OMAHA BEACH.

Discussion in 'NW Europe' started by Trux, Apr 16, 2017.

  1. Trux

    Trux 21 AG

    Assault Group O1 APAs.
    APA 26. Samuel Chase.
    Samuel Chase.jpg

    APA 45. Henrico.
    Henrico.jpg

    Assault Group O2 APAs.
    APA 28. Charles Carroll.
    Charles carrol.jpg

    APA 30. Thomas Jefferson.
    APA 30.jpg

    Assault Group O3 APs.
    AP 76. Anne Arundel.
    Anne Arundel.jpg

    AP 67. Dorothea L Dix.
    Dorothea L Dix.jpg

    AP 77. Thurston.
    AP 77.jpg

    All good looking ships.
    Photos of APA 30 and AP 77 from the excellent navsource.org site.

    Mike.
     
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  2. Trux

    Trux 21 AG

    British LSI(L).
    Empire Anvil.
    Empire Javelin.
    These were identical US Maritime Commission C1-S-AY1 designs. Built in the US to a British requirement they were generally similar to the USN APAs but with many minor differences to meet British needs and operating procedures. They were merchant ships with Merchant Navy officers and crew. Each was 11,650 tons, 417 foot long and had a top speed of 14 knots. Armament was one 4” gun, one 12pdr gun and twelve 20mm guns.

    Empire Anvil was commissioned as a RN vessel and renamed HMS Rocksand later in 1944.
    Empire Javelin remained a merchant vessel until sunk in late 1944.

    On D Day the two British LSI(L) each launched a large flotilla of eighteen LCA. They carried the first wave assault troops to the beach. 551 Flotilla from Empire Javelin lost six of its eighteen boats and the rest were damaged, many seriously. They were not called on to make a second trip. Eleven LCVP collected second wave troops and LCT(A) or LCT(HE) collected the residue.


    British LSI(S) and LSI(H).
    The small landing ships of Assault Group O4 sailed with Convoy O1 which was the fast convoy using swept channel 3. It sailed from Portland at 1647 on D-1.

    Prince Charles.
    Prince Charles was the flagship of Senior Officer Assault Group O4. It also carried Colonel Rutter who commanded the Provisional Ranger Group.

    Prince Charles anchored in the Transport Area at 0328. At 0353 No 2 craft was lowered to take Colonel Rutter to Ben My Chree to take command of the 2 Ranger force bound for Pointe du Hoc. At 0405 Nos 7 and 8 craft were lowered to embarkation level and they left the ship at 0427. At 0445 No 2 craft returned and was hoisted on board.

    Because of the poor weather conditions the Senior Officer Assault Group ordered that craft should be lowered ten minutes early to allow extra time in case of delays so at 0518 the order ‘Hands to Operation Stations’ was given. At 0523 the craft were lowered to the embarkation level and at 0537 the loaded craft were lowered. Also at 0537 ML 163, the Navigation Leader, was hailed by load hailer as follows, ‘Am lowering and want you to take craft in a bit slower. I will come to the beach and pick them up under the lee. Wait until they are formed up before you start off.’ By 0540 all the craft were clear and at 0544 they were formed up and moved off. ML 163 led the craft from Prince Charles, Prince Leopold and Prince Baudouin towards shore.

    At 0607 Prince Charles dropped a danbuoy to mark the position of the anchorage and at 0750 signalled Prince Leopold and Prince Baudouin ‘Weigh and follow me to the beach’. Permission had been obtained from the Admiral Commanding Force ‘O’ and the three ships moved to within two miles of the beach to recover the LCAs. This was a wise move as the LCAs would have had great difficulty in moving back to the Transport Area because of the weather conditions and the fact that many had suffered damage. Prince Charles failed to recover four of its own craft but did recover some from other ships.

    0828. Hoisted LCA 882, from LSI(H) Princess Maud.
    0840 LCA 1038 hoisted.
    0907 LCA 626 hoisted.
    0910 LCA 441 hoisted.
    0942 Hoisted LCA 837, from LSI(H) Princess Maud.
    At 1000 LCA 421 was sighted towing LCA 750, both from Prince Charles. LCA 750 capsized and sank at 1008.
    1025 LCA 421 hoisted.

    The ship then returned to the Transport Area where it anchored at 1113. At 1458 The Senior Officer Assault Group requested permission to sail for the UK which the group did at 1540.


    Prince Leopold.
    Prince Leopold carried seven LCA of 504 LCA Flotilla consisting of LCAs 570, 1045, 571, 550, 568 622 and 623. It also carried LCS(M) 102.

    Sailed with Convoy O1. At 2120 on D-1 it reported that it had trouble finding the entrance to Channel 3, the fast channel, and entered Channel 4. Many danbuoys had dragged so the convoy zigzagged between Channel 3 and Channel 4 and became disorganised.

    Arrived at the Transport Area at 0336 and lowered its LCAs at 0530. The craft were lowered in pairs because of the rough seas. They formed up and proceeded inshore astern of ML 163. The boats were carrying 5 Ranger Battalion which was to reinforce 2 Rangers at Pointe du Hoc if necessary. Attempts to contact 2 Rangers were unsuccessful so the boats followed the alternate plan and landed on Dog Green at 0800. All seven craft manoeuvred through beach obstacles and landed the Rangers in shallow water and without casualties. The craft withdrew and picked up two survivors from Empire Javelin.

    At 0805 Prince Leopold closed the beach to recover the LCAs which returned to the ship in formation and were hoisted on board. They were hoisted two at a time and on the lee side the ship turning round to permit this. At 0945 it signalled ready to proceed and waited in the swept area. At 1030 it returned to the Transport Area to await orders for the second flight and anchored at 1120. Its LCAs were not required for further trips to shore. At 1620 sailed for the UK using Channel 1 and arrived at 2210.

    LCS(M) 102 did not accompany the LCAs but was lowered at 0415 and reported to Amsterdam from where it was to accompany 520 and 522 Flotillas to Pointe du Hoc. This craft became water logged and eventually drifted to Dog Green where it was not required so returned to Prince Leopold and was recovered.


    Prince Baudouin.
    Prince Baudouin carried seven LCA from LCA Flotilla 507. These included LCA 1377, 863, 670, 578, 577, 554 and 521. It also carried LCS(M) 91.

    Prince Baudouin reported no incidents on the crossing but the convoy was sometimes out of the buoyed channel. It anchored in the Transport Area at 0334. The LCAs were lowered at 0545 and formed astern of Flotilla 504. LCA 578 was swamped and the engine stopped. Its troops were taken off by LCT 88 which took them to the beach. The craft was taken in tow by an LCVP until its engine were restarted and it returned to the ship under its own power. The remaining craft beached and disembarked at 0805. LCAs 670, 577 and 521 picked up casualties from LCI(L) 91. LCA 863 struck an underwater obstacle and was holed. Its crew was taken off by LCA 1377.

    Prince Baudouin closed the beach at 0808 to pick up the LCAs. It then reported to the Transport Area at 1125. The LCAs were to have gone to APA Thurston to take a second flight ashore but this was cancelled.

    LCS(M) 91 was lowered at 0430 and proceeded to take position to starboard of the flotillas from Amsterdam and Ben My Chree. It became flooded forward and drifted down to Dog Green and was abandoned at 0940.

    Mike
     
    Last edited: Jul 28, 2017
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  3. Tricky Dicky

    Tricky Dicky Don'tre member

    Mike

    Please answer me one question - how do you stop your brain from exploding?? - it hurts mine just reading it

    TD
     
  4. Trux

    Trux 21 AG

    'Still they watched and still their wonder grew that one small head held all that he knew.'

    Goldsmith. The village schoolmaster.

    Sorry about your brain TD.

    Mike
     
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  5. Trux

    Trux 21 AG

    Two nice photos of LCA from Prince Baudouin.

    Baudouin.jpg
    Embarking Rangers at Portland.

    ranger LCA.jpg
    A trip round Portland Bay?
    Flotilla officer's craft. See officer in port housing and loud hailer aft.

    Mike
     
    Last edited: Jul 28, 2017
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  6. Trux

    Trux 21 AG

    The LSTs.

    Each of the assault groups was assigned six LSTs. It was considered that these vessels were too valuable and too vulnerable to allow more of them into the area early in the landings. All the LSTs were US six davit types which meant that they could carry six LCVP and lower them from davits. The LCVP could be used as guide and control craft for DUKWs and Rhino Ferries. Four LCVP from each of the LSTs were to be left in the assault area for use by the Naval Officer in Charge.

    Each of the LSTs towed a Rhino Ferry which was to be used to carry vehicles from the upper deck of the LST to the beach. The lower, tank, deck of the LST was used to carry DUKWs which were to be launched well out to sea. The DUKWs carried field artillery, anti tank guns, ammunition and engineer stores, mainly trackway material.

    Because the LSTs were towing Rhino Ferries their speed was limited and they were to sail with slow convoys and use the slow channel for the crossing. For Omaha the LSTs sailed with Convoy O2. They adopted a formation of two parallel columns and the LSTs led the convoy with LCTs following.

    On arrival at the Transport Area the DUKWs on the tank deck were launched. The normal method of launching was for the ramp to be lowered until the front end was in the water. DUKWs would then reverse down the ramp and into the water. Reversing gave two advantages. One was that as the stern of the DUKW entered the water both the propellers and rudders would be operable so as to give the driver control. Driving forwards off the ramp would mean that the propellers would not be in the water and steering by the front wheels would become ineffective when they left the ramp. A secondary advantage was that reversing off the ramp eliminated the risk of damage to propellers and rudder as the DUKW left the ramp.

    Once the DUKWs were launched the vehicles on the Upper Deck could be lowered to the Tank Deck so as to be ready to board The Rhino Ferry. All the LST of Assault Group O1 and O2 were later types and had a ramp from the Upper Deck so that vehicles could drive straight from the Upper Deck onto the Rhino Ferry. Earlier LSTs had lifts which made unloading from the Upper Deck slower.

    The Rhino Ferry was towed behind the LST. Those for Omaha carried a DUKW and a bulldozer lashed down on deck. They were operated by the Seabees (CBs or Naval Construction Battalions) who travelled across the Channel on the Rhino so as to be able to use the engines to lessen the strain on the tow cable. On arrival at the unloading point the ferry moved to the bows of the LST. A centre line was passed to the LST and the ferry reversed towards the LST ramp. The LST doors were opened and the ramp lowered to 6 foot above the water. The ferry was then winched up to the LST ramp using the centre line. Side lines secured the ferry to the LST and the bow ramp was lowered to the level of the ferry deck. Vehicles could then drive directly on to the ferry, which headed to the shore under its own power when loaded. On arrival at the beach the vehicles could drive straight down the fixed centre ramp into 1½ foot of water.

    Rhino Ferries were 175 foot long, 43 foot wide and 5 foot deep, with a ramp at the bow. They were powered by two 160 horse power outboard motors and a separate tug of similar construction with a further two 160 horse power outboard motors. There was sufficient deck space to allow an LST to unload in two trips. The ferry could unload and retract itself on a falling tide. Rhino Ferries were constructed from standard NL (Naval Lighterage) pontoon modules. These were steel pontoons seven foot long, five foot wide and five foot deep.

    Normandy-Photo-2-1024x799.jpg
    Rhino Ferry, complete with DUKW, Dozer and Seabees, reversing up to an LST.



    LCT(5) and LCT(6).

    All the LCT of the assault groups were LCT(5) or LCT(6). Both were designed to be broken into three sections, bow, centre and stern, for transport on LSTs or cargo vessels for the long Pacific journeys. On arrival they were to be launched in sections, re assembled and used for the ship to shore movement of vehicles, supplies and personnel. On D Day of course they crossed the Channel under their own power.

    It was envisaged that a major use for these LCTs would be in the discharging of LSTs. In the Mediterranean the LSTs were normally able to get close to a beach and lower the ramp onto dry land, or at least shallow water. On the Normandy coast this was not possible because of the shallow gradient. LSTs would touch bottom while still some distance from dry land. In the first hours of the landings LSTs were forbidden to beach and dry out and it was not certain that the beaches would be suitable for them to do so even at a later stage. In the event it was found possible to dry them out without damage and this became the normal way of discharging them.

    The LCT(6) was designed with doors at the rear as well as a ramp at the front so that vehicles could drive straight through. They were also designed to reverse up to the bow ramp of an LST and moor so that vehicles could drive straight on to the craft. When full the craft closed the rear doors and headed for the beach to discharge vehicles over the bow ramp. It was also possible to use one or more of the LCT(6) to form a floating pier for LSTs to discharge vehicles over. This was not done on the Normandy beaches. In practice it was found that on the Normandy beaches the short sea swells made it difficult to maintain station at the bows of an LST and on the beach waves could wash over the stern doors and into the tank deck.

    The LCT(5) was adapted to accept vehicles from an LST by having a section of the side bulwarks made so that they could be removed. The craft then manoeuvred and moored so that it was broadside to the LST ramp. Vehicles could then drive from the LST onto the crafts tank deck and then manoeuvre so that they were facing forward.

    In the event both types of LCT were used more for carrying vehicles from MT ships and coasters to shore than for unloading LSTs. They were also useful for carrying supplies and personnel.

    LCT(6).jpg
    Brand new, unused, LCT(6). 501 will be the first one built.

    Mike



     
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  7. Trux

    Trux 21 AG

    Control Craft.
    Control Craft were US Navy PC and SC. The PC was a Patrol Craft intended for anti submarine patrol work and escort duties, although it was really too small, too slow and too lightly armed for the latter. They were 175 foot long, 280 tons and a top speed of 20 knots. They were steel hulled, armed with a 3 inch gun and a 40mm LAA gun. Crew was 80 men. Well equipped with navigation equipment for their size they made useful control craft. The SC was a smaller wooden hulled anti submarine craft. They were 110 foot long, 95 tons and had a top speed of 20 knots. Crew was 28 men and the armament was one 3 inch gun.

    Three PC and three SC were deployed with the assault groups on Omaha on D Day. The PCs were primary control craft and each had a SC as secondary control craft, to assist the PC or to take over if the PC was a casualty. It is mere coincidence that PC were Primary Control and SC were Secondary Control. When the small LCS(S) had escorted the first boat waves to shore they reported to the PCs as assistant control craft, liaison craft and despatch craft.

    For various reasons these craft were not able to perform their control functions adequately. If all had gone smoothly and according to plan they would probably have succeeded. They were only required to guide groups, including the LCTs carrying DD tanks and then to mark the Line of Departure and monitor the various groups as they arrived at and departed from the line. They also provided a means of communication between the Assault Group Commanders and the various waves of craft. When things did not go to plan it became apparent that they could not cope.

    A major reason for the failure of the control craft to actually control the flow of craft was a lack of training. The PC commanders had a few days instruction but practical experience was limited to taking part in one exercise and several drills as Landing Craft Control Vessels. The SCs had no training at all, having reported to Portland while loading for D Day itself was in progress.

    The PCs lack of training was due largely to the fact that they were needed for escort duties. The movement of landing craft to the port of embarkation at Portland needed escort vessels, not so much for defence but for navigational guidance. It was accepted that the commanding officers of LCTs could not be fully trained in navigation and were not experienced in handling their craft in the tricky tidal waters of the Channel. Some British MLs had been assigned for control duty but they were too few in number, their navigational equipment inferior and their commanders diffident about giving orders to USN officers.

    On D Day when things began to go wrong it was apparent that the officers assigned to control duties were not only undertrained but were to young, too junior and too inexperienced to be able to cope with the responsibility.

    On D Day both the PCs and SCs acted as escorts for the convoys crossing the Channel before moving on to their duties as control craft. Some had had a busy night escorting, locating and sometimes rescuing craft.


    The smaller control craft performed their initial duties well but without direction from above they could do little to control the craft milling around off the beach.

    LCS(S)
    Landing Craft Support (Small) were 36 foot long and had armour on the pilot house. Armament varied but was usually two .5” machine guns or one .5” and two .3” machine guns. Eight MkIII smoke pots were also fitted at the stern. The crew was six and there was space for four extra personnel. These craft could be carried on APAs or LSTs and were used to guide the initial boat waves to the beach and give them fire support. After leading the first waves of craft to the beach and standing by to give fire support they reported to the PC control craft and acted as guides or despatch boats.

    The LCS(S) suffered from the same problems as other control craft on D Day. They were basically sound and useful designs and could have been of considerable use in avoiding traffic problems and in sorting out problems when they occurred. However the crews were not well trained in these tasks and more senior officers were not trained in making use of them.

    LCC
    Landing Craft Control were an essential craft in controlling the flow of craft to the beach. They were used to lead in waves of craft, to mark and control the line of departure, to control the flow of craft to and from the beach and when they had completed these tasks they assisted with hydrographic survey work.

    LCC were well equipped with:
    Gyro Compass.
    SO Radar. A surface search radar developed for small craft. Range 15 to 20 miles.
    NK 2 Echo sounder.
    NJ 8 Echo sounder.
    Gyro repeater.
    Odograph. Plots the course and distance travelled.
    OBG Underwater sound receiver.
    ZB/RU Radio Direction Finder.
    Two TCS transmitter/receiver.
    Two SCR 610 FM transmitter/receiver.
    Plus an array of aerials.

    Crew was fourteen and three twin .5” machine guns were carried in gun tubs

    The LCC was not well thought of in its primary role as control craft and navigation leader. It did however perform useful work as a survey craft, plotting obstacles on beaches, marking positions for buoys and moorings and identifying suitable beaching and drying out locations for LSTs and coasters.


    Motor Launch as Landing Craft Control.
    Fairmile ‘B’ motor launches were 112 foot long, displaced 75 tons and had a top speed of 20 knots.
    As navigation leaders they were equipped with:
    QH 2 navigation aid.
    Direction finding loop.
    Echo sounding recorder.
    Asdic recorder.
    Log recorder.
    Nine or 20 mile measuring reel.
    They generally lacked search radar and gyro compass.

    British Motor Launches were assigned to work as control craft and navigation leaders with US forces. They were generally experienced in working in the coastal waters of the Channel and working as navigation leaders. There were problems of working with US naval forces in that they had different working methods and different expectations. In good conditions they should have been capable of performing well but in the confusion off Omaha they were doubly disadvantaged.

    Uss_pc-815_1.jpg
    PC

    sc.jpg
    SC

    Mike
     
  8. Perfect digest as usual Mike!

    There were nine US-type (aka Mark I) LCC on D Day: five in Force "O", numbered 10, 20, 30, 40 & 50, and four in Force "U", numbered 60, 70, 80 & 90.
    Here is LCC 70 on Survey duties off Normandy on 10 June 1944 (high resolution images in tiff format can be downloaded from the source page):

    LCC(1) 70 boat (survey craft) off Normandy, 10 Jun 44 - 80-G-252685.jpeg
    Source: 80-G-252685

    LCC(1) 70 boat (survey craft) off Normandy, 10 Jun 44 - 80-G-252686.jpeg
    Source: 80-G-252686

    Michel
     
    Last edited: Jul 30, 2017
  9. Trux

    Trux 21 AG

    Michel,

    Thank you for your kind words and interesting photos. These craft did a lot of essential work after the initial landings and this will be described under 'Developing and Operating the beach'. Long way off yet.

    In the interest of balance it should be said that the control system worked well on the larger scale. There are a great many accounts of chaos and confusion off the beaches but very little of the success. A notable success was the ability to land infantry when it was urgently needed ashore. The system was able to identify suitable beaches and direct LCI(L) to them. It was also able to direct LCVP from the transports to meet the LCI(L) off shore and ferry the troops to the beach. While many LCTs reported making several attempts to beach without any help the control organisation under the Deputy Senior Officers Assault Group were able to halt the flow of LCT at the Point of Departure, recover most of those which were already past the line, and then reorganise them. Craft were then held to seaward of the line and sent in when needed and when there was space for their vehicles on the beach.

    Mike
     
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  10. Trux

    Trux 21 AG

    Task Force 124.7.

    Escort Group.
    Some of these vessels also appear under the Bombardment Group. They joined the latter on arrival off the Normandy coast.

    All the Escort Group vessels screen the convoys for the Channel crossing. Some are designated as navigational leaders for the LCT convoys or as temporary flagships for the LCT Flotilla Commanders. All the escort vessels have further duties on arrival. Some join the bombardment group, some join the screen, some screen the bombarding ships or minesweepers and some will escort return convoys. Some will do more than one of these tasks.

    On the crossing they had little to do in their primary role since there were other forces patrolling and screening either side of the routes and a considerable number of aircraft providing cover against air and sea attacks.

    US Livermore Class destroyers.
    USS Frankford. DD 497.
    USS McCook. DD 496.
    USS Carmick. DD 493.
    USS Doyle. DD 494.
    USS Endicott. DD 495.
    USS Emmons. DD 457.
    USS Murphy. DD 603.
    USS Plunkett. DD 431.
    USS Baldwin. DD 624.
    USS Harding. DD 625
    USS Saterlee. DD 626.
    USS Thompson. DD 627.

    USS Carmick, USS Satterlee, USS McCook, USS Endicott and USS Doyle support the minesweepers and then join the Gunfire Support Groups.

    USS Baldwin, USS Frankford, USS Thompson, USS Plunkett and USS Harding report to the Commander, Area Screen. They will be prepared to relieve the Gunfire Support Group vessels as directed by the Assault Force Commander or Commander Bombardment Group.


    British Hunt Class coastal destroyers.
    HMS Melbreak.
    HMS Talybont.
    HMS Tanatside.
    On arrival at the Transport area the three Hunt Class destroyers join the Gunfire Support Groups. When released from the Gunfire Support Groups, and in any case not later than H+8 hours, they report to Commander Assault Group O2 in USS Charles Carroll for escort duty with the return convoys.

    French destroyers
    Aventure.
    Escaramouche.
    On arrival Aventure and Escaramouche take station to the seaward of the LST line and report to Commander LST Group 34 for escort duty with the return convoy.

    The British escort destroyers
    Vesper.
    Vedette.
    On arrival these take station to the seaward of the LST line and report to the Commander Assault Group O4 for escort duty with the return convoy.

    US Destroyer Escorts.
    DE Borum
    DE Amesbury
    DE Blessman
    The DEs escorted the Bombardment Group across the Channel and then joined the screen. Blessman screened Ancon before joining screen.

    Eight USN Patrol Craft (PC) escorted the assault groups and then reported to Assault Group Commanders for duty as control vessels. When released they reported to Commander Area Screen.
    PC 552, PC 553, PC 564, PC 565, PC 569, PC 617, PC 618, PC 808

    Six USN Submarine Chasers (SC) escorted assault groups and then acted as standby control vessels. They took over the duties of control vessel when the PCs joined the screen. SCs remained as control craft until released.
    SC 1291, SC 1307, SC 1332, SC 1353, SC 1354, SC 1360.

    Mike
     
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  11. Trux

    Trux 21 AG

    Task Force 124.8.
    Gun Support Craft.

    This group consisted of Landing Craft Gun, Landing Craft Flak, Landing Craft Rocket and LCT(A)/LCT(HE). All were capable of approaching close inshore. The group crossed the Channel with the slow Convoy O2, sailing behind the LSTs.

    LCH. LCI(L) 520.
    Flagship of Captain, Commanding Officer Gun Support Craft.

    Each of the following craft towed an LCM for the engineer gapping team.

    5 X LCG(L). Landing Craft Gun (Large).
    LCG(L) 424, 426, 449, 687, 811.

    9 X LCT(R). Landing Craft Tank (Rocket).
    LCT(R) 366, 423, 447, 450, 452, 464, 473, 482, 485.

    7 X LCF. Landing Craft Flak.
    LCF 3, 5, 6, 7, 9, 11, 12.

    16 X LCT(A).
    2008, 2124, 2275, 2075, 2049, 2037, 2227, 2287, 2050, 2229, 2043, 2273, 2307, 2339, 2425.
    2228 was non operational and was replaced by LCT 210. This was the Flotilla Commanders flagship.

    Plus:
    32 X LCP(L) Smoke. These did not tow LCMs.
    LCP(L) 241, 242, 243, 244, 211, 128, 230, 231, 232, 235, 163, 247, 294, 239, 233, 293, 198, 236, 295, 248, 110, 84, 162, 160, 200, 3, 238, 102, 237, 114, 313, 43.
    On D Day LCP(L) 43 was non operational and did not cross the Channel.


    Landing Craft Gun (Large).
    These fired on beach defences during the run in of the assault waves. At H+30 minutes they were at the call of Forward Observers Bombardment. They were LCT Mk3 converted to carry the same 4.7” guns as used on destroyers, although only two per craft. The crew was two officers and 13 men plus one Royal Marine officer and 22 gunners. They were to provide direct fire against beach defences from much closer inshore than the destroyers. It was intended that LCG should remain out of range of enemy mortar fire because of the large quantity of ammunition carried above the water line.

    Each of the LCG(L) towed a LCM for a Gapping Support Team. The personnel were carried on LSI(S) Princess Maude.

    LCG(L) 424, 426 and 449 were each assigned to fire 120 rounds of 4.7” ammunition on WN 73. LCG(L) 449 and 426 went astray and arrived off Utah Beach, eventually arriving off Omaha too late to join in the preliminary bombardment.
    LCG(L) 687 was assigned to fire 120 rounds of 4.7” ammunition on WN 62.
    LCG(L) 811 was assigned to fire 120 rounds of 4.7” ammunition on WN 65.

    From the reports of officers commanding.
    LCG 424.
    LCG4 had problems towing the LCM for use by the demolition team that the craft carried. The LCM used its engine to reduce the strain but eventually the cleats to which the tow rope was attached gave way and the LCM proceeded independently. There were also problems with station keeping. Attempts to obtain information on correct stations in the convoy from escort vessels failed. Approaching the Transport Area there was more confusion as craft left the convoy and scattered. Since radio silence was in force and signal lamps forbidden so close to the French coast the craft commander tried to obtain a bearing to the beach from a PC and a DD using a loud hailer. There was no reply. The craft deployed to the right of the LCT(A)s and opened fire on the assigned target at 0610 at a range of 6000 yards, Firing ceased at 0640 after firing 66 rounds at a pillbox at 64807162 (WN 73). At 0651 the craft opened fire on a house containing machine guns. 26 rounds were fired. At 0718 craft fired one shot at a machine gun nest but ceased fire because of the danger to own troops. At 1135 craft opened fire on an assigned target at 65209132. Ceased fire at 1147 having fired 24 rounds. For the rest of the day the craft cruised around the fire support area awaiting instructions. Over the next week 258 rounds of 20mm ammunition were fired at aircraft. On June 13 the craft sailed in convoy for the UK.

    LCG 687.
    During afternoon of D-1 the craft was ordered by an escort to move ahead of the LCT(A)s and take up station behind the LSTs. This was probably because the LCT(A)s were having difficulty in maintaining convoy speed. At 1702 the LCM tow parted and a new tow line was rigged. The convoy arrived at the shore side of the Transport Area and cast off the LCM. At 0420 LCH 520 ordered craft forward to her position as the control craft was absent. The craft proceeded down the port side of the boat lanes. At 0510 the craft was rammed in the bow by a LCT(A). Damage was minor and repaired by the damage control party. At 0515 the craft set course for the shore to get into position off Fox Green. The target was identified by the gunnery officer. This was pillboxes and machine guns at 69308940 (WN 62). Opened fire at 0609 at a range of 4,000 yards. Fire ceased at 0627 at a range of 1000 yards. The target was believed to be neutralised but dust and smoke made it difficult to be certain. 110 rounds were fired. The craft proceeded to Fire Support Area 4 to await orders. At 1203 LCH 520 ordered the craft to the right flank to engage enemy machine guns and gun emplacements holding the exit from Dog Green. Commenced firing at 1227 at 1500 yards. Ceased firing at 1247 when 20 rounds AP and 20 rounds HE had been fired. Returned to Fire Support Area 4. Dropped anchor for the night at 2230.

    At 1215 on D+1 DD 472 suggested that the craft investigate German small craft inside the breakwater at Port en Bessin. Proceeded with LCG 426 and opened fire on small craft with one gun and two Oerlikens at 1259. Ceased fire at 1309 with 30 rounds fired. On D+2 craft patrolled the outer edge of the anchorage. At 0115 on D+3 fired 300 rounds of Oerliken 20mm ammunition at aircraft. It was believed that hits were scored and the plane crashed into the sea. Patrolled again during the daytime on D+3. On June 12 reported to the Convoy Sailing Area for return to UK on June 13.

    LCG 811.
    The craft had difficulty in keeping station on the LCT(A)s on the crossing because of problems with rough seas and the towed LCM. At 1600 on D-1, after several tow lines had parted, the LCM was ordered to proceed under its own power but stay close to the craft. During the night it was even more difficult to keep station with the LCT(A)s. The Transport Area was reached at 0330 and the craft then departed for the left flank of the boat lanes at the Point of Departure. The craft found the line of green dan buoys marking the edge of the lanes and followed them. At the line of departure there were only five of the eight LCT(A)s in the wave. At H-20, when 4000 yards from the beach, the target at 676901 (WN 65) was identified and fire was opened. Fire ceased at 0630. The target was obscured by smoke but two hits were observed. The craft then ran parallel to the beach and within 1000 yards of it until 1200. Only occasional small arms fire was seen but the source could not be located. At 1200 the craft proceeded to Fire Support Area 4 for the rest of D Day and anchored overnight. Each day thereafter the craft reported to Fire Support Area by day and anchored at night. At 2130 on D+1 an aircraft was fired on. Total ammunition expended was 14 rounds of smoke, 33 rounds armoured piercing and 105 rounds of 20mm Oerliken. The craft sailed for the UK on 13 June.

    LCG 426 and LCG 449 inadvertently joined the convoy for Utah Beach and did not reach Omaha in time for their assigned fire tasks. Unfortunately the Report of LCG 449 is largely illegible.

    LCG 426.
    LCG 426 followed LCG 449 to the Transport Area and found itself off Utah Beach. When it realised the error it altered course for Omaha Beach at emergency speed. At 0610 it picked up three survivors and one body. The craft arrived at Omaha at 0745 and searched for targets of opportunity. It fired on a machine gun post with six rounds of High Explosive and six rounds of Armoured Piercing. At 1600 it retired to the Transport Area to deliver casualties to APA 45. It then cruised until dark when it anchored for the night. At 0030 on D+1 it fired 250 rounds of 20mm Oerliken at an aircraft. At 1300 it accompanied LCG 687 to fire on small craft in Port en Basin. Fired 55 rounds plus 1100 rounds 20mm. Then resumed cruising. 8 June fired 120 rounds 20mm at aircraft. Port engine failed at 2250. Thereafter cruising and anchoring until June 13.



    Landing Craft Flak.
    Landing Craft Flak were conversions of LCTs. The tank deck was decked over to provide crew accommodation and ammunition, and light AA were weapons fitted. They were designed to give protection against low level air attacks for landing craft on the approach to the beach and for troops on the beach. Secondary functions were to protect landing craft from seaborne attack on the approach to the beach and to engage enemy beach defences with direct fire. After the landing they were to provide seaborne anti aircraft protection for the transport areas.

    LCF Nos 3 to 6 were converted from LCT3s and carried eight 2 pdr pompoms and four 20mm. LCF Nos 7 to 18 were converted from LCT4s and carried four 2 pdr pompoms and eight 20mm. Two Royal Marine officers and forty eight Royal Marine gunners were carried in addition to the crew of two officers and 10 ratings.

    Each LCF towed a LCM which was a Reserve Craft for Gapping Teams. This carried reserve equipment for the demolition teams.

    The LCFs arrived at the Transport Area with the Gunfire Support Convoy. They were more seaworthy than some other craft and they seem to have arrived in good order and on schedule. The demolition teams were transferred to the towed LCMs and the LCFs took up their assigned positions at first light. They deployed with LCF 3, LCF 5 and LCF 9 on the left flank, LCF 6, LCF LCF 7 and LCF 12 on the right flank and LCF 11 in the centre. On the right flank of Dog Beach LCF 6 was 350 yards off shore, LCF 7 was 700 yards off shore and LCF 12 was 1000 yards off shore. On the left flank of Fox Beach LCF 3 was 350 yards off shore, LCF 5 was 700 yards off shore and LCF 9 was 1000 yards off shore. In the centre LCF 11 was 700 yards off shore. This deployment gave cover against low level air attack over the small boat lanes. Further off shore AA defence was provided by larger warships.

    On D Day no enemy aircraft appeared. LCF 6 fired at one target of opportunity on shore. This was a machine gun position in a house on the shore of Dog Beach. It was observed to be under fire from troops ashore and from a destroyer. LCF 6 moved closer to shore and fired some 600 rounds of 2pdr ammunition.

    At dusk The LCF were positioned to patrol as AA defence for the ships and craft anchored off shore. Two craft were assigned to ACG4 Ancon for protection against E Boats and aircraft.

    After D Day the LCFs still had little to do.
    D+1. Two craft fired at aircraft
    D+2 Craft fired at 0130 and claimed one enemy plane shot down.
    D+3. Two craft fired at 0115. Five craft fired at 2340.
    D+4. Four ships fired between 0100 and 0430.
    D+5. Four craft fired.
    There was no firing thereafter.



    Landing Craft Tank (Rocket).
    Landing Craft Tank, Rocket were conversions of LCT3. Modifications included blast screens protecting the bridge and upper works, radar and other navigation equipment on a lattice tower mast and banks of rocket projectors. Either 1,080 projectors MkI or 936 projectors MkII could be carried in sets of six. These fired a series of 24 rocket salvos in rapid succession. Each rocket carried a 29lb warhead. Launchers could not be aimed or trained so that the LCT had to be aimed and be positioned exactly 3,500 yards from the target area. When the rockets had been fired the stands could be removed and the LCT used in the ferry operation.

    The LCT(R)s towed LCMs which were Reserve Craft for the beach obstacle demolition teams. One LCM was a Command Craft.

    The LCT(R)s had difficulty in towing the LCMs and difficulty in keeping station but they did all arrive on time. At the Transport Area only one craft, LCT(R) 450, of those supposed to go to the left of the beach actually went the correct way. The others however did manage to make their way across to their correct positions in time to open fire.

    LCT(R) 366 fired first at H-7 minutes. LCT(R) 450 and 447 fired last at H+2 minutes when the LCT(A) wave was some 500 yards from the beach. The officers in charge of craft reported that they believed that they fired on target. When the craft had fired their rockets they turned out of the boat lanes and retired to reload. Normally reloading took some twelve hours. On D Day the time varied between nine hours and thirty six hours. The variation was caused by the effects of rough sea conditions, lost anchors, rockets stuck in the launchers and the clearing of misfires.

    Radar 970 and PPI prediction drawings were used successfully by all craft. Ranging salvoes were fired but varying degrees of visibility made accurate calculations of the point of impact impossible. The majority of craft did not see the target but all except LCT(R) 366 fired by radar. The firing position of the craft was taken with reference to landmarks and fixes obtained from QH navigation radar and Radar 970.

    The reports from some troops complained that no rockets seemed to land on the beach and that most were landing some distance inland. It seems they had been told that the rockets would clear beach obstacles and mines and make craters in which troops could shelter. In fact most rockets landed where they were supposed to, not on the beach but on the bluffs inland.


    LCMs for Clearance Teams.
    The LCMs were towed across the Channel by the various craft of the Support Group. When on tow they were to have engines running at sufficient speed to prevent a slack tow line. In the event of an engine failure or other mishap on passage other nearby LCMs were to take the disabled craft in tow to a LCT at the rear of the convoy. In the hours of darkness the crew of a disabled craft should board an LCT and cast the LCM adrift. Crews should refill fuel tanks before reaching the assault area.

    The Assault and Command craft were towed by LCT(A) and LCT(HE). These were to be towed to a position 1000 yards inshore of Point King where the LCMs were to go alongside the LCTs and embark the personnel for the teams. The LCMs of each section, Omaha East and Omaha West, were to assemble on the section commanders craft and proceed to the Line of Departure. They were to deploy for the approach and leave the Line of Departure when despatched by the Control Craft at about H-10 minutes. The Command craft proceeded under the direction of the section commander and beached at his discretion.

    The Support craft were towed by Gunfire Support Craft. They were to be cast of tow at Point King and assemble by sections on the senior boat officer of each section. They were to proceed to LSI(S) Princess Maude to embark the support teams. They then proceeded to the line of departure and deployed. They were to leave the Line of Departure when despatched by the control craft at about H-5 minutes.

    The Reserve craft were also towed by Gunfire Support Craft and were cast off at Point King to assemble under the senior boat commanders. They were to proceed to 1000 yards inshore of Point King where the teams were transferring to LCMs. They were to replace any craft which were missing and then proceed to LSI(S) Princess Maude to embark any teams whose craft had not arrived. The remaining reserve craft were to proceed to the Line of Departure and deploy. They were to leave the Point of Departure when despatched by control craft in time to arrive 1000 yards offshore by H+20 minutes. They were then to lie to on call.

    After disembarking the demolition teams the LCMs were to report to Ferry Control Subordinate Command No 1 in an LCI(L) a mile off Charlie and flying a flag hoist ‘Fox Easy, Roger, 1.


    LCP(L) Smoke.
    LCP(L) were distributed to areas where they could make smoke to give cover if this was required. The six craft assigned to the battleships Texas and Arkansas, three to each, were late arriving because of low speed and heavy seas and did not report for this duty. No smoke was called for and the craft were released to the Naval Officer in Charge for ferry control, meeting convoys and as dispatch boats.

    Of the 32 assigned craft:
    LCP(L) 43 was non operational.
    LCP(L) 128 and 211 were badly damaged en route and ordered to return to the UK.
    LCP(L) 241, 242, 243, 244 and 238 were sunk up to June 24.
    LCP(L) 230, 231, 232, 235, 163, 247, 294, 239, 233, 293, 198, 110, 84, 162, 160 200 and 3 were driven onto the beach. Few were salvageable and the majority were wrecks.

    On the bright side there were only two casualties, a compound fracture of the leg which was evacuated by hospital ship and a crushed foot evacuated to USS Bayfield.

    Mike.
     
    Tricky Dicky and Aixman like this.
  12. Trux

    Trux 21 AG

    LCT(A).
    Reports do not distinguish between LCT(A) which were armoured and LCT(HE) which were not.

    Each LCT(A) and LCT(HE) towed a LCM for the Gapping Teams. The personnel, except for the LCM crew, were carried on the LCT.

    The report of the Flotilla Commander stressed the difficulties encountered during the crossing. Considerable difficulty was caused by the carrying away of the bulwarks by the force of the seas. The bulwarks had been cut for easy removal to facilitate the side loading of the LCT(5) from LSTs.

    The Flotilla Commander on LCT 210 arrived at the Transport Area at 0400 and proceeded to an area 1000 yards shoreward. Here the demolition teams boarded the towed LCMs. This transfer took some twenty minutes and was made difficult by the heavy seas.

    Since the craft were scattered during the crossing and no communication was possible the craft could not be gathered together for the run into the beach as was intended. Craft made the run independently and since they were behind schedule each made the best speed possible. There were few control craft to give assistance.

    2049 was abandoned in a sinking condition during the crossing. 2229 sank two miles off the beach. Two officers, four naval ratings and three army personnel were lost but the remainder were picked up. 2307 struck an obstacle and sank in the afternoon.

    There were many problems and many contributory factors, enemy action generally being a relatively minor and short duration one. The weather was certainly a major problem. The rough seas and heavy winds caused much of the initial damage to craft. The fact that so many craft reported that the starboard bulwark or gunwales collapsed is explained by the fact that the wind and waves were coming from the west. As the craft were heading almost due south much of the time it was the starboard side that received the pounding. The bulwarks were not very sturdy and had been further weakened by making sections removable to enable side loading. In order to enable LSTs to be unloaded without beaching it was decided that Rhino Ferries and LCT(6) would be used since both could moor with their sterns to the bows of an LST so that vehicles could drive straight on. This was not possible with the LCT(5) so sections of bulkhead were made removable so that the craft could moor across the bows of an LST and vehicles drive on and then be manoeuvred so that they faced the crafts bow.

    Other areas were susceptible to wave damage. Many craft found that water found its way into the engine compartments and the crew quarters at the stern of the craft. In some cases water simply trickled in through small gaps but in many case the pounding loosened fittings, clamps and seals. Many craft suffered from water entering the ballast/buoyancy tanks under the tank deck. Again in some cases this was simply because of ill fitting seals but in some cases the tanks were damaged when bulwarks collapsed. The effect of flooding of tanks, compartments and tank decks was that craft developed a list to starboard and the weight of water slowed the craft down. Flooding and extra strain caused many engines to break down, in turn causing further reduction in speed and increased strain on remaining engines.

    When it came to beaching the extra weight of water caused an increase in draught and craft had difficulty. They had even more difficulty in retracting with a list and reduced power. The fact that some craft eventually broke in half, or even into thirds, is not as alarming as it might sound. The LCT5 was built in three watertight sections so that they could be carried on larger ships and assembled on arrival.

    An experienced and well trained crew would have had difficulty in coping with the conditions and mishaps but there were few such crews. It was accepted that the commanding officers of craft did not have navigation skills and depended on a flotilla leader for these. Since radio silence was in force during the crossing it was not possible for the craft to contact shipping unless it was close enough to signal with lamp or flag. The LCT(A) were relatively late additions to the inventory as were the demolition teams they also carries. There had been little time for thorough training.

    In the event the crews performed remarkably well in very poor conditions.

    The LCT(A)s started engines at 0130 on D-1 and sailed from Portland at 0300 on D-1 in convoy with the rest of the Gunfire Support Group. Each LCT towed a LCM for the Obstacle Clearance Units. At the Transport Area the LCM was to be released and personnel and equipment transferred to it. The LCT(A)s were then to proceed as a group down the swept and marked channel towards the beach. At the Line of Departure the craft were to move laterally to take up position opposite their assigned landing point. They would then be ordered to proceed towards the beach by the Control Craft. Bad weather and rough seas caused the late arrival of the convoy, which had become scattered, and transferring personnel and equipment to the LCMs also took longer because of the poor conditions. This left little time for the craft commanding officers to orientate with the beach outline.


    Reports.
    The following reports are posted almost verbatim. This is not because they are of great military or naval importance but rather because they show the difficulties and dangers presented by the sea. If some of the troops ashore had a traumatic day it was surely equalled, maybe exceeded, by the experience of some LCT(A) crews. 'For those in peril on the sea'.

    LCT(A) 2008.
    At 0550 when the craft was six miles out the ramp chains broke and the ramp dropped. Temporary repairs were carried out but after twenty minutes they broke also. A second temporary repair was made but this again broke. The craft arrived off Fox Green at 0800 and touched down at 0815, too late for the planned fire support role. The tanks were discharged and the craft retracted by 0900 but the ramp was lost entirely while doing so. One army casualty and two navy LCVP survivors were picked up on the beach and taken to AP 76 Anne Arundel. The craft then reported to the Officer Commanding the LCT(A) Flotilla and since it had lost its ramp it took no further part in landings on D Day. On D+1 it carried troops to shore and then stood by for repairs to its engines, propellers and to have a new ramp fitted. The craft then continued with regular unloading of vehicles until June 19 when it was caught on the beach by the storm, broached to and the engine room flooded.


    LCT(A) 2037.
    This craft beached on Fox Green at 0645, pretty well on time. It retracted after unloading at 0700. While on the beach it suffered minor damage from shell splinters and machine gun bullets and suffered one casualty. It picked up two small craft survivors from the beach and carried them to AP 77 Thurston about 1100. It then loaded with personnel and jeeps, leaving at 1200. At 1430 it arrived at Fox Green but was ordered to stand to. At 1600 the engine room began to flood after the bilge pump failed so it proceeded to beach against orders. The army refused to get off so at 1645 it retracted and beached again at a different point. The army again asked that another attempt be made at 1700. This time a hundred troops waded ashore but the officers in charge of the seventeen jeeps refused. It beached again at 1730 but the ramp engine failed to start. It retracted and reported the condition to LCI(H) 520 at 1800. It was given orders to land again but the engines were failing at the craft was ordered to anchor at 1830. At 2000 LCT(6) 542 came to give a tow to the Transport Area but while being towed the craft collided with LST 494 and the tow line parted. The craft moored alongside LST 494 at 2030.

    At 0400 on D+1 the quarters started flooding and this was reported to LCI(L) 87 at 0614. At 0830 the seventeen jeeps were transferred to a Rhino Ferry. The flooding was reported again to LCI(L) 87 at 0900 and 1200. At 1830 the condition was reported to Ancon. At 2300 LCI(L) 84 arrived to pump out the craft. Emergency repairs were carried out and on D+5 the craft sailed to the UK for repairs.


    LCT(A) 2043.
    On the crossing the craft shipped water into the engine room and borrowed a pump from an escorting PC. The craft could not maintain speed on the run in to the beach and arrived late at 0655. One engine broke down on landing. The two gun tanks were discharged under fire and the craft received ten hits from mortar fire and several from machine guns. The tank dozer received a hit on its track and could not be unloaded. Several hits were below the waterline forward and the craft developed a fifteen degree list to starboard. It retracted from the beach and picked up two survivors in the water. LCT(A) 2307 was observed to be in trouble with its engines broken down and listing badly. LCT(A) 2043 came alongside, passed a line and towed it from the beach in a sinking condition. At the Transport Area survivors were transferred to a Coast Guard craft. LCT(A) 2043 continued to work on Omaha for some weeks.


    LCT(A) 2049.
    At 0145 on D Day LCT(A) 2049 struck a mine some twenty miles off the French coast. The mine caused a hole in the starboard side of the engine room. Attempts were made to pump out and plug the hole but it was too large. Within a few minutes the starboard engine failed and the engine room was flooded. The craft was listing some twenty five degrees and the decks were awash. Since the craft was in danger of capsizing the order was given to prepare to abandon ship. The LCM for the demolition unit was ordered to come alongside and the demolition stores transferred to it. All personnel then transferred to the LCM which meant that it was carrying sixty eight men plus stores. The LCM continued to the Transport Area where all hands except the demolition unit were taken aboard LST 317 and returned to the UK later in the day.


    LCT(A) 2050.
    At 2115 on D-1 the starboard engine went dead but the craft continued. At 0330 the towed LCM came alongside to collect the demolition team. The craft then proceeded towards shore but the centre engine went dead at 0445. The craft still managed to beach on Dog White on time at 0635. At 0640 the tanks were ashore and the craft attempted to retract but found it difficult with two engines dead. It was 0720 before it succeeded. At 1015 the craft was ordered to report to AP 77. At 1115 it was alongside AP 77 when the generator failed. A request was sent to AP 77 to send a mechanics to fix the engines and generator. At 1445 the starboard engine and generator were fixed but a starboard list was noted. No further work was done on D Day.

    From D+1 LCT(A) 2050 worked normally unloading vehicles and on 10 June it reported to ARL 4 to have the centre engine changed. On 13, 14 and 15 June unloading continued but on 16 June the craft was ordered to beach and have a new shaft and propeller fitted. When the storm began on 19 June the raft anchored inside the breakwater but the anchor cable broke and it moored alongside a blockship. From 26 June to 1 July it was engaged in towing damaged craft off the beach and then returned to the UK.


    LCT(A) 2075.
    LCT(A) 2075 had no problems when crossing the Channel or approaching the beach but had difficulty in finding the assigned landing point and did not beach and discharge tanks until 1430. It then carried out unloading duties until 15 June when the engine room flooded and it reported to ARL 4 for repairs. When the storm began the craft cast off and anchored off the beach. At 1800 hours on 19 June two pontoon sections drifted into the craft and causing damage and flooding of the engine room. Since it was holed, flooded and without engines it cut the anchor cable and drifted into the beach. It drifted into broached LCTs and suffered considerable damage. All personnel were removed from the craft, leaving only a watch party and the craft remained non operational on the beach.


    LCT(A) 2124.
    The report for this craft has little to say until the time of landing. The two gun tanks did fire on the run in and the craft beached at 0638. The two gun tanks landed under fire from an emplacement to port which in turn was engaged by the tank dozer which remained in the craft for ten minutes. A shore emplacement to starboard scored ten hits on the craft causing damage including puncturing three starboard wing tanks, damaging the anchor stave and plate, cutting the anchor cable causing the loss of the anchor, puncturing fuel tank vents, damaging the ladder to the tank deck and minor damage to the bridge and sides. The craft retracted at 0705 and headed for the Transport Area. About 6000 yards from shore the engines stopped because of salt water in the fuel supply. Calls for assistance brought no results. At 1000 HMS Sapper, an armed trawler which was on patrol, took the craft in tow and took it to the Transport Area where it was tied alongside Salvage Vessel 95. The salvage vessel was ordered to take the craft and another LCT(5) to the LST area for tow to the UK but the LST convoy sailed before a tow could be arranged.

    0745 on D+1 the craft broke loose from the salvage vessel and drifted for an hour before it found that two engines would start at 0900. Efforts were made to find the salvage vessel and at 1430 it tied up to another salvage vessel, 98, for emergency repairs to the anchor and port engine. The craft was then able to carry out light unloading duties although with a strong list to starboard because of the punctured tanks. On June 15 the craft reported to ARL 4 for survey of the damage. On June 18 it was ordered to beach on the Easy White repair beach. Repairs were not possible because of the storm. On 19 June a Rhino Ferry drifted into the craft forcing it to broach and run into another beached LCT. On June 20 another Rhino Ferry drifted into the craft causing further damage. During the remainder of the storm the jostling of two Rhinos and two LCTs caused more damage. LCT(A) 2124 remained on the beach until July 16 when it was towed off and returned to the UK on a LSD on July 23.


    LCT(A) 2229. (Actually a LCT(HE)).
    LCT(A) 2229 capsized and sank two miles off the French coast. The officers died and the reports were made on the evidence of survivors, including the coxswain.

    Problems started on the evening of D-1 when rough seas damaged the bulwark and water washed into the tank deck and engine room. Attempts were made to shore up the bulwark but it eventually collapsed. Water seems to have got into some compartments and caused the craft to list, which in turn caused the tanks to slide and further affect the balance and stability. The demolition personnel were ordered off in their LCM but the craft crew and tank crews remained. About 0430 on D Day one engine failed and the others failed soon afterwards. The Commanding Officer ordered abandon ship at 0555 as the ship was capsizing. One life raft had been lost and the remaining personnel had one raft and a rubber dinghy which meant some men having to remain in the water. Several men, including the Commanding Officer died of exposure before the survivors were picked up by a minesweeper about 0900.


    LCT(A) 2273.
    At 1530 on D+1 the sea broke the starboard bulwark at the section cut for side loading. The bulwark sheered the covers off the starboard tanks and they filled with water immediately. Emergency repairs were made to the bulwark and it was held in place with pols and lashings, and the backs of sailors. At 2000 the bulwark broke again and was carried away. The craft was listing because of the filled tanks and now the sea water filled the tank deck and the tanks ammunition trailers shifted causing an even greater list to starboard. The port engine compartment flooded and the engine failed. It was decided that the craft was in danger of capsizing so seven seamen remained on board to attempt to manage the craft while the rest transferred to the towed LCM. At 0730 the craft arrived at the Transport Area and the crafts crew and tank crews returned from the LCM. The craft and LCM then made for the beach independently. The craft arrived off the beach at 1100 but was told to stand off until the shore batteries had been silenced. At 1600 it landed on Dog Red and the tanks were unloaded immediately. Because of the list it had been ordered that the craft should beach and then be abandoned, the crew being taken off by LCVP. With the tanks unloaded the list was reduced and the craft was able to retract and go to a LSD to collect diesel fuel. The craft then dropped anchor and the crew tried to get it back on an even keel and all engines running.

    June 8 and 9 were spent repairing the craft and then on June 10, 11 and 12 it was unloading vehicles on Easy Red. At 1000 on June 12 the craft hit the beach with a full load and buckled in the centre sections. On June 13 the craft was taken to the salvage beach. On 15 June it was ordered to retract and moor at a blockship. During the storm on June 19 another craft moored alongside it and both were secured with heavier ropes from the blockship. On June 20 another craft moored and the rough seas pounded all three craft together. At 0300 on June 21 a cable parted and further pounding caused LCT(A) 2273 to fold the centre of the craft where it had previously buckled so that the centre was out of the water while the bow and stern were low in the water. At 0730 all equipment and stores were transferred to LCT 965 as a precaution. At 1330 both sides of the craft ripped apart from the bottom up to the cargo deck, the bottom of the craft was cut through and the forward tanks were full of water. At 1400 it was decided that the craft was no longer safe and so personnel transferred to LCT 965 which then stood off and anchored. LCT(A) 2273 broke up and washed ashore in two sections, stern and centre. The forward section was presumed to have sunk. The crew returned to the UK on June 24.


    LCT(A) 2275.
    During the crossing in the morning of D-1 the craft began to flood in the engine room and mess deck on the starboard side. At 1100 the starboard engine failed and from then on the craft struggled to maintain steerage way. Flooding continued until there was eighteen inches in the mess deck, the galley range was out, there was three foot of water along the forward bulkhead and the starboard engine room was flooded. All this caused a list to starboard. At 1600 it was decided that the demolition teams should be put into the LCM and that it should proceed independently. At 1800 they got the starboard engine working and maintained some headway. At 2200 a British convoy was sighted and asked for a position but no reply was received. Since the craft could only manage four knots it could not keep up with the convoy. At 0600 a minesweeper was sighted and a position obtained. The craft was then some eighteen miles from Dog White. It headed for the Transport Area and then went on to Rendezvous Area 5. No escort craft, control craft or other LCTs were there. The craft proceeded to the beach. Four attempts were made to land tanks at 1200 but failed. Eventually landed tanks at low tide. While on beach anchor cable shot off and bow armour damaged. Craft retracted and anchored off shore and waited to contact ARL4 for repairs. Engines finally broke down and a craft under tow hit it and damaged starboard side mess deck. Eventually got alongside ARL 4 for repairs. Craft then made twelve trips to beach with personnel, vehicles and supplies and three trips to Port en Bessin with pipes. (The lack of details regarding dates was due to commanding officer writing the report from memory)

    When the storm broke on June 19 the craft was alongside a coaster unloading ammunition. The mooring lines broke and the craft moved away and anchored but the anchor cable broke and the craft went to the beach to unload. There were no shore personnel unloading so the craft waited on the beach until it broached too. Other craft beached or were driven ashore and the jostling caused considerable damage including five starboard and two port tanks ripped open, stern ‘bashed in’ and ramp damaged. After the storm the craft was towed off by a tug and ordered to wait until it could join a convoy to UK. It was assigned a convoy on 3 July but could not maintain convoy speed and made its own way across the Channel. On arrival it had lost a propeller and had one failed engine.


    LCT(A) 2487.
    No trouble was experienced during the crossing. The craft beached on Easy Red at 1350. Trouble was experienced in retracting because of under water obstacles. The craft cleared the beach at 1425. After D day operation was hampered by a bent propeller shaft and a damaged propeller caused by the under water obstacles. It remained operational until June 30 when the damage rendered it unoperational and it was towed to the UK.


    LCT(A) 2402.
    This craft was under the command of a relief officer, an ensign. At 1700 on D-1 all engines including the generator stopped because of salt water in the fuel tanks. The convoy commander was contacted and he ordered the craft to anchor and to abandon ship if repairs could not be made. A tug arrived and towed the craft for two hours by which time the engines restarted and the void tanks pumped out. The starboard engine was not running properly and at 0200 on D Day it stopped. The craft had a starboard list and this plus the loss of an engine made steering difficult. By 0400 the convoy was out of sight and the port engine control failed making steering impossible. A minesweeper took of some personnel and a coast guard cutter removed the remainder. The craft was abandoned.


    LCT(A) 2339.
    At 1230 on D-1 the port engine went dead. The crew started repairs and put the other two engines at flank speed to maintain position. At 1305 the centre engine went dead. The craft could not maintain position on one engine and so fell back three miles. The port engine restarted and the craft regained its position at 1800. The starboard engine started flooding at 1900 and the load was shifted so as to give a list to port and minimise the flooding. Demolition personnel were unloaded at H-120 and the craft proceeded to Easy Red. At 3000 yards the tanks commenced firing at targets of opportunity. When the craft was 150 yards from the beach enemy machine guns, mortars and artillery started firing. The craft beached at 0630 and discharged tanks under heavy fire. It retracted at 0636 and started for the Transport Area. At 0645 LCT 210 was seen to be on fire and in distress and the craft towed her to the Transport Area and tied her to a rescue tug. On the way to the Transport Area two wounded men from the craft plus one from LCT 210 were put on a LCP(L) for transfer to a hospital ship. At 1200 330 troops were taken on board from PA 67 and taken to Fox Green. The craft could not beach until 1630 because of heavy shell fire on the beach.

    The following twelve days were spent unloading supplies, ammunition, vehicles and personnel. On June 19 the craft anchored because of heavy seas. During the night of June 21 the anchor cable was cut by a LBV and so the craft got under way and moved to Dog White. At 0230 on June 22 the port engine went dead and at 0345 the engine room started to flood. By 0430 it was completely flooded. At 0445 the craft beached. At 0700 it retracted and tied up alongside a LCT(6) to borrow a pump. At 0800 it moved to Easy Red and beached. All engines were now dead. At 0930 reported to Naval Salvage Unit and returned to UK on June 25.


    LCT(A) 2310.
    At 0430 on D Day the Transport Area was sighted and passed. At 0445 the craft was under way for the beach in the buoyed channel and with the craft listing to starboard. It passed the Line of Departure and the beach was visible but unidentifiable. Followed LCT(A) 2454. At 0620 the starboard engine stopped and the list was increasing. At 0650 the craft beached and discharged its load under heavy fire which caused two casualties. It retracted from the beach at 0705 when the port engine went dead and the rudder was not functioning. At 0715 the radio went dead and the generator blew up. At 0745 signalled LCF 27 to take the wounded off.

    (The next page of the report is missing).


    LCT(A) 2307.
    LCT(A) was unable to tow the LCM across the Channel because of heavy seas so it proceeded independently but close behind. At 2200 on D-1 waves smashed in the centre section of the starboard bulwark. Attempts to repair it failed and the tank dozer was moved to port to correct the list that developed. Early on D day it lost its position in the convoy along with several other craft and was late arriving at the Transport Area. There were no control vessels to be seen. At 0430 an LCI told the craft to make for the beach so demolition personnel were transferred to the LCM and the craft proceeded to the beach at top speed. Because of the lack of time the craft did not move down the swept channel to the Line of Departure and then across to Easy Green but it cut diagonally across from some miles out. For the last 1000 yards the craft was under machine gun fire. It beached at 0640 on a small sand bank some yards from the waters edge. The tanks and the tank dozer each fired twenty to thirty rounds on the run in. The tanks did not move to leave the craft so they were ordered to do so. One tank left at 0650 but the second tank did not move. Gunfire caused two casualties and severed the ramp cable and chain. The second tank, commanded by a lieutenant, was again ordered to leave but refused on the grounds that the water was too deep. The craft attempted to move further up the beach but failed. The tank dozer wished to land but could not get past the gun tank. The craft started to retract at 0800 in order to make another landing but since the ramp was dangling and the craft listing it was decided to reverse to the Transport Area. It was taken in tow by LCT(A) 2043, still stern first. A ML took the casualties and a LCVP took the army and navy personnel to APA 26 Samuel Chase. The commanding officer returned to the craft to destroy secret material and then reported to LCT(A) 2008. LCT(A) 2307 capsized and sank in the Transport Area.

    Note:
    ARL 4 was USS Adonis. This was a LST converted to Landing Craft Repair Ship. She was at Portland until D Day carrying out repairs on craft and it was intended that she should stay there for some time. However so many landing craft were damaged that she was ordered to Omaha on D+1.

    Mike.
     
    Last edited: Aug 2, 2017
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  13. Trux

    Trux 21 AG


    Task Force 124.9.
    Bombardment Force ‘C’.

    Bombardment Force ‘C’ crossed the Channel using the fast swept channel. It was to make the best use of its speed but was twice held up by the minesweepers. On arrival it dispersed to its assigned positions off the coast.

    USS Texas.
    Battleship with ten 14” guns.

    USS Arkansas.
    Battleship with twelve 12” guns.

    HMS Glasgow.
    A Southampton class cruiser with twelve 8” guns.

    FFS Montcalm.
    FFS Georges Leygues.
    Two French light cruisers each with nine 152mm guns.

    8 X DD. Fleet Destroyers of Desron 18.
    All were from the Livermore Class with four 5” guns.
    USS Frankford. DD 497.
    USS McCook. DD 496.
    USS Carmick. DD 493.
    USS Doyle. DD 494.
    USS Baldwin. DD 624.
    USS Harding. DD 625
    USS Saterlee. DD 626.
    USS Thompson. DD 627.

    Hunt Class destroyers.
    Four 4" guns each.
    HMS Tanatside.
    HMS Talybont.
    HMS Melbreak.


    Bombardment Force ‘C’ was to provide fire support for Omaha Beach. The orders identified three phases of support.
    Counter Battery Fire.
    Pre arranged and scheduled beach bombardment.
    Close supporting fire after landing.

    The primary role of the heavy bombardment units, the battleships and cruisers, on other beaches was the neutralising of coastal artillery batteries which could threaten the shipping and the craft as they approached the beach. This involved a period of bombardment of the coastal batteries after which they would only be engaged if they opened fire. To assist with this spotting aircraft were used. There were only two batteries which threatened Omaha. One at Longues was actually in Gold area and was the target for another bombardment force. The other battery was at Point du Hoc and this was engaged by the USS Texas before being assaulted by Rangers. The remaining bombardment ships were assigned targets on or behind the beaches. The bombardment of these targets was limited to forty minutes by the need to have the fall of shot observed, which meant good light, which meant it could not start earlier. British beaches had an extra hour of daylight before the first troops landed but the tides dictated that troops should land on Omaha an hour earlier.

    Daylight was important to naval gunfire for two reasons. One was to enable the spotter aircraft to identify the battery which was firing in the event of it engaging the shipping offshore. For the neutralisation role each bombardment battleship or cruiser was assigned a battery as its target and allocated a spotting aircraft to report directly to it. The second reason was that although major naval units had sophisticated gunnery control systems these were designed for use in the open seas. It was necessary to have the spotter aircraft spot the fall of shell and radio the ship to say whether the shells were landing under, on or over the target. Corrections could then be made. Relays of spotter aircraft were on station from twilight, which was sunrise minus 40 minutes, until they were no longer needed.

    Neutralisation implies that they were to prevent the enemy batteries interfering with the landings. It was never considered practicable to actually destroy enemy batteries with naval gunfire. Many of them were well protected against even the heaviest naval guns. In general the naval bombardment force would only engage enemy batteries if they themselves opened fire. Large warships could not carry sufficient ammunition to maintain a barrage for any length of time and it was not practicable to re ammunition at sea. Major warships had to return to the UK to re ammunition.

    It was hoped that some damage, both material and morale, would have been inflicted by air bombardment. Certainly it was expected that communications would be damaged. This hope was not realised.

    Bombardment Control was to be exercised from USS Ancon under the Naval Commander Force ‘O’. The Stand By Flagship was also the Stand By Control Ship which would take over if the Flagship was disabled. As a last resort USS Augusta would assume control. Whichever Bombardment Control Ship was actually controlling, the same call signs were to be used and bombarding ships need not know which control ship was in fact controlling them. The stand by ships were to listen out on the Bombardment Call Wave for an unanswered call which might indicate that the control ship was out of action. If fire was required unexpectedly the Bombardment Control Ship would detail a ship for the duty and tell her the target and the call sign of the aircraft which was to spot for her. The firing ship should then contact the aircraft and tell it what the target was.

    Pre arranged spotting sorties were to be flown from sunrise minus 40 minutes up to Sunrise + 320 minutes after which sorties would be flown over the target area until Sunrise + 590 minutes. These would be prepared to spot on impromptu targets. During this period any of the ships could call on any of the sorties concerned and carry out a shoot. After this time any requirements for spotting aircraft should be signalled to the Allied Naval Commander by the Naval Commander Force ‘O’. A percentage of sorties would remain over the target area for impromptu shoots.

    Neutralising fire on the beach defences would be carried out from H-40 minutes until H Hour. At H Hour the bombardment would lift to fire on targets inland for twenty minutes.

    After the initial fire tasks Texas was assigned the task of firing on the Pointe du Hoc battery. Montcalm neutralised Port en Bessin.

    Arkansas, Glasgow, Leygues and the destroyers carried out assigned tasks of firing on the beach, behind the beach and on the flanks of the beach. Some bombarding ships had difficulty identifying targets. Beach defences were carefully camouflaged and although they had been accurately identified by aerial reconnaissance photographs the ships could not visually identify the targets and thus had problems spotting the fall of shell.

    HMS Glasgow was to fire on WN 66, expending 400 rounds of 6” ammunition.
    USS Arkansas was to fire on WN 66 and WN 68, expending 385 rounds of 12” ammunition and to fire on WN 62 with its secondary armament, expending 250 rounds of 5” ammunition.
    USS McCook was to fire on WN 71, expending 300 rounds of 5” ammunition.
    USS Carmick was to fire on WN 70, expending 250 rounds of 5” ammunition.

    Close supporting fire was intended to cover the period between H Hour and the time when Shore Fire Control Parties were set up. Naval gunfire at this stage was restricted by the presence of friendly troops on shore. Targets needed to be positively identified. The US beaches did not have an equivalent of the British LCS(M). This could go very close inshore and observe positions and then report to the fire support craft and ships. It was reported that one enterprising US Naval Gunfire Liaison Officer, unable to find a place to land, did set up his radio in his LCVP and spotted from close inshore.

    Ranging fire when using spotter aircraft should be in salvos of up to four guns when practicable. The ranging salvo was to aim on 400 yards down ladder. This meant that the first shells should aim to land 400 yards short and adjustments then made by increasing the range in 100 yards increments until fire straddled the target. Apparently it was thought that fire landing in front of the enemy position would create smoke, dust and debris and thus obscure the view for their control instruments. Also fire creeping towards the gun position would have a demoralising effect. Before opening fire the ship should confirm the targets coordinates with the spotter aircraft.

    The first salvo of an indirect shoot by a Forward Observer Bombardment should also be by four guns if practicable. Other ranging salvos observed by a Forward Observer Bombardment should be by a single gun.

    Spotting aircraft could discover targets of opportunity and request fire on them. In this case it was the ships responsibility to check that there were no friendly troops in the area. Spotting aircraft did see and report a company of self propelled guns heading towards Colleville in order to support a counter attack.

    All spotting aircraft were briefed for two targets before take off from the UK. Such targets were normally identified well in advance and if any change was requested it was to be before the briefings took place. In emergency the request could be made while the aircraft were airborne but any change of target was to be notified by the Assault Force Commander to Tactical Air Control which would inform the aircraft.

    Since the time a ship is available for bombardment depends on the rate of expenditure of ammunition this expenditure should be kept to a minimum needed to achieve the result of neutralising enemy batteries. A close check was kept on the expenditure of ammunition. After each shoot a signal was to be sent stating the number of rounds fired. Signals should also be sent when ships had 50% and 25% of ammunition remaining. Heavy ships and cruisers should report ammunition states to Rear Admiral Commanding 2 Cruiser Squadron who will send ammunition reports to Naval Commander Western Task Force and copy the signal to Naval Commander Force ‘O’. Destroyers and LCGs should report to Naval Commander Force ‘O’ who should report to the Naval Commander Western Task Force the names of destroyers when 25% of their ammunition remains.

    Heavy ships, cruisers and destroyers were to sail to the UK for replenishment of ammunition under the orders of Naval Commander Western Task Force. Landing Craft Gun ammunition was to be replenished from an Ammunition Store and Issue Ship.

    A reserve of fire support ships was provided to relieve ships damaged or with depleted ammunition stocks. These included ships with other duties such as flagships, escorts and screen. Reserves included:

    Cruisers.
    USS Augusta.
    HMS Bellona.

    Destroyers,
    Desdiv 33
    Desdiv 119
    Desdiv 18
    USS Plunkett attached to Desdiv 33.

    Mike
     
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  14. Trux

    Trux 21 AG

    Air Spotting.
    Air spotting for the bombarding and fire support warships was provided by the Air Spotting Pool based at Lee on Solent. This core component of this pool were the Fleet Air Arm Squadrons, numbers 808, 885, 886, and 897. These were augmented by two Air Defence Great Britain squadrons, Numbers 26 and 63 which were still equipped with the older Spitfire VB. Until noon on D Day there were also three Mustang squadrons from 2 Tactical Air Force, numbers 2, 268 and 414.

    There was one US Navy squadron, VCS 7. This squadron flew Spitfire VB in RAF markings. It had ten operational aircraft plus five reserve. This was a useful addition to the pool as well as being a good use of available resources. The seventeen pilots were trained seaplane pilots from the spotting seaplanes carried on major US warships. These planes were not carried on warships on D Day as they were far too vulnerable.

    The Spotting Pool squadrons flew a total of 218 spotting missions on D Day, each mission having a pair of aircraft.

    The Western Task Force was assigned continuous cover from ten pairs of aircraft from H-40 minutes, when the preliminary bombardment began, until H +230 minutes. After this time there were five pairs available. It was assumed that by this time enemy shore batteries would have been taken by ground troops and that Shore Fire Control Parties would be ashore and operating.

    Spotting was organised in groups with each group providing a continuous cover of a pair of aircraft. Out of twenty groups Omaha was assigned four. Group 9 provided a continuous cover over twenty four time periods each of 45 minutes. Group 9 provided a similar cover except for time periods 12, 16, 20 and 24 when the turnround time required meant there were no aircraft available. Group 12 provided cover for periods 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, and 7 while Group 15 provided cover for periods 1,2, 5 and 6. Again the gaps were caused by there being insufficient aircraft to fill the schedule.

    Twenty four VHF frequencies were assigned for use with the spotting aircraft. Bombarding ships were informed of the frequency to be used by their spotting aircraft. They were to set watch on the assigned frequency and establish communications with the aircraft by using the aircrafts call sign followed by code word ‘Turret’. If a second ship was using the same spotting plane it would use codeword ‘Spunyarn’. Each of the bombarding ships carried a complete set of twenty four crystals for the sets so that they could change if necessary. Each spotting plane had crystals for the spotting frequency plus the reconnaissance frequency and air sea rescue frequency.

    The larger ships were well used to working with spotting aircraft since cruisers and battleships normally carried some of their own. These were launched by catapult and recovered by simply landing next to the ship and being lifted aboard using a crane.



    Shore Fire Control Parties.
    The Joint Assault Signals Communications Organisation was unit designed to provide communications for the beach. A part of their task was to provide Shore Fire Control Parties, and Naval Gunfire Liaison Officers. Shore Fire Control Parties were provided on the scale of one per company for the assault units, plus parties for battalion headquarters. They were to position themselves near the relevant headquarters and pass on requests for fire support to the vessel(s) assigned to them.

    Those ships assigned fire support tasks were to set watch on their Shore Fire Control Party spotting wave by the time their Shore Fire Control Party was expected to land. A Shore Fire Control Party who could not get in touch with the attached ship within 20 minutes of opening communication was to report to the Bombardment Control Ship. It was ordered that the Bombardment Calling Wave channel was for passing calls for support to the Bombardment Control Ship and was to be kept clear for that purpose. However some observers used this channel in preference to their assigned direct channel and jammed the system. Fire support ships were also to set watch on the Assault Force Auxiliary Wave which was to be used for passing information or instructions to fire support ships.

    The Naval Gunfire Liaison Officers were assigned to Division Headquarters and Regimental Headquarters. The Divisional detachment consisted of two officers and twelve men, mainly signallers. The Liaison Officer assigned to Regiment Combat Team Headquarters was stationed at the Artillery Battalion Headquarters so that fire calls could be shared between shore artillery and naval units.

    Each ship engaged in fire support via a Shore Fire Control Party had a Naval Gunfire Support Officer on board.

    Shore Fire Control Parties used a SCR 609 radio set. This was a VHF voice set using preset crystals for tuning. This was carried in a Jeep but until vehicles could be landed it could be broken down into three manpack loads. Major gunfire support ships had a SCR 608 radio set. This was more powerful, more sophisticated, and a lot heavier. Destroyers did not have this set. These sets continued in use as long as the SFCP was within range when the SCR 284 was used. The SFCP had two assigned frequencies, one for for the high frequency SCR 284 and one for the VHF 609. The ship ordered to work with a particular SFCP was to set watch on both frequencies.

    Shore Fire Control Parties were assigned on the basis of one per battalion, one per artillery regiment and one per divisional artillery headquarters.

    SFCP 1 was assigned to 2 Ranger Battalion
    SFCP 2 was assigned to 5 Ranger Battalion.
    SFCP 3 was assigned to 1 Battalion, 116 Infantry Regiment.
    SFCP 4 was assigned to 2 Battalion, 116 Infantry Regiment.
    SFCP 5 was assigned to 3 Battalion, 116 Infantry Regiment
    SFCP 6 was assigned to 111 Field Artillery Battalion.
    SFCP 7 was assigned to 1 Battalion, 16 Infantry Regiment.
    SFCP 8 was assigned to 2 Battalion, 16 Infantry Regiment.
    SFCP 9 was assigned to 3 Battalion, 16 Infantry Regiment.
    SFCP 10 was assigned to 7 Field Artillery Battalion.
    SFCP 11 was assigned to 1 Battalion, 18 Infantry Regiment.
    SFCP 12 was assigned to 2 Battalion, 18 Infantry Regiment.
    SFCP 13 was assigned to 3 Battalion, 18 Infantry Regiment.
    SFCP 14 was assigned to 32 Field Artillery Battalion.
    SFCP 15 was assigned to 1 Division Artillery Headquarters.
    SFCP 16 was assigned to 1 Battalion, 115 Infantry Regiment.
    SFCP 17 was assigned to 2 Battalion, 115 Infantry Regiment.
    SFCP 18 was assigned to 3 Battalion, 115 Infantry Regiment.
    SFCP 19 was assigned to 110 Field Artillery Battalion.
    SFCP 20 was assigned to 1 Battalion, 26 Infantry Regiment.
    SFCP 21 was assigned to 2 Battalion, 26 Infantry Regiment.
    SFCP 22 was assigned to 3 Battalion, 26 Infantry Regiment.
    SFCP 23 was assigned to 33 Field Artillery Battalion.
    SFCP 24 was assigned to 1 Battalion, 175 Infantry Regiment.
    SFCP 25 was assigned to 2 Battalion, 175 Infantry Regiment.
    SFCP 26 was assigned to 3 Battalion, 175 Infantry Regiment.
    SFCP 27 was assigned to 224 Field Artillery Battalion.
    SFCP 28 was assigned to 29 Division Artillery Headquarters.
    SFCP 29 was assigned to 1 Battalion, 8 Infantry Regiment.
    SFCP 30 was assigned to 2 Battalion, 8 Infantry Regiment.
    SFCP 31 was assigned to 3 Battalion, 8 Infantry Regiment
    SFCP 32 was assigned to 29 Field Artillery Battalion.
    SFCP 33 was assigned to 1 Battalion, 22 Infantry Regiment.
    SFCP 34 was assigned to 2 Battalion, 22 Infantry Regiment.
    SFCP 35 was assigned to 3 Battalion, 22 Infantry Regiment.
    SFCP 36 was assigned to 44 Field Artillery Battalion.
    SFCP 37 was assigned to 1 Battalion, 12 Infantry Regiment.
    SFCP 38 was assigned to 2 Battalion, 12 Infantry Regiment.
    SFCP 39 was assigned to 3 Battalion, 12 Infantry Regiment.
    SFCP 40 was assigned to 42 Field Artillery Battalion.
    SFCP 41 was assigned to 4 Division Artillery Headquarters.
    SFCP 42 was assigned to 358 Regimental Combat Team.
    SFCP 43 was assigned to 502 Regimental Combat Team.
    SFCP 44 was assigned to 459 Regimental Combat Team.


    There was a gap in communication from H Hour until the first Shore Fire Control Parties landed at H+30 minutes. When the first parties did land they often had problems including not having a working radio, losing key personnel, not having a local army commanding officer with whom to liaise and being unable to see anything. In most cases it was early afternoon before the system worked as intended. The greatest problem for the supporting destroyers was not knowing the position of own troops. They could not fire on targets unless they were certain that own troops were not in the vicinity.


    Precautions were taken against the major bombardment ships being engaged by shore batteries using radar. Certain ships were equipped with radar jamming sets but the use of these was strictly limited. Jamming was always a two edged weapon and its use would also jam much needed communications. In the event the enemy batteries did not use radar and jamming was not employed. Also provided were radar reflecting balloons which could be deployed to give an image similar to a major warship and thus confuse enemy batteries.

    Mike
     
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    Trux 21 AG

    The Ships.

    The battleships were too old for fleet work in the Pacific but were very capable in the bombardment role. They were fully operational and not war weary units. Their main guns were 12” or 14”, much larger than any mobile guns used by ground forces. They could fire very heavy shells to a range of twenty miles and using power ammunition supply and loading could maintain a high rate of fire. Their fire control equipment gave them great accuracy and the ability to engage several targets simultaneously if required. Gun control radar and optical directors were provided to allow guns to fire a full broadside from all guns on one target or use separate fire control for forward and aft turrets separately. The secondary armament of 5” guns on either side were controlled by separate fire control equipment. If the ship was broadside on to the shore this arrangement allowed two shore targets to be engaged by the main armament and one by the secondary armament.

    The battleships also carried anti aircraft search radars, anti aircraft fire control radars and optical instruments and IFF (Identification Friend or Foe). As well as contributing to the anti aircraft defence of the area they could give early warning and fire control to other ships. Wireless jamming and Electronic Counter Measures were also carried. Powerful surface search radars could monitor movements up to a distance of a hundred miles.

    Battleships had a comprehensive suite of communications equipment. They had long wave and short wave wireless plus the very useful TBS (Talk Between Ships) radio. They also had a number of signal lamps and Texas was equipped with a British day light system which was mounted on the mainmast and visible for a considerable distance.

    The morale effect of the battleship was also considerable. Troops in landing craft could not help but be impressed and reassured by the battleships massive presence and equally massive broadside. The negative effect on enemy morale must also have been considerable.

    Both Texas and Arkansas were Atlantic Fleet units and so were not at Pearl Harbour. This meant that they survived intact but did not receive the virtual rebuild of some of the Pearl Harbour casualties.


    USS Texas.
    Texas was a pre WWI US battleship which had undergone several refits and modifications. She was 27,000 tons, 565 foot long and 106 foot wide. Armed with ten 14” guns in five twin turrets and six 5” guns in barbettes. Texas could fire heavy shells to a range of 18,000 yards. She carried both armour piercing and high explosive rounds but ammunition was limited to 100 rounds per gun.

    USS Arkansas.
    Arkansas was another pre WWI battleship. She was 26,000 tons, 555 foot long and 106 foot wide. Armament was twelve 12” guns in six twin turrets and six 5” guns in barbettes.


    The Cruisers.
    HMS Glasgow.
    A Southampton class light cruiser.
    Glasgow provided a very useful fire support having twelve 8” guns capable of firing to a range of 24,000 yards. 200 rounds per gun was carried.

    FFS Montcalm and FFS Georges Leygues.
    Two French light cruisers built in 1937. They were 7,600 tons, 587 foot long and had a top speed of 31 knots. Each carried nine 152mm guns in three triple turrets plus four twin 90mm AA. The main armament had a range of 28,000 yards and 170 rounds per gun was carried.


    The Destroyers.
    Eight Fleet Destroyers of Desron 18.
    All were from the Livermore Class and were 1630 tons, 347 foot long, carried four 5" guns and had a top speed of 37 knots. The 5” guns had a range of 18,000 yards and 400 rounds per gun, all high explosive, were carried

    USS Frankford. DD 497.
    USS McCook. DD 496.
    USS Carmick. DD 493.
    USS Doyle. DD 494.
    USS Baldwin. DD 624.
    USS Harding. DD 625
    USS Saterlee. DD 626.
    USS Thompson. DD 627.

    USS Endicott, DD 495, appears on various lists but was damaged before D Day and did not take part.

    This was a large class, of some 66 destroyers. Commonly called Livermore or Benson – Livermore they varied in detail. Desron 18 had two groups of four identical ships, evidenced by the pennant numbers. The key data remained the same.

    The destroyers were very active in the fire support role. For a time they provided the only effective fire support for the troops ashore.

    At H-40 minutes the destroyers opened fire on their assigned targets. Where shore batteries returned fire the destroyers shifted fire from their assigned targets to neutralise the enemy batteries. As the first wave of craft closed the beach the destroyers preceded them to within 1000 to 2000 yards. The destroyers then took up positions on the flanks of the craft approach lanes, ready to support the troops ashore.

    Until the Shore Fire Support Parties were established ashore the destroyers fired on targets of opportunity. This was necessarily restricted by a lack of knowledge of own troops positions. In some cases destroyers closed to less than 1000 yards from shore and fire was directed by individual commanding officers.

    Once the Shore Fire Support Parties were ashore fire was directed by them where possible. Some parties did not survive and some lost radio equipment so that a variety of methods of directing fire was used. Some commanding officers continued to act on their own initiative, some fire was directed by the Commander Destroyer Squadron 18 and some by the Commander of the Fire Support Task Group.

    In some cases the destroyers fired for considerable periods at the highest possible rate. By 1750 hours USS Satterlee had expended 70% of her ammunition and was withdrawn to the Area Screen, being replaced by USS Thompson. At 1800 hours USS Barton and USS O’Brien reported to the Fire Support Area and were assigned stations and Shore Fire Control Parties. At 2000 hours USS Carmick had expended 70% of her ammunition and was withdrawn to the Area Screen.


    Three Hunt Class destroyers.
    HMS Tanatside.
    HMS Talybont.
    HMS Melbreak.
    All Type 3 Hunt Class with four 4” guns.

    The Hunt Class destroyers were active in giving Fire Support from close inshore but have not received the same coverage as have the US destroyers. The 4” gun had a range of 19,000 yards and 250 rounds per gun was carried.

    The reports by individual officers commanding destroyers indicate considerable frustration that they were not able to use their firepower to full advantage in support of the troops ashore. In most cases this was because of a lack of communications with the shore. When communications did work the effect could be impressive.

    USS Doyle.
    On learning of the difficulties troops were experiencing on Easy Red USS Doyle moved into the boat lanes directly in front of the beach and some 1000 yards from it. It was not possible to reach the most favourable position for firing because the boat lanes were crowded. It was difficult to manoeuvre because of the small craft milling around. By the time it was able to fire the enemy had stopped firing and the positions could not be spotted. It was reported that good relationships had been formed with the Naval Shore Fire Control Party and the battalion commander but in the event the observer became separated for the whole of D day.

    USS Emmons.
    There were no communications with the shore until 1930 hours so USS Emmons fired on targets of opportunity and on targets designated by the commander Task Group 124.9.

    USS Herndon.
    Almost a text book shoot. At 1310 hours the Naval Shore Fire Control Party called for a shoot in support of infantry on top of the bluffs. Initially twelve rounds a minute were fired but the observer called for increases in the rate of fire until they were firing four gun salvos every five seconds. This continued until the ammunition supply could not be maintained. As ammunition was hoisted from lower magazines it took longer for it to reach the guns. The rate of fire was reduced to a salvo every 15 seconds. The results were reported as being excellent. The enemy was on the run and own troops were advancing.


    It was reported that army commanding officers did not have complete confidence in the destroyers ability to engage targets with accuracy because the destroyer was moving. Of course the destroyers fire control systems were designed to fire on a moving target from a moving ship and in all sea conditions. On occasions troops were convinced that they were being fired on by their own ships, and even radioed for the fire to cease. In fact the fire was from enemy artillery.

    Mike.
     
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    Trux 21 AG

    Task Force 14.10.
    Sweeper Group.

    4 Minesweeping Flotilla. Fleet minesweepers.
    Aberdare Class minesweepers.

    31 Mine sweeping Flotilla. Fleet minesweepers.
    Royal Canadian Navy. Bangor Class minesweepers.

    167 Minesweeping Flotilla. BYMS.
    104 Minesweeping Flotilla. Motor minesweepers.

    4 and 31 Minesweeping Flotillas each had two minesweeping motor launches and four dan layers attached. Motor launches swept ahead of the fleet sweepers. Since they were shallow draft they were less likely to set off mines. Dan layers laid buoys to mark lanes.

    The Aberdare Class of 4 Minesweeping Flotilla were built at the end of WW1 and did not see active service. They were 231 foot long, 710 tons and had a speed of 16 knots. They were armed with a 4” gun forward and a 12 pounder aft. They were large and roomy enough to accommodate and handle the range of minesweeping gear that came into service in WW2. Their disadvantage was that they were coal burners and thus made smoke.

    The Bangor Class was built in WW2 and was 162 foot long, 592 tons (in Canadian service) had a speed of 16 knots and also carried a 4” gun and a 12 pounder in Canadian service. It was considered rather cramped for the equipment needed.

    It was essential that a wide lane across the Channel be swept clear of mines, and then kept clear. Ten channels, two per beach, were swept to within ten miles of the Normandy coast. This would allow Landing Ships and Craft to reach the Transport Area some ten miles from shore. Minesweepers then swept areas for the landing ships and craft to assemble, fire support ships to position themselves and routes for craft to move to and from the beach and along to other beaches.

    As far as possible groups of ships and craft were composed of vessels capable of the same speed. Landing Ships, APAs and LCI(L) were to travel at 12 knots in Channel 3. LCTs were to travel at 5 knots. Since LSTs of the first groups were towing Rhino Ferries they were to travel at 8 knots but where they travelled in mixed groups with LCTs they travelled at 5 knots. The sweepers of 31 Minesweeper Flotilla swept Channel 3 which would be used by fast convoys of both Assault Group O1 and Assault Group O2. The sweepers of 4 Minesweeper Flotilla swept Channel 4 which would be used by slow convoys of both assault groups.

    Minesweepers needed to keep a good formation and employ precise navigation. A flotilla of sweepers advanced in echelon with paravanes trailing astern. The paravanes were attached to long steel cables which should catch mines and lead them to the cutting blades on the paravane. Mines would then float to the surface and be exploded by gunfire. The swept channel was marked with dan buoys which had lights for use at night. These buoys were laid one per mile by specially equipped trawlers.

    A large area south of the Isle of Wight had already been cleared of mines. This was Area Z where the various convoys, sailing from a number of ports, assembled and were marshalled for the crossing. The coastal routes from Portland to Area Z had also been kept free of mines, leaving the minesweepers of Force ‘O’ to concentrate on the Channel crossing lanes. At the entrance to the swept lanes leaving Area Z were stationed Harbour Defence Motor Launches fitted as navigation leaders. These were equipped with Type 78 radio beacons which could be picked up by naval radar. For Channel 3 it transmitted a one second high pitched tone and the letter C. For Channel 4 it transmitted a two second high pitched tone and the letter D. By night these launches flashed their channel number and by day they flew the appropriate numeral flag.

    The minesweepers of Force O1 started sweeping Channel 3 at H minus 10 hours and was timed to arrive at the transport area at H minus 5½ hours. The minesweepers of Force O2 started sweeping Channel 4 at H minus 12 hours and were timed to arrive at the transport area at H minus 3½ hours. Since both minesweeping groups had a planned speed of 7½ knots that of Channel 4 had to turn and steam back along the swept channel in order to lose 1½ hours. It had started sweeping earlier than that of Channel 3 because Channel 4 was to be used for slow convoys.

    As the lanes were swept they were marked by danbuoys laid by specially equipped trawlers. At Latitude 50 degrees, 5 minutes North the lanes were marked on the centre line by a white flashing lights on danbuoy. At each mile interval the centre line was marked by a fixed green light danbuoy. When the enemy mine belt was reached at 50 degrees North the lanes were marked on each side, on the starboard by an occulting red light danbuoy and on the port by a flashing white danbuoy. At each mile thereafter the channel was marked by fixed red and white danbuoy lights. At the point where the channels reached the enemy mine belt underwater sonic buoys had been laid some days earlier. These lay dormant and only started transmitting on D-1 so that the minesweepers could accurately locate the starting point.

    When the Transport Area was reached the starboard hand was marked by a red occulting red light danbuoy and the port by a flashing white danbuoy. These marked the end of the swept channel and the northern edge of the transport area. The southern edge of the Transport Area was marked by fixed red danbuoy lights. Later the danbuoys would be replaced by more permanent buoys.

    This system worked well in general but there were instances of convoys using the wrong channel. One group of Force O started in the correct channel, No 4, but the tide carried the tail of the convoy to the east and into Channel 5. This forced a group from Gold out of its channel. When the tide turned the errant group returned to its correct channel.

    Once the Swept Channels had been completed the sweepers began their far side tasks. 4 Minesweeping Flotilla swept the Transport Area while 31 Minesweeping Flotilla swept part of the Transport Area and then swept Boat Lanes from the Transport Area to shore and the Fire Support Channels to either side. These lanes were marked by red (to port/left) and green (to starboard/right) danbuoys,

    During the remainder of D Day the minesweepers were busy sweeping the area between the Transport Area and the beaches so that later in the day major craft could anchor closer to shore. At about 1600 4 and 14 Minesweeping Flotillas rendezvoused with Trinity House Vessel G de Joli at the northern ends of the swept channels and then swept the area between Lanes 3 and 4 to create a wider Channel 34 to Omaha. This channel was to be at least 1.8 miles wide.

    Note:
    Danbuoy lights are described as fixed, flashing or occulting. Fixed means they shone permanently (until the battery ran down). Flashing means that it was on for periods shorter than the periods of darkness. Occulting means the period of darkness was longer that the lit period.

    How to remember port and starboard.
    Port wine is red and it is passed round the table to the left of course.

    Mike.
     
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  17. Trux

    Trux 21 AG

    Task Force 124.11.

    Far Shore Service Group.

    Motor Torpedo Boat (RN).
    PT Boat (USN).
    6 US Submarine Chasers.
    12 Motor Launches.
    2 Harbour Defence Motor Launches.
    15 US Coast Guard Cutters.

    Landing Ship Emergency Repair.
    Landing Ship Dock.

    Ferry Service.
    Thames barges converted for use off the beaches.
    72 LBV(2). Landing Barge Vehicle. All have engines and ramp for landing vehicles.
    16 LBE. Landing Barge Emergency Repair. LBV fitted for the repair of small craft.
    2 LBK. Landing Barge Kitchen.
    5 LBW. Landing Barge Water.
    26 LBO. Landing Barge Oiler.

    10 Fuelling Trawlers.

    20 Rhino Ferries.
    172 LCVP.
    139 LCM.
    12 LCM Salvage.

    Many craft, mainly LCT and LCVP of the assault groups remained for service with the Ferry Service.

    Since most of the work of the Far Shore Service Group was done after D Day the various elements will be described more fully later.


    Task Group 124.12.
    Despatch Boats

    Flagship carrying Commanding Officer Task Group 124.12.
    USN PT 72.

    Nine RAF Seaplane tenders. Not the large USN ships but small craft for taking crews out to seaplanes and flying boats.
    37 foot tenders.
    210, 269, 270, 271, 283,

    41 foot tenders.
    1547, 1548, 1549, 1586.

    These were not popular and were soon retired. Apparently they were in poor mechanical condition and were often unserviceable. They were replaced by Coast Guard cutters which were slower but were reliable.

    RN Motor Launches which accompanied the Assault Groups as escorts or control craft were to depart by 2300 hours and return to the Solent. They then joined the Naval Despatch Boat Service.
    ML 118, ML 153, ML 163, ML 187, ML 189, ML 193, ML 194, ML 230, ML 304, ML 448 and ML 907.



    Task Group 124.13
    Rescue vessels.


    Fifteen United States Coastguard Cutters
    USCG Cutters 1 to 15.

    The Coast Guard Cutters were to act as rescue vessels for the Channel Crossing and then report back to the UK. There were so many swamped craft and consequently many survivors in life rafts or life preservers that permission was sought and given for five cutters to remain off the beaches. Personnel who were rescued off the beaches were put onto transports and craft. Casualties were returned to the UK. Non casualties would return to the UK if they were put onto a craft that was returning.

    Mike.
     
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  18. Tricky Dicky

    Tricky Dicky Don'tre member

    Port has 4 letters the same as left

    TD
     
  19. Trux

    Trux 21 AG

    Embarking.

    The loading tables were prepared by the planning staff but were to be supervised by unit personnel. Transportation Quartermasters were assigned by corps and division headquarters on the basis of one per battalion sized unit. Commanding offices of units assigned a Commanding Officer Troops and an Assistant Transportation Quartermaster to each craft allotted to his unit. They were to supervise the combat loading of the ships and craft. On LCTs the Commanding Officer Troops and the Assistant Transportation Quartermaster were to be same person. This system should have worked well since the loading tables were precise and detailed. In the case of LSTs in particular scale drawings were produced to show where and how each vehicle was to be parked. However several sources suggest that overloading was common as unit Assistant Transportation Quartermasters found there was room for an extra jeep or Weasel and so loaded one. Soldiers might be excused for not realising that this would affect the draft and the beaching characteristics of the craft and possibly its stability.

    Ships and craft for Force ‘O’ embarked vehicles and personnel at Portland starting on 31 May. The largest ships, with accommodation and cooking facilities, loaded first as personnel could remain on board them for some time. Personnel embarked at the Great Western Railway Pier at Portland. LST and LCT embarked vehicles at three hards, R1, R2 and R3 at Portland. Light vehicles to be carried in the transports (APA and LSI(L)) were loaded onto the transports own LCM and LCVP at Hard R1.

    Portland did not have particularly good port facilities. It was a ferry port in peacetime, providing a link from the Great Western Railway terminus to the Continent. It did however have a large expanse of water sheltered by Portland Bill, a large narrow strip terminating in a rocky outcrop.

    When loaded ships and craft of Force ‘O’ were moored or anchored as follows.

    Anchored in Portland Harbour.
    2 flagships
    4 APA. Attack Transports.
    2 LSI(L). Landing Ship Infantry (Large).
    1 LSD. Landing Ship Dock.
    20 Rhino Ferries

    Moored at buoys in Portland Harbour.
    1 FDT. Fighter Direction Tender.
    21 LST
    127 LCT 5 and 6
    2 LCT 4
    2 LCT HE
    2 LCT CB

    In the coastal forces pens at Portland.
    1 PT. USN Torpedo Boat.
    5 LCC. Landing Craft Control.

    Anchored in Weymouth Bay.
    10 BYMS. Small minesweeper.
    16 Fleet Mine Sweeper.
    6 Danlayer
    10 MMS. Motor Minesweeper.
    3 LSI(H). Landing Ship Infantry (Hoist)
    3 LSI(S). Landing Ship Infantry (Small).
    3 LST
    ARL Adonis. Landing Craft Repair Ship.
    Depot Ship Melville.
    9 DD. USN Fleet Destroyers.
    3 Hunts. RN coastal destroyers.
    2 V Class Destroyers.
    DE. US Destroyer Escort.
    2 frigates
    9 PC. US Patrol Craft.
    7 SC. US Anti Submarine Craft.
    3 Anti Submarine trawlers.

    Moored at the quay at Weymouth Harbour.
    4 LCH. Landing Craft Headquarters.
    33 LCI(L). Landing Craft Infantry (Large).

    Above the bridge at Weymouth Harbour.
    28 LCP(L) smoke
    9 LCM Salvage.

    Moored at buoys in Poole Harbour.
    119 LCM3
    6 LCM3 Salvage
    72 LBV. Landing Barge Vehicle.
    26 LBO. Landing Barge Oiler.
    16 LBE. Landing Barge Emergency Repair.
    5 LBW. Landing Barge Water.
    2 LBK. Landing Barge Kitchen.
    8 LCT(A)
    2 LCT(HE)
    7 LCF
    7 LCG
    9 LCT(R)
    10 MMS

    Moored at town quay Poole Harbour.
    7 ML.

    The above are only the ships and craft which formed part of Force O. Others were moored and anchored in these places also.

    Mike.
     
  20. Trux

    Trux 21 AG

    CROSSING THE CHANNEL.

    The Convoys.
    Confusingly convoys had similar designations to the assault groups.

    Convoy O1.
    A fast convoy sailing from Portland on D-1. It used Channel 3 and was to arrive in the assault area on the first tide. It consisted of:
    AGC. Flag.
    4 APA. Attack Transports.
    3 AP. Transports.
    2 LSI(L). Landing Ship Infantry (Large)
    3 LSI(H). Landing Ship Infantry (Hoist)
    3 LSI(S). Landing Ship Infantry (Small).
    4 LCH. Landing Craft Headquarters.
    33 LCI(L). Landing Craft Infantry (Large)
    1 HDML. Harbour Defence Motor Launch.

    1 LCD. Landing Craft Dock carrying 20 LCM, each carrying one Sherman M4 tank. This sailed separately and was to arrive after daylight.

    Convoy O2 A.
    A slow convoy sailing from Portland on D-1. It used Channel 4 and was to arrive in the assault area on the first tide. It consisted of:
    127 LCT 5 and 6.
    2 LCT 4. Loaned from Force B
    5 LCC. Landing Craft Control.
    7 LCF. Landing Craft Flak.
    5 LCG. Landing Craft Gun.
    2 LCT (CB)
    8 LCT(A)
    8 LCT(HE)
    9 LCT(R). Landing Craft Rocket.
    1 HDML. Harbour Defence Motor Launch.
    28 LCP(L) Smoke.
    6 LCM Salvage.

    Convoy O2 B.
    A slow convoy sailing from Portland on D-1. It used Channel 4. It consisted of:
    10 LST towing 10 Rhino Ferries.
    1 Fighter Direction Tender.

    Convoy O3.
    A slow convoy sailing from Portland on D-1. It used Channel 3 and was to arrive on the second tide. It consisted of:
    14 LST towing 10 Rhino Ferries.
    12 stores coasters joined at Area Z.


    The following convoys were destined in whole or in part for Omaha but did not sail with the assault group.

    Convoy OC
    A slow sailing from the Solent on D Day and scheduled to arrive on the second tide. It consisted of:
    8 stores coasters.

    Convoy O4.
    A far shore service convoy sailing from Poole on D-1 and scheduled to arrive on the afternoon of D Day. It consisted of:
    6 LCM Salvage.
    65 LCM(3).
    36 LBV. Landing Barge Vehicle carrying stores.
    6 Fuelling trawlers.
    3 LBW. Landing Barge Water.
    20 LBO. Landing Barge Oil.
    8 LBE. Landing Barge Emergency Repair.

    Convoy O5.
    A far shore service convoy sailing from Poole on D Day and scheduled to arrive on the morning of D+1. It consisted of:
    65 LCM(3).
    36 LBV. Landing Barge Vehicle.
    3 Fuelling trawlers.
    2 LBW. Landing Barge Water.
    6 LBO. Landing Barge Oil.
    8 LBE. Landing Barge Emergency Repair.
    2 LBK. Landing Barge Kitchen.

    In addition each of the 64 LSTs of the 2nd and 3rd tides were to leave 4 LCVP. This would make a total of 256 LCVP which would report for duties off the beaches.

    In addition to the Rhino Ferries the LSTs were to tow
    28 causeways to arrive on the 1st tide of D+1.
    2 Large barges to arrive on D+1.
    3 Large barges to arrive on D+2.
    3 Large barges to arrive on D+3.

    On June 5th the group sailed from Portland. Convoys left in carefully calculated order so that they would arrive in the correct order. Transports and LCI(L)s were formed into fast convoys capable of maintaining 10 knots. Other craft were formed into slow convoys travelling at 5 knots. LSTs were normally capable of maintaining 10 knots but were towing Rhino Ferries and so restricted to 5 knots. They sailed along a swept lane to Area Z off the Isle of Wight. There Harbour Defence Motor Launches were stationed to mark the turning point into the correct cross channel lanes. Force O was to use Lanes 3 for fast convoys and Lane 4 for slow convoys. By night the launches flashed their channel number and by day they flew the appropriate numeral flag, 3 or 4.

    The battleships and cruisers of the Bombarding Force crossed the Channel independently and at high speed. However they were timed to use the swept channels to avoid slow moving small craft. Destroyers of the Bombarding Force acted as escorts to various groups until they left to take up bombardment positions.

    The whole of Assault Group O2 had cleared the German mine belt by 0030 hours D Day and the leading transport of Force O, Flagship Ancon, anchored in the Transport Area at 0251. Other transports anchored in their respective Transport Areas soon after. They started lowering their landing craft and embarking troops almost immediately.

    Off Omaha West the troopships Charles Carroll, Thomas Jefferson and Empire Anvil arrived and anchored in line abreast (the British anchored in line astern). Normal practice on US transports was for the boats to be lowered and then troops boarded them using scrambling nets. Once loaded the craft had to circle until they were ordered to form line astern for the long trip to shore. They would form line abreast some 2,000 yards from shore.

    APA 28 Charles Carroll would be the command ship until she left in the afternoon. On board were the Naval Commander Assault Group O2, the army Colonel commanding 116 Regimental Combat Team and a representative of the Allied Air Force.

    A Landing Craft Headquarters, LCI(L) 86, acted as stand by headquarters ship, ready to assume command if any mishap should befall the Charles Carroll. It would assume command anyway when the Charles Carrol left. As well as the Deputy Senior Officer Assault Group O2 the LCH had the deputy commander of 112 Regimental Combat Team on board.

    Since the large LSTs were vital to the follow up and build up lifts of vehicles each Assault Group was only allowed to use six of them on the first tide. Assault Group O2 had LST 310, LST 315, LST 316, LST 317, LST 332 and LST 372. These would arrive at the same time as the transports having used the slow channel. They would wait in the LST line to seaward of the transport area until called further forward to discharge their DUKWs. They would then prepare the remaining vehicles for loading onto the Rhino Ferry which each of them towed. LSTs also lowered LCVPs. Each LST was to leave four LCVP in the assault area.

    The various waves of LCTs and LCIs were timed to arrive at the Transport Area just as they were required to proceed towards the shore. They should not need to anchor and wait. There were seventeen LCI(L) and fifty four LCT(6).

    Mike.
     
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