an embarrassment, really.

I think most people in Holland didnt want to know it was coming, knew they couldn't really do much
about it anyway. If it had been a WW1 style of engagement, the Dutch would have made a
much better showing.

2 other things:

After the war, Germany became a very important trade partner again with Holland.
Generally, you don't try to piss off your trade partners too often.

Last, I think most Dutch people didn't think the Occupation would be as bad as it was.
Germanic 'cousins' and all that. So Defense preparations weren't taken seriously.
I'm sure if the Dutch had known what was coming, they would have taken a much
more serious approach to the whole thing.

My parents were children during the Occupation, it wasn't something spoken about often.

When I lived in Spain, no one wanted to talk about Franco.
Living in Italy, expressing admiration for Mussolini is actually a crime here.

Maybe there is a touch of that in Holland, some things better to not bring up.



p.s. the war over Holland website looks really good though, going to have a closer look.

 

Is it worth trying to get some discussion going on the Netherlands in 1940 ?
Are any of the Dutch members actually interested in the campaign ?

At least, I do!

But when you study literature about the war that is published by Dutch authors or translated into Dutch, you will find out that most publications are about Occupation, Holocaust, Resistance, Third Reich, Leaders and Liberation. How can this be?

I can only give my thoughts about this. I could imagine that the Dutch focus on different subjects, because for us the process of the war was different. During five years of war, we only fought for a couple of days. After these days we were a occupied country, from which one of the highest percentages of Jews were transported to concentration camps. For the liberation, we had to depend on the British, Americans and Canadians.

But this different focus does not mean the efforts of our soldiers during the couple days of fighting in May 1940 are forgotten. The German troops were supernumerary, better equiped and trained, but at some places the Dutch troops gave them a rather good bloody nose, to use Andy's words. The Grebbeberg, the Afsluitdijk, airfield Ypenburgh, Rotterdam..

I have got some very good books about these battles and visited some very interesting lectures about these subjects. But in a broader view, these are just not the major subject in Dutch historiography. But that is just my view on it..

 

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Couple of additions to this old thread, that I happened to miss on my previous visits. And that, while I am being the author of War Over Holland

- The Netherlands East Indies were a separate souvereign state within the Dutch Royal Empire. The Ministre of Colonies in the Dutch parliament was q.q. prime-minstre of the Colonies, amongst which the NEI. He had its own budget. The Governmental General was the local highest in command, much like Lord Mountbatten in India was. The KNIL was the Netherlands East Indies Army, most of which was formed by indigenous people under Dutch NCO's and officers. The KNIL had its own autonomy as to what weapons to procure and what strategy to follow as long as it went along with the grand strategy of Dutch foreign affairs. After the defeat of the homeland, the government in exile took over the integral government from the Ministre of Colonies. The only exception to this arrangement was the Royal Netherlands Navy. That was an Empire force and jointly funded, but decision making was entirely done in the Hague (London after 13 May 1940).

- The Dutch were not - like a Dutchman here erroneously (#48) suggested - overrun by superior German numbers. This is one of many hoaxes about those days. The German numbers were in fact inferior to the Dutch formations fielded. Grossly: the 1st Cavalry Division (9.000 men), the X. Corps (50.000 men), the XXVI.Corps (incl. reserve division around 80.000 men) and the Airborne Corps or VII.Aircorps (11.000 men). That addes up to around the size of the Dutch field army, being 150.000 men. The entire Dutch fielded capacity was 280.000 men. The one little nuance that Dutch historians often abuse to exegerate the German numbers is the strength of the 6.Armee, that entirely passed across Dutch turf in the appendix like province "Limburg" in the far south-east. Alle these forces left the Dutch soil again, and only elms of two divisions remained in a marginal contact with a few Dutch bat's in the southeast of the country. The main German offensive was however executed by 150.000 men, of which obviously a fair share never saw any actual action.

- Another hoax is that the Dutch politics had failed, and the armed forces were on the paying end of that stick. Should one take the opportunity to compare how much inventive German general staff officers managed to squeeze out of the 100.000 core army, all western European nations should be ashamed of them blaming their governments. It were our armies growing overconceited over a marginal WWI victory, forgetting that Germany did not yield militarily but basically economically and socially in 1918. The Dutch defense budgets were many times over the current rates. But most of the money was spent on the high wages of the conscripts. The Dutch conscripts were by far the best paid of the entire continent. That left little or less to spent on arms and material. Basically however, the level of training was extremely poor, the NCO and officer education not below standard but almost without any standard! The average professional officer was theoretically moderately trained, practically virtually untrained. Basic tactics were of WWI level. Conscript/reserve officers and NCO's knew less of field service than the average scout, let alone of basic tactic manoeuvring. Operations were a non-existing skill! That had nothing to do with politics, but everything with an inapt military elite.

- Many forget that the average German soldier that was prominently fielded in May 1940, had only received a basic training of three months! When we all mobilized come August 1939, the Germans had no leaps advantage on our armies as it came to time under arms of the bulk of the respective armies. The entire "excellent training" hoax is still very vivid today, but is a hoax, entirely. The Germans had one or two excellent outfits, an avant-garde of say 10% of their fielded resources of fine quality, but so did our side. To my firm believe there is but one thing that made the entire distinctive gap between the hurds of the Reich and "our" sides: battle and operation tactics. And that meant the world in difference. The Germans were very much trained in the discipline of "independant field commands" (Auftragstaktik), battle field dynamics, combined arms as opposed to our solid defensive thinking, rigid chains of command and dusty tactics.

- The main reason why the Netherlands were defeated in a mere five days was of dual nature: the instant war on all fronts (the Germans attacked on the entire 400 km wide east border and landed on the the Hague - Moerdijk axis right within the Fortress Holland) and the main battles fought unassisted. Belgium with almost twice the fielded numbers fought 18 days, but was conventionally attacked and had the support of the entire northern French army and the BEF. Yet the Germans managed to shuff this mass of troops aside, although temporized, in order not to chase the Allies out of the bulge before the mechanized formations had cut off their retreat.

- Obviously the Dutch army was a vintage army as it came to training. But that was it. The material difference between the Dutch and German armies was not of the size often exegerated in many 'historical' books, like the famous books of E.H. Brongers, that only preach victimship and submission. That is beloney and a rape of the actual events. The Dutch had excellent rifles, that were as good as the German Mauser. The Vickers and Schwarzlose machineguns were fine, although not as rapid firing and agile as the German MG-34, but the Americans and Britisch fought the entire war (and Korea) with the same MG's, so what's the issue there? The Dutch had modern mortars and artillery, mixed with older and some vintage guns. Like all armies. The backbone of the German infy worked with MG.08/15 or MG.13 light MG and MG.08 heavy MG. Only the avant-garde was better equiped. The mass of MP's is a hoax all along. MP's were scarce in May/June 1940. Our handgrenades were better than their light steel grenades, our antitank guns of 4,7 cm better than their PAK 3,7 cm. The average German regiment was only better equiped when it came to light infantry guns and antitank guns, but basically the same in MG's and other weapons. There was but one giant difference material-wise. The German Luftwaffe versus the Allied airforces.

We were not massively material-dominated or outnumbered. We were out manoeuvred, out-smarted but particulalry, out-psyched. We were mentally overrun in the Spring of 1940, with only a touch of material domination by the Germans. That is what I strongly believe and - what I think - I can proof to a large extent.

 

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Stolpi, excellent points. Particularly on the poor coms in the Dutch army. Btw: I think this poor coms element was applicable to basically all Germany's adversaries in the April-June 1940 episode.

You are absolutely right that the Dutch lacked tracked AFV's. They had about 40 modern armoured vehicles with a potent 3,7 cm Bofors AT gun, in use for recce duties. The omission of tanks has always been blamed on the politicians, but the facts are that the Dutch army only filed a request to procure tanks as late as 1937 and when it was initially rejected for budget reasons, a refiled request some months later was bounced by the Ministre's military advisor (who himself was to become the next MoD) Dijxhoorn, who was a lt-col in the General Staff. This marvelous fellow, who had himself put on a padestal for having attended the course for senior staff on the French Academy, even stated that the Spanish civil war had seen tanks being countered by antitank guns, hence the tank era was to be considered over! How wrong can one be? That thoughtless advise, in an era that military science publications were evident on the contrary of the aforesaid statement, was easily adopted by the MoD causing the second request for tank procurement to be denied too. By then it was too late.

On the other hand, it had mattered little during the German campaign in the Netherlands. The German had only employed their tanks of the small 9th Tank Division in the south, later parked them in front of the gates of Rotterdam. Would the Dutch have had tanks, they would certainly have been kept in the Fortress or - most likely - with the bulk of the field army behind the central front. But before the German tanks could matter in any way, before they could provide leverage that tilted the odds on the battlefield, the massive airraid on Rotterdam sealed the fate of the Netherlands. The involvement of the 9th Panzerdivision mattered little for the final outcome in the Netherlands.

As to the C2 coms (C3) arrangements. Indeed the Germans had a much better C3 arrangement, particularly in the higher echelons. Remarkable is that where Dutch coms worked well, the battlefield effect was evident. So indeed, the C3 arrangements are very relevant in the assessement of German advantages. I do however count coms as a vital instrument to facilitate efficient Command and Control, "field leadership" as a whole. As I said hereabove leadership and basic offcer quality as it came to tactical and operational skills was virtually non existant in the Dutch army. And since the French dogmatic of detailed order tactics was also applied in the Dutch army (as opposed to the German mission tactics) coms were even more important to manage the evident dynamics that could influence the order-details. The Dutch C2 scheme was however of a pre-WWI layout, totally missing the modern concept of time-is-of-the-essence, which was one of the key-elms of the German mission command. This significant difference between the two armies widened the gap between abilities of both sides even further. Should your (Stolpi) statement be that this missing coms element was also a material issue of significance (that I should have managed earlier), I would agree.

 

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A bit of nuance here: The Dutch Queen was irrelevant during the wardays. On Paper she is head of state, but she doesn't run the military or government (or how did King George VI did it any different in UK?).

Yes the dutch military was woafully inadequate, but they weren't supposed to hold out against the full force of the germans..especially when those germans (factor 10x more*) are meant to punch through to Belgium and France.
And thus the Dutch RELIED on support from the French and English as had been AGREED.
And you guessed it: THAT never came in substance.
A few british bombers to bomb dutch airfields, (but NO british fighters to take down German planes)..a british demolition team to blow up dutch Oil reserves in Rotterdam (and then the hell out instead of shooting some german paras in Rotterdam centre a few miles further)..and that was it.
The French 1st Div. put more contribution around Breda..but also they didnot/couldnot (no orders) push further or harder.

So what CAN you do when your cities are obliterated one (Rotterdam = first) by one (Utrecht would be next, then The Hague, Amsterdam..etc) and you have NO defense whatsoever (no more airplanes (that did a pretty good job), except there were good dutch Flak gunners, but they could not be deployed anywhere all the time...) and NO help from your strongest Allies;
Surrender under those conditions was and is the sane thing to do.

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*If Gooseman says that 90% of those troops went through Limburg and were "thus" never deployed in Brabant/Utrecht then he misses the (psychological?) fact that at any given time those troops (which are not ALL in the frontline day one, but qeued for miles and miles) could be REDEPLOYED if and where a neighbouring battle goes slow or awry.
That is the PRINCIPLE of reserves.
SO yes, if a team of 100 dutch soldiers held a german offensive for a day, then the deployed fighting germans were probably also 100-300 men..but the difference is that those av. 200 germans CAN and WOULD be replaced/refreshed at ANY moment, whereas the dutch officer would NOT have that luxury.. and mostly it did not come to that point as the dutch ammunition got depleted before...

And of all things THE most important factor was indeed the AIR SUPERIORITY of the germans. No need to explain how demoralizing effect that has to ANY 1940 type of land troops and its transportation (be it the best of the best anti tank gun, artillery or armoured car unit).

A (distant) uncle of mine "guarded" the south Moerdijkbridge and said his rifle was a "rusty piece of shit before 1900 that would explode at the first shot". I'd rather go for his (exaggerated but making a point) version than Gooseman telling us that the Dutch had "the best up to date" rifle compared to the German K98. (Maybe the Rotterdam marines had a special rifle ?)


NB: a sign of "top " quality would be to see that the Germans would use the Dutch material in their other wartheatres; As far as i can tell, none of the Dutch (excellent?) artillery was reused, none of its planes (The Finnish had their own Fokker D21's) <perhaps the German built seaplanes?>, a DAF armoured car for policing here and there, and that's about it .

 

Another nuance:
While Britain, Germany, France had a big solid war industry , the smaller neutrals DIDnot. Except for pistols and rifles (Belgium) and a armored car here and there (Holland, Sweden) and sometimes a smart fighterplane (Holland). So in the build up of war in the 1937-1940's what do you do to get proper rearmament ?
ORDER material with the big factories in France and UK.
And what happens if ALL countries (Poland, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Norway, Yuguslavia, Greece, Turkey, etc..) start ordering ? Correct: DELAYS. There were delays of THREE years before the first "tankette" from UK or France would arrive in the Benelux (that would be 1941 by the way!).
And when the war finally broke out UNEXPECTED in sept 1939..then UK and France CANCELLED the orders and KEPT the production to themselves.
The tankettes/airplanes were not even delivered to the DEI to bolster the defense against japan.

And THAT is the real reason why these smaller countries COULDNOT rearm properly.

(And still did a helluva good fight given their deficiencies...)

 

as with the British, and the French, and the Americans...

 

I'm dutch..and no they are not forgotten.
But that website www.waroverholland.nl is there since many years (and expanding) and it is so complete and one of my favourites since then.
There is almost no need to make other discussion fora.
But it is true and frustrating that many war enthusiasts from the big war countries (UK, France;USA, Russia; Germany) do neglect such fights/battles (in Norway, Belgium, and Yugoslavia, to China) in those backwater locations to a point of condescension.

So, a special thread is welcome, but I guess it caters more to the foreigners than to the Dutch historian amateurs.