I was recently perusing some Canadian war diaries, as you do, and I came across an Operational Research report on German tank casualties in Normandy here. This includes the table below, which shows that in the latter stage of the campaign in the last three weeks of August, no less than 18% of the destroyed tanks examined had been hit by air-to-ground rockets, this being well above the ~6% I generally see quoted. As this phase of the Normandy campaign, when the Germans were retreating, was the first time that German tanks would have been generally visible from the air, I think this figure, even given the small sample of tanks examined, shows that air-to-ground rockets were more accurate than is generally perceived.
Is that the solid head rocket or the exploding type? I know about anti ship and U boat rockets. The solid shot goes straight through (usually terminal for a U boat) and the exploding rocket is like a 6" HE shell.
Maybe, but 18% of 39 tanks is only 7 tanks so not really a great impact when you consider all those Typhoon memoirs! Was the study biased by how easy those tanks were to find? Regards Tom
7 tanks in both cases I think. My inner statiscian screamed something about sample sizes, and when shushed started screaming about definitions of 'destroyed' and 'comparibility of events', before I strangled it. All the best Andreas
'Hollow charge projectiles' didn't suddenly get worse, though. Isn't it more the case that the infantry couldn't catch with fleeing panzers? In the first phase, the panzers were mostly coming to them... For the Typhoons the second phase suited them better. I'm not sure we can draw conclusions on accuracy - clear of friendly forces, they might just have been a lot more liberal with their RPs. On the other hand, could less effective flak during the retreat have contributed to greater accuracy?
There's also the issue that an M-kill during the retreat is a sure kill, while an M-kill when you are stuck in a fixed position is just that and the tank can be repaired and returned to service. So even a near-miss is a major issue. Me, I think this is a useless survey because it doesn't mention the mighty 2" mortar, vanquisher of King Tigers. All the best Andreas
In Falaise, the wrecks could be examined promptly and undisturbed, which certainly simplified the determination of the causes of damage. What had been destroyed somewhere in the botany beforehand could often hardly be assigned to a specific cause of damage when it was found later. These factors distort such loss statistics. If one also considers that retreats under enemy pressure are usually more costly than battles on relatively static front lines, then both results (6% and 18%) are correct in themselves, although the former certainly has a higher error rate.
What first got me thinking about this is a Youtube documentary on the Typhoon here, in which Ken Adam had noted in his personal diary that in practice he was regularly putting all his rockets within a 50 yard square. There are obviously flaws in the survey linked to in my first post, and many of these are admitted to in the survey itself! However, there will be flaws in all tank destruction surveys, and was the mythical survey that allocated only ~6% of tanks destroyed to RP attack any better? The historiography seems to have gone from "Typhoons destroyed almost every tank" to "Typhoons destroyed almost no tanks", while the survey I have pointed to provides some tentative evidence that RP attack was a comparatively significant cause of tank destruction, and merits further investigation.
Reducing the efficiency of the fighter-bombers to a mere body-count of tanks is far too short-sighted and in no way does justice to their actual effect. As a German, I know more than enough eyewitness accounts from the "receiving end" to be able to say that destroyed tanks were the least of the problems that fighter-bombers caused: Things like being paralysed by tactical interdiction of the battlefield far into the rear, only being able to move at night and above all the very demoralising effect of being largely helplessly at the mercy of swarms of "Jabos" were much more present... (And one is amazed at how even militarily unimportant details like the lack of mail from home for weeks can have detrimental effects on combat morale)
I very much agree with that, but even so, as the current paradigm tends to paint RAF Typhoon pilots as serial over-claimers as regards tanks, it is I think worthwhile to revisit the topic as new information comes forwards.
Overclaiming is completely normal: At some point, it was decided internally on the Eastern Front that the German flying tank destroyers were only allowed to register claims if the target was visibly burning with smoke. And this, although an error rate of 30-40% was already assumed when reporting claims. I would also find that highly interesting It would be great if you could keep us up to date here.
In 1946 No 2 Operational Research Section published a report covering its work over the period June 1944-July 1945. This was groundbreaking work in the field of operational research and the paper is worth reading for this reason alone. One of the areas of study was Joint Report No3 - Rocket Firing Typhoons in Close Support of Military Operations, and this can be found on p.176 of the link. It can be seen at Table II that the report assessed that 140 rocket projectiles (RP) would need to be fired at a Panther to achieve a 50% chance of a hit; this would require 18 sorties by a single aircraft. Hardly ringing endorsement for the RP Typhoon. However, the report considered that a direct hit would result in the tank being knocked out and usually set on fire. Interrogation of German tank crew PWs revealed that experienced crews would remain in their tanks when attacked and had great difficulty in preventing inexperienced crews from bailing out. The principal finding of the report was that RP attacks were of most use in reducing the enemy’s morale while raising the morale of own troops. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA951850.pdf
Isn't the likelihood of hitting a Panther tank in that report based on the assumption that the tank is by itself with no other Panthers nearby? If you take the stated probability that 140 rockets over 18 sorties were needed for a 50/50 chance of destroying a tank, then the 7 of 39 tanks destroyed in the last three weeks of August in the report I posted at the start of the thread* required 1960 rockets to be deliberately aimed at them over 252 sorties in order for them all to be hit. That seems a bit high to me, and it may have been that those tanks were easier to hit because they were travelling in a column. Also the comment about experienced crews remaining in their tanks relates to cannon and not rocket attack, if I am reading it correctly. * which was also by No.2 Operational Research Section
Maybe. I can only take the report at face value and one has to remember the report was written in the very early days of OR. All I know is that the RP was a wildly inaccurate weapon. Here is an extract from TYPHOON BUSTING THE MYTHS which describes rather well to my mind the challenges of firing it: The attack phase lasted mere seconds, but the facts relating to the weapons in use show that hitting a target was more luck than judgement. In clear air, in a 60° dive, releasing your rockets at 4,000ft, roughly 1,700 yards (1,555m) from the target, would give you a relatively high chance of a hit or damage near-miss with the 60lb RP-3 rocket. For every 150 yards (137m) you release your rockets too far from that sweet spot, they drop 15 yards (14m) short; 150 yards too close and they travel 15 yards too far. And that is not counting anything else. For every 2g you are pulling, the rockets will deviate by around 30 yards (27m). Every 4° of sideslip you’ve dialled in to counteract the wind, you are missing by 50 yards (46m). Then, for every 20mph gust of wind, the rocket will be blown 30 yards (27m) off course. To ensure a hit with a weapon put together quickly by an armourer in a dusty field as one of the thousands of rockets he and his mates need to assemble that day, and which may bind on the rail as it launches, you need to complete these complex calculations in your head and trim your aircraft correctly to counter these effects, all the while in a 500mph dive and being shot at. In my book I describe a pre-H Hour attack by 24 RP Typhoons against a German company position on a railway embankment at Rethem, NW Germany, which was supported by 5 x 10.5cm Flak mounted on railway flats. From the resistance offered by the German marines holding the position to the subsequent attack by 2 Mons and a squadron of tanks from 5 RTR it is clear that the Typhoon attack had little or no impact. This is supported by photos - both air and by AFPU photographers - which show not only the Flak as intact but also all other rolling stock and two locomotives, as well as buildings in proximity to the railway line. Although British WDs record a successful attack by the Typhoons, the reality of the RP’s lack of effect would soon be all too apparent to those who had to attack.
The results are quite similar to the experience the Luftwaffe had with their "Panzerblitz" rockets against tanks. There the hit rates were given with 3-5%
