The stop order for Blaskowitz had good reasons: In April 1945, plans were indeed still being spun that border on the fantastic and document the complete loss of reality of the OKW: In the "lee" of the 11th Army (General of the Artillery Lucht) in the Harz Mountains, the deployment of the 12th Army (General der Panzertruppe Wenck) in the Dessau area was ordered. At the same time a tank corps (XXXIX. Panzerkorps, General der Panzertruppe Decker) was formed in the Lüneburg Heath The OKW had planned to send the 12th Army from the Dessau - Roßlau area proceed to the Harz mountains, there to join the 11th Army . The XXXIX. Panzerkorps was also supposed to push forward from Uelzen via Braunschweig to the Harz. These combined forces should now turn westwards to Heeresgruppe B (Generalfeldmarschall Walter Model), which was encircled in the Ruhr Basin, and build a new front together. On this occasion, it seems Blaskowitz was then to advance southwards if possible in order to close this gigantic cauldron: a „Super Cannae“ par excellence Obviously this plan was based on the idea to establish a separate piece with the Western Allies, who are regarded as war-weary. The divisions thus freed up would then be ready for the final Decisive battle in the East has become free. The death of Roosevelt on 12 April 1945 fired the fantasies in the Führer's headquarters even further - there were seen analogies to the death of the Czarina Katharina in the 7-year war. Such an operation would have been extremely ambitious even with troops of the quality of 1941. With was actually there in April '45, it seems like a mad grotesque: The XXXIX. Panzerkorps consisted of at most 100 armoured vehicles of all types, usually worn out vehicles from driving schools. In addition there were about 5000 men personnel, mostly from training units. The 11th and 12th army together had at best corps strength, but without structure or resources... In reality, only the XXXIX. Panzerkorps attacked with almost 60 tanks and armored vehicles of all kind and 3000 men (!) The first goal was to capture Braunschweig. Due to the situation three battle groups marched separately to the south, where the last splinters came about 40 kilometres before they were smashed
To me this is a most interesting piece of information - thanks, Harry Ree. Busch is of interest to me because I wrote a book on the German Infantry Regiment No. 56 in WW1 - this unit had its garrison in my hometown Wesel and fought on the western front throughout WW1. I suppose that most would agree that this conflict very much shaped the decisions and actions of officers of his generation in WW2 - and it made them willing instruments of Hitlers war of aggression. Both photos are from the municipal Archives of Wesel
WW1 was a shaping experience for German generals – and also for many lower level commanders of that generation who led regiments and batallions. I am summarizing some of the findings of Felix Römer who published „Comrades: Inside the German Wehrmacht“. He stresses the signifcance of this level of command for the stubbornness in defence. Not too original is this part of his analysis: The militaristic values of German society before 1914 were powerful – any man in uniform counted more that a civilian. The image of the officer was extremely high, the best thing one could aspire to was becoming an officer. Added to this was the experience of battle in WW1 – violence was an everyday factor for these men. The defeat of 1918 and the revolution further radicalized many of these officers. They adhered to an all pervasive extreme nationalism and were fixated on military solutions and war. „National Socialism“ was in many regards – but in varying degrees - congruent with their world view. This was coupled with what German officers perceived as military „virtues“. Being a soldier and fulfilling the standards of the „ethos of the soldier“ became an end in itself. They wanted to display „professionell skill“ as well as courage, strength of nerves and toughness or steeliness. Ruthlessness was an effective expression of these qualities and a means to counter any semblance of cowardice or hesitation. To be accused of incompetence by one’s peers or superiors was feared most, and there was a constant fear to lose face and to harm one’s reputation. In battle this meant: „Failure“ was deemed to be a worse accusation than inhumane conduct or recklessness. Orders were executed to the last, commanders did not use the wriggling room that sometimes offered itself (especially under the German system of „mission-type tactics“). Rather, they were extremely keen to display their sense of duty to the utmost. These factors overrode all doubts even when faced with averse circumstances, absurd orders and hopeless situations. The Nazi leadership could count on these men and their idea of „soldiering“. War was not „the continuation of politics with different means“ but rather a „way of life“ for this officer caste. Interestingly, this was not only the case for generation of officers shaped by WW1 but also for those brought up under Nazi rule from 1933 – again in an extremely militaristic environment.
Many thanks for your interesting post Alberk. I would very much like to have read Römer's book but at over £50 on Amazon it's sadly a bit outside my price range. In the Epilogue to my book I mention the deep-seated militarism that had its foundations laid way well before the Nazi era but I suspect there would have been additional facts I could have drawn from Römer. Oh well, perhaps in the second edition!
That is a bit steep. I notice it was published in the UK only last year. Here, it has been around for some years. The German version ins available as a paperback for 14 Euros. What comes across in this book is that the Germans considered themselves to be the best soldiers in the world and that they wanted to excel at what they were doing - hubris, I know, but this also was the standard many set for themselves. And there was the ambition to impress your peers with this. Still quite common here in Germany - in other professions, too. It's still the sweetest reward to hear others who grudgingly admit: "He knows his stuff", or "Maybe he's an a...hole, but he knows what he's doing..." Well, I should not be stereotyping here - but I suppose it's just about ok when one talks about his own people. And, admittedly, it is a trait that I share.
The confidences of the confessional! As a former soldier I am torn two ways with regard to the Wehrmacht of 1945. In one way I hold elements of it in high regard in that they fought to the end despite all; but against that they were fighting to support a criminal regime that had absolutely no regard for its servicemen and was only interested in the continuance of the war in order to keep itself in power. Countless thousands - German and Allied - died unnecessarily as a result of this.
The fighting quality of an army is one thing. Another question is: Which regime does it serve? The German military leaders of the 1920s - i.e. the top ranks of the Reichswehr - professed to be „unpolitical soldiers“ and kept some distance to the democratic Weimar Republic. When Hitler came to power the same leaders immediately gave up their „unpolitical“ stance. „Keeping their distance“ was replaced by embracing the new regime enthusiastically - from then on they were on a slippery slope.
One should add that "keeping their distance" to the democratic Weimar Republic was not "unpolitical" at all - it was an arrogant act of quiet defiance. And it was not the military leadership alone that displayed this attitude - it was shared by other elites and millions of Germans - Hitler did not have to twist their arms.
