Favourite Allied tank of the War (and semantic digressions)

Any chance you could source a photo of his boss E.M.C. Clarke?

Been dying to find out what he looked like.

 

It sure does.

And as you wrote earlier, there is more mystery than detail over relative speeds over the same type of ground.

The key difference is that the complaints about speed refer to the A9 and A10 but not the A13 or A15.

If, as was the case in the 2-pdr negativity, the speed complaint was soley an attempt to cover up their own tactical incompetence, then it would need to include the A13 and A15s too. Not so?

I agree, the complaint is certainly there to cover up that incompetence in part, but not soley.

As you point out, the speed differential is used to explain away tactical failure but silence covers the point that they also failed with the faster tanks too.

In the round, my take-away belief is that on the battlefield the German Mk.III and Mk.IV had a bit more speed in them than the A9 and A10 but were significantly outpaced by the A13 and A15. "Factory" speeds, however, may well have been more closely aligned.

You mentionned it previously. Was the complaint more to do with their ability to run away? The Birks report mentions the slow speed of the A9 and A10 and the RHA 25-pdr guns. The latter with specific reference to running away.

You also may recall a line I posted elsewhere which I picked up from a good friend. The German approach to battle was to fight until the battle was won, whereas the British tended to retreat when it got difficult in order to fight another battle another day.

Also, in regards to regular reports of spotting enemy amour doing 40mph, perhaps the problem lies in the accuracy of the reports not the speed. Frequently the reports related to trucks not tanks or, occasionally, armoured cars. If German tanks really were doing 40mph so frequently, then (a) the Germans must have had a good few thousand in the desert given the number of reports and (b) the A13 and A15 would also join the slow list.

I guess the wider point of what the user thought of their tanks is well covered by evidence that A9s and A10s were not on their "favourite" list and their 'speed' is probably an overused excuse that overshadows the whole.

 

It's worth noting that although the A9 and A10 were to an extent slower than the Panzer III and IV, I don't think there was an instance in the desert when a unit equipped with A9 and A10 tanks were enveloped and cut off by German armour. The A9 and A10 seem always to have been able to disengage, even if this was a more awkward procedure than with the A13 or A15.

Creagh's complaint, as you state, was that the A9 and A10 had difficulty engaging the German tanks, as he stated that "The result is that the A9 & A10s cannot bring the GERMAN tank to battle unless the latter is prepared to accept the engagement." This of course only becomes a problem in the British doctrine where the primary role of armoured formations is to destroy enemy tanks. In the German doctrine, where armoured formations are there to seize tactically or strategically important ground, or envelop the enemy, speed differentials between tanks are much less important, which is why they didn't sweat too much over the fact that the Panzer III was much slower than the M3 Stuart.

How much slower the A9 and A10 were than the Panzer III in practice is really a moot point, and I doubt we will ever find out. What really matters I suppose is that speed differentials were more important for the British because of their doctrine which, as I think we would both agree, was extremely flawed, and far inferior to the German one.

 

Even the versions of the Mk III with the Maybach HL 120 engine and Variorex gearbox only reached a maximum of 40kph – not mph.
Perhaps there were some examples that were faster due to series dispersion. However, these are not representative
The limiting factor was the final drive (Seitenvorgelege), always an Achilles' heel of German tanks.

 

Come to think of it, I can't recall off the top of my head a single occasion when British Cruiser tank units were significantly "bested" by German armour.

Their problems were almost always self-induced - either going into battle near the end of their overhaul lives and breaking down en masse, or attacking well-prepared static positions and gun lines.

 

First, thank you for understanding my main point despite my abysmal wording. What I wanted to say, in drawing my belief that A9 & A10 were slower than the German tanks on the battlefield, was that whereas the common belief that the 2-pdr was inferior is not based on reality, the relative speeds are.

Yes, no formations were outrun and destroyed. Not even the postively snail like Infantry tanks. Which then leads one to think it was more about finding excuses to justify withdrawing early from the battlefield to avoid being overrun rather than not wanting a repeat of an earlier defeat. It takes me back to the Birks comments about the RHA. The idea they had to be on their toes rearwards before the enemy got to within 4,000 yards of their position.

***

As you and I have often discussed, British after battle reports were often an exercise in shifting blame for defeat and avoiding having to question their own tactical understanding and decisions. It is for that reason many of the excuses simply don't make sense.

This being a prime example.

It is an excuse based upon flawed reasoning and trying to make the evidence fit a pre-determined (and false) answer.

The role of armoured formations (as opposed to army tank battalions) was to seek out, engage and destroy enemy armour. Surely a slow tank is a more inviting target than a fast one. So why is the slowness of the A9/10 prey so uninviting to the panzer vultures? The answer is, of course, it wasn't. The reason the vultures were disinterested had more to do with their understanding of tactics.

Agreed. On both points.

Absolutely.

It is written into British doctrine that mobility (of which speed is either understood to be a factor in mobility or just a different word for the same thing) is a key part of survivability. And, perhaps, this applied more to the old desert sweats than those that had never left Blighty.

 

Indeed.

Although I think there were some examples in the Gazala battles where they were "bested". But since I have not studied that period in detail, I can't say any more.

 

The initial problem with the 2pdr against German mediums was not the gun itself, but the ammunition. German tanks were often using FHA, which is superior to RHA against uncapped shot. 2pdrs did not get a decent capped shot until 42, which was well past the usefulness of the gun against enemy mediums.

 

For direct comparison
2-pdr
1.08kg - 792m/s - AP/T Mk I

3,7-cm L/45 KwK 36
0,685kg – 760m/s - PzGr.39
0,368kg – 1030m/s - PzGr.40

5-cm L/42 KwK 38
2,060kg - 685 m/s - PzGr. 39
0,900kg - 1,050 m/s - PzGr.40

PzGr. 39 was always the standard ammunition for tank vs tank
PzGr.40 was so-called special ammunition, of which only a few rounds were carried.

 

It was a pre-war gun designed to take on pre-war tanks. Quite remarkable that it was still effective against front-line Pz.III and Pz.IV in 1942.

It became 'obsolete' with the arrival of the 6-pdr rather than ineffectiveness. Mind you, I don't think it would have stood up too well against the German armour coming onstream in 1943.

It's principle draw-back was the lack of HE round especially when considering the role of Infantry tanks. However, the reason for that lies with RTC/RAC doctrine not the technical capabilities of the weapon itself. Indeed, one has to wonder whether Infantry tanks should have been armed with the 2-pdr in the first place.